Hay, Paul, marquis du Chatelet

THE POLITICKS OF France.

By *Monsieur* P. H. *Marquis of* C.

Sir John Cordon. M.D.

WITH

REFLECTIONS

On the 4th and 5th Chapters:

Wherein he Censures the *Roman* Clergy, and the *Hugonots*; by the Sr. *l'Ormegregny.*

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The Authors

EPISTLE

TO THE

FRENCH KING.

SIRE,

ALL the Nations of the Earth wait with impatience for the Oracles which Your Majesties high Wisdom disposeth it self to pronounce: and the whole Universe, by submitting to the Laws which you are about to give this Kingdom, will declare, That You alone deserve to Command all men. If the Delphique Priestess scrupled not to style Lycurgus *a God, for his having setled the* Spartans *in order; what must not Fame say, when it shall publish Your Majesties Auguste Name? Future ages, Sire, shall proclaim aloud what You perform in Yours; and report the splendour of Your Heroick Virtue. Happy the People who already find the*

effects of it: but a Thouſand times Happy they of Your Majeſties Subjects, whom You permit to offer at Your feet ſome token of their Admiration. You have often done me the Honour to grant me this precious Favour; and I beſeech with loweſt reſpect, that You further pleaſe to accept the Piece I now preſent You. It ſatisfies not the greatneſs of my Zeal, that during the courſe of my Life, I inceſſantly ſpeak of the Paſſion I have for Your Service; my Writings muſt inform Poſterity of it after my death; and the whole world ever know to what degree I am,

Sire,

Your Majeſties moſt humble, moſt obedient, and moſt faithful Subject and Servant,

P. H. D. C.

The

THE PREFACE

THE Bookseller will needs have a Preface to encourage the Sale of the Book. Now, for my part, I think there needs no other recommendation than its Title; for those that will not be induced to buy it because 'tis French, will not fail to have it for the sake of its Politick's; yet, if any should scruple laying out their money only on the Credit of the Title page, their Scruple (I doubt not) will be removed when they are told that the Author of the Growth of Popery, says; That this Book is the measure of the French Kings designs, and I'm sure there's none of us all that will be-grudge Two Shillings to be made Privy to His Councels. But if neither of these things, nor the Credit it had in its native Language, will cause the Book to sell, I can't imagine how a Preface should do it; for I know few (if any) that read the Preface of a Book they intend not to read also; I have known some, indeed, read the Book, and omit the Preface, which I doubt would be the fate of this, should I make it long, I shall therefore only tell you how this Scheme of the vast designs

of

of the French *King became publick, and ſo conclude. The Author was a perſon bred up under Mr.* Colebert, *and to ſhew his abilities, he writ this Treatiſe, and in Manuſcript Preſented it to the* French *King, which was favorably received; but afterward, vanity prompting him to Publiſh it in Print, the King look't upon him as one that had diſcovered His Secrets, and turned his Favour into Frowns: cauſed him to be Impriſonned in the* Baſtile: *where he continued a long time, and was not deliverd thence, but to Baniſhment, which, to thoſe that read the Preface, affords one Encouragement the more to read the Book ſince it diſcovers a Secret which moſt men ſeek more after, and delight more in, than Wiſdom or Truth*

Pour Monſieur de C. *ſur ſon traitte de la politique* Francoiſe.

Sixain,

Si donner de moyens au plus grand Roy du monde,
D'Eſtre Maiſtre abſolu ſur la terre & ſur l'onde,
C'eſt marque d'un Eſprit, & rare & marveilleux;
Je puis dire en d'epit de toute la critique,
Que ce traitte de politique,
Ne fut dicte que par les dieux.

To this effect.

If that to give the Great *French* King in hand,
The means to ſway o're all, both Sea's, and Land;
If this be Wit, (which none can well deny)
Then to the Teeth of all Critiques,
I'le maintain theſe Politiques
Are Wit, above the sky.

THE POLITICKS OF France.

CHAP. I.

1. *What the Politicks are.* 2. *What their object, end, and means.* 3. *The different ſorts of Governments.* 4. *That Monarchy is the beſt.*

THE Politicks are the Art of Governing States. The Ancients have call'd e'm a Royal and a moſt Divine Science, ſurpaſſing in excellency, and ſuperiour to all others. They have allow'd

them the ſame precedence in practical Learning, which the Metaphyſicks and Theologie, have among the Speculative.

The means which the Politicks preſcribe, are compriſed under the heads of an exact obſervance of Religion, a doing Juſtice in all caſes; a providing that the people be protected in the times of Peace and War; and a preſerving the State in a juſt and laudable mediocrity, by exterminating the extremes of Poverty and of Riches.

The Politicks have Three principal branches: namely, the Three ſorts of regular Governments, in which men live under the Authority of Laws.

The Firſt is Monarchy, in which one only Prince doth command for the Publick good.

The Second is Ariſtocracy; in which the honeſteſt and wiſeſt perſons, being elected out of all the Subjects, have the direction and adminiſtration of Publick affairs.

The Third is Democracy, in which all deliberations and orders are held, and do paſs by the agency and vote of the People.

The principal end to which a Democracy tendeth, is Liberty. That of an Ariſtocracy, is Riches and Virtue. The end of a Monarchy is, the Glory, the Virtue, the Riches, and the Liberty of the Country.

A Tyranny, the moſt dangerous of all vicious

vicious and unlawful Governments, ſtands in direct oppoſition unto Monarchy.

A Tyrant commandeth meerly for his own perſonal, not the Publick profit: A King do's the contrary.

Tyranny is deſtructive to the Glory, the Virtue, the Riches, and the Liberty of the People.

An Ariſtocracy often falls into an Oligarchy; and this happens when a determinate number of perſons is no longer choſen out of the whole to govern, and the choice is made of the Rich and Noble only; not generally out of all the Citizens.

Sometimes there riſeth up Oligarchy, even within Oligarchy; and this comes to paſs, when the Magiſtrates are choſen of the nobleſt and richeſt of ſome preferred Families, not of all the rich Gentry.

An Ariſtocracy is in ſome ſort an Oligarchy, but much better then that which is ſimply ſuch: foraſmuch as in an Ariſtocracy, Juſtice is adminiſtred to perſons of all ranks, according to deſert; which in an Oligarchique State is not done.

A well-temper'd Ariſtocracy is of long duration, and ſeldom comes into the danger of ſuffering any Change.

An Oligarchy, on the contrary, ſuch as was the Government of the *Decem-Viri*, or Ten, at *Rome*, and of the Thirty at *Athens*, is eaſily corrupted. For the perſons who

are in command, do frequently uſurp a Soveraign Authority. Such uſurpation is not ſtiled a Tyranny; (for this is of one alone) but ſtrictly a Dynaſtie; that is, a Potentacy or Power, violently aſſumed and retained, contrary to the diſpoſition of the Laws. The *Greeks* (whoſe the word Dynaſtie is) do take it, in this caſe, in an ill ſenſe.

An Ariſtocracy and an Oligarchy are diſſolved, when ſome one among the Rich, the Noble, or the Brave, do's attain to an overgrown height. Thus *Cæſar* became Maſter of *Rome*. The *Ariſtocracy* is alſo in danger when they that govern come into contempt with the multitude, or are hated by them, ſo that the inferiours grow factious, and mutiny againſt them, as hapned at *Rome*, when the Tribunes of the People were firſt created.

The apprehenſions which the more then ordinary virtue of ſome excellent perſons, gave the people of *Greece*, cauſed the introducing of Oſtraciſme among the *Athenians*, and of Petaliſme at *Syracuſe*: Puniſhments, but glorious for ſuch as were condemn'd to them.

A Democracy likewiſe, ſometimes, turns into an Oligarchy. And that is, when the dregs of the ignorant people, ſeduced by evil Orators, (whom the *Greeks* call Demagogues, or Leaders of the people) do diſpoſe of affairs tumultuouſly, with uproar and

and violence, without reſpect to Law or Equity. Thus the *Athenians*, ſeduced by their ſpeakers, did put to death *Ariſtogenes*, and other Captains who had fought in company with *Thraſibulus*, and gain'd a notable Victory upon the *Lacedemonians*, their enemies.

Oligarchies are the means ſometimes that People loſe their liberty, and fall into ſervitude. *Piſiſtratius* became Tyrant of *Athens* that way, and *Dionyſius* of the *Syracuſians*.

There are as various Monarchies, Ariſtocracies, and Democracies, as there are different manners of men. But I have diſcours'd all this only curſorily; and I deſign not any further to engage my ſelf in theſe matters, my purpoſe being to ſpeak preciſely of the concerns of the *French* Monarchy.

There are two ſorts of Monarchy, unto which all Regal Governments, of whatever quality imaginable, are reduced; whether Elective, Hereditary, Barbarous, Deſpotical, or any other.

The firſt of theſe is entituled, The *Lacedemonian*; in which the King hath but a limited Authority. The ſecond *Æconomical*; in which the King hath a Soverain and Abſolute power in his Kingdom, as the Father of a Family hath in his houſe.

'Tis no longer a queſtion, Whether Mo-

narchy be the beſt Government, the caſe having been often debated by Politicians, and ſtill decided for Regality. And indeed it is of greateſt Antiquity, leaſt ſuſceptible of change; moſt conform unto the Government of GOD himſelf; and not only repreſents the Authority which a Father exerciſeth in his houſe, but it alſo neceſſarily occurs in an Ariſtocracy, and in Democracy it ſelf. For, both in the one and the other of theſe States, the Soveraignty is entirely one; ſo that no ſingle perſon can poſſeſs any the leaſt parcel of it. In an Ariſtocracy, no one of the Senators is a Soveraign; but the whole Senate being united of one accord, is King. In a Democracy, no one of himſelf hath power to make the leaſt Ordinance; the People aſſembled are the Monarch. Thus every where appears an indiviſible Soveraignty; ſo conform to the Laws of Nature is Monarchy.

In fine, it may be ſaid, that there never was Ariſtocracy, but founded upon the corruptions and ruins of ſome Monarchy: moreover, that Tyranny, it's direct contrary, is the worſt of all Governments. Now from all that I have ſaid, it follows by a neceſſary conſequence, That the Monarchique State is better than any other.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

1. *Of the true good and happineſs of States.* 2. *Of the true good and happineſs of a King.* 3. *How Felicity may be acquired.*

THings reckon'd under the notion of Good, are of three ſorts. Corporal, as Health, Beauty, Strength, Agility, and the like. External, which we commonly call Goods of Fortune; as Birth, Riches, Dignities, Reputation, Friends, and ſuch others. The third ſort are thoſe of the Soul: theſe are ſimply and abſolutely good, that is, good of themſelves; and ſo they can be no other but virtue alone.

Things accounted good are no further ſuch indeed, than as they promote our Felicity, and bring us to it; Corporal and External things are not inſtruments to effect this. But the good of the Soul is the true happineſs.

Felicity is not a ſimple habit; otherwiſe a man aſleep would be happy: but it conſiſteth in action, which is the true uſe of Virtue.

The Soul makes us capable of living happily: for happineſs is meaſured by virtue: nor can we be counted happy, but pro-

portionably as we are counted good.

The intention of Political Science is, to bring to pass, that men lead their lives happily; as I have obſerv'd in the precedent Chapter. 'Tis therefore certain, that it requires they be actually virtuous.

All that I have been diſcourſing is of conſtant and confeſſed truth. Whence clearly reſults, That the Politicks conſider virtue in a much more noble manner than Ethicks do; for theſe, confining themſelves to the forming of idle ſpeculations, can produce but an imperfect felicity, which the Schools do call Theoretical. The Politicks on the contrary go further, and cauſing us to exerciſe virtue, do give us a Practical, that is, ſolid and perfect Felicity.

In fine, it is not doubted, but the Act is preferrable to the habit. Beſides, the Ethical or Moral diſcourſes of virtue, can have no other aim, but at moſt, the welfare of particular perſons; which do's not always produce that of the Publick: And the Politicks, regarding the welfare of an whole State, provide at once for that of each particular; as a good Pilot, in endeavouring the ſafety of his Ship, procures neceſſarily, the ſafety of all that are embarqued in it. Alſo, the care of the welfare of particular perſons, ſeems to be beneath the Politicks, except ſo far as it is neceſſary for the publick good. Yet ſometimes particular men

men muſt of force ſuffer for the publick good; as when a Malefactor is puniſhed, and when ſome houſes are pull'd down to ſave a Town from Fire, and from Enemies.

The happineſs of a State is of the ſame quality with that of particular perſons. For as we ſay a man is happy when he hath ſtrength, riches and virtue; in like manner we ſay a Common-wealth is happy when it is potent, rich, and juſtly governed.

A Monarch is, in reference to His State, what the Soul is to man. There is no doubt therefore, but that the proper goods of a King are thoſe of the Soul: and that he can poſſeſs no other. Fortune being beneath a true Soveraign, and extrinſick to Him, cannot give him ought of that kind from Gold or Glory: All that He hath doth ariſe from His own Virtue. His Power, His Treaſures, and the various effects of beneficence which He holdeth in His hand, do not conſtitute His happineſs: as GOD Himſelf is not bleſſed by external bleſſings, but only confers them as a diſtribution made to His creatures, and that He may cauſe them by ſenſible means to experiment His goodneſs.

The Magnificence of a man renders him conſiderable, if his Spirit in it be Great and Heroick.

But it is not enough to have ſpoken of

that which conſtitutes felicity, we muſt take ſome accompt of the means which conduce unto it.

Nature, Conſtancy and Reaſon, do contribute to endue us with virtue. The two former do enrich the mind, and diſpoſe it to receive virtue; then reaſon, being cleared by the light of precepts, makes it ſpring up, and cultivates it.

Of all Precepts, thoſe of greateſt efficacy are the Political, which being indeed Laws, do command and oblige men to obey, in a mannner, blindly: neceſſitating and conſtraining us to live well whether we will or no. 'Tis upon this ground it hath been ſaid, That there lies no ſervitude at all in ſubmitting to the power of the Law; and that it's the proper act of men truly free, to reduce their inclinations, and ſubject their practice to the ſame: foraſmuch as the conforming of life and manners to the impulſes of virtue, which is always right, always uncorrupt, is in truth a ſetting our ſelves at full liberty, and an enfranchiſement from the Empire of importunate and irregular paſſions.

But of theſe general Theſes enough. It is time at length to enter upon the ſubject which occaſion'd my taking up the deſign of this preſent Treatiſe.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

1. *Of the* French *Monarchy.* 2. *Of the Scituation and Quality of* France. 3. *Of the Nature of the* French.

THE Monarchick Government doth not more excel other Governments, than the *French* Monarchy doth all other Monarchies on earth. It is hereditary, and for twelve whole ages there hath been ſeen Reigning from Male to Male, upon the Throne of *France*, the Auguſt Poſterity of *Meroue* of *Charlemagne*, and of *Hugh Capet*. For it is exactly proved, that theſe three races of our Kings, are Branches iſſued out of the ſame ſtock. This very Succeſſion, ſo Legitimate as it hath been, and ſo long continued, makes at preſent the ſureſt foundation of the welfare of the State; and carries in it Splendor, Reputation and Majeſty. Indeed, to how many ills are Elective Kingdoms expoſed? how many Cabals? how many Complottings; and in truth Wars, are kept on foot by ſo many different agitations? The one and the other *Roman* Empire, and the Kingdom of the *Poles*, do adminiſter ſenſible proofs of this Opinion.

If the *Spartans* heretofore did draw ſo great an advantage from the honour they had

had to be commanded by Princes of the blood of *Hercules*: the *French* have far greater cauſe to glory; ſince in the Catalogue of His Majeſties triumphant Anceſtors, there may be counted an hundred *Heroes* greater than *Hercules* himſelf.

Is there a Monarch in the world, whoſe juſt power is more abſolute than that of our King? and by conſequent, is there a Monarchy comparable to the *French* Monarchy? It is neceſſary that the power of a good King be not confin'd within other bounds than reaſon and equity do preſcribe: otherwiſe there will ever be diviſion between Princes and People, to the ruine of them both. What a diſorder would it be in man, if the eye or hand ſhould fail of following the impulſes of the Soul? this diſobeying and rebellious member would prove dead, or ſeized with a Palſie. If then the whole body ſhould fall into an univerſal revolt againſt the Spirit of Man, all the Symmetry, the order and œconomy would be utterly defaced. Thus the Subjects in a Monarchy, once ceaſing to yield their King a full Obedience, and the King ceaſing to exerciſe His Soveraign Authority over them, the Political Ligatures are broken, the Government is diſſolved, by little and little all is reduced to extream calamities, and oft-times to Anarchy, and an annihilation. Such are the inconveniencies that occur in

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Royalties of the *Lacedemonian* kind, where the Prince hath but a limited Authority; and if all that *England* ſuffer'd in the late times were pourtray'd here, it would be eaſie to obſerve of what importance it is unto the felicity of a Monarchy, that the Prince do in it command without reſtriction. In fine, the obedience of inſtrumental parts, as thoſe of Organical bodies, and the Subjects of a State, is of ſo indiſpenſible a neceſſity, that the common good and conſervation of that Whole, which they compoſe, depends upon it. In Democracies, even the moſt tumultuous and diſorderly, all muſt bow under the will of the multitude, though blind, ignorant, and ſeduced: in like manner, the parts of the bodies of Brutes muſt act by their motions, though they be in rage and madneſs. And the reaſon of this neceſſity is, that the Body and the Soul, which is the form thereof, are but one indiviſible Whole; ſo a King and Subjects are together but one Whole, that is, one State.

In fine, the *French* Monarchy is accompanied with all the mixture that can be deſired for a compleat and perfect Government. The Counſellors of State do compoſe an excellent Oligarchy in it; The Parliaments, and other Officers of Judicature, do form an Ariſtocracy; The Provoſts of Merchants, the Mayors, the Conſuls, and

the

the General Eſtates do repreſent rarely well limited Democracy; ſo that all the different modes of governing by Laws, being united in the Monarchy, do render it as excellent and conſummate, as reaſon can propoſe. The Regality of *France* is therefore of the Æconomick kind; in which the King hath an abſolute power in his State, as the Father of a Family in his houſe; and though he govern at His pleaſure, and without contradiction, it is alway for the good of His Kingdom: even as the Maſter of an houſe do's rule it with an entire Authority, and inceſſantly provides for the accommodating of this Family. There is nothing Deſpotical nor Barbarous in *France*, as in the States of the *Moſcovites* and *Turks*. In ſhort, our Laws are holy and equitable, to a greater degree than in any Common-wealth that ever was; and they are conceived with ſo much prudence and judgment, that they are apt to make the people happy in the gentle times of peace, and enable them to triumph in the occaſions of War.

The ſcituation and compactneſs of *France* are known to all the world; ſo that it would be a needleſs labour, ſhould I here expatiate, to ſhew the beauty and richneſs of our Grounds and of our Rivers: or declare, how we abound in Wine, in Corn, in Silk, in Wools, in Cloth, in Wood, in Cattel, in Salt, in Mines, and in Money; how-

how neceſſary we are to our Neighbours; and to what degree we may forego their Succours and their Merchandiſe. I might juſtly be accus'd of a fondneſs for ſuperfluous diſcourſe, if I ſhould particularly conſider all theſe great advantages; and as much, if I ſhould ſpeak of the pureneſs of the Air, and the incredible number of Inhabitants: the moſt ignorant having a full and an aſſured knowledge of e'm. I ſhall only ſay, that it need not be wondered at, if men whom Fortune brings forth, and breeds up in ſo excellent a Climate, be capable of handſomly contriving, and ſucceſsfully executing the haughtieſt enterpriſes. In fine, its an unſpeakable ſatisfaction to a man that ſets himſelf to treat of the Politicks of *France*, that he may know the *French*, of all the people upon earth, are the moſt ſuſceptible of Learning, of Policy, and of Government. For if one conſider the ſcituation of the Country, he may be aſſured, that the conſtellations of Heaven are eminently favourable to it. The experience and skill of the Ancients do inform us, that the ſcituation of Regions is the prime cauſe of the temperature of the men in e'm; as it is of the quality of the Plants and Fruits which they produce.

The Laws of this State being ſo Judicious as they are, do argue the Wiſdom of thoſe that Enacted them, and of the people that

that accepted them; whereof the long duration of the Monarchy is a ſecond proof.

On the other hand, the great acts of the *French* do ſpeak their Valour. They ſerve in our age, for examples to all nations in matter of execution; and not only ſo, but are as eminent likewiſe for their Counſels: And they have choice of the beſt Generals on earth to lead Armies, as well as of the beſt Soldiers. That heat and impetuoſity which is taken to be viſible in all their attempts, is an effect of their high courage; and the confidence they ſhew, with ſomewhat leſs of reſtraint and reſpect than prudence could wiſh, can be imputed to nothing but their fearleſneſs: In fine, the Emperour *Charles* the Fifth declared with very much judgment, That the *French* ſeem'd to be Fools, but were really wiſe.

Now ſince we know what *France* is, let us examine what may moſt conduce to the well-governing of it, to the conſerving it in plenty, and in reputation; in what it may be augmented, and how its intereſts with the neighbouring States ought to be ſecured. In a word, let us ſee what way may be taken to maintain the parts that compoſe it, in ſo regular an harmony, that they may all inceſſantly contribute to the weal of the Monarchy.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

1. *Of the Clergy.* 2. *Useful means to obstruct Frauds in Beneficiary cases.* 3. *Of the Monastick Religious of each Sex.*

OUr Ancestors have ever been great observers of Religion. Long before the coming of JESUS CHRIST, the *Druids* were their Priests, and had an entire direction, not only of affairs relating to the service of their false Gods, but of those too which concern'd distributive Justice; even in the general Assemblies held by all the *Gauls*, whether for confirmation of Peace, or for reconciliation of disagreeing parties, who might embroil the Republiques, or whether the making of some common National enterprises was in question, still there was no resolution formed, but by their advice. No wonder then, if since the Truth of the Gospel appeared, and made known the holiness of Christianity, the Prelates have conserv'd so many Prerogatives and Considerations. They have been called to the Royal Counsels; they have assisted at the decision of the most important affairs, they have every where held the first rank; much hath been attributed to their

Judg-

Judgments, and the reſpect had for their Character and Dignity, hath gotten them great and ſignal priviledges, which have exempted them from contributing to the burthens of the State; though at the ſame time wealth was heap'd upon them by Alms and Foundations. But as Church-men, after the mode of the Court of *Rome*, uſe to convert whatever is freely granted them into a point of Religion; in ſuch manner, that by little and little, they engage the tender Conſciences of the faithful in vain ſcruples, and poſſeſs them with a ſuperſtitious fear of offending; they have not been wanting to aſſert and maintain, that theſe exemptions and priviledges were not liberally given them; that Kings did but ſettle them in poſſeſſion of an advantage which was by Divine Right inſeparable from their Profeſſion: that they, while Men of War fought for the Glory and Liberty of their Country, ſufficiently did their part, in lifting up, as was anciently done, their eyes and hands to GOD, to impetrate His powerful Protection: that their Arms were Prayer, Oblations, and Penitence, which they never forbore to uſe for the publick ſafety; that from the Caves and Deſarts whither they retired, they ſent up materials to the higheſt Heavens, which formed into Thunders there, might fall back upon, and beat down the enemies of the *French* name.

In

In fine, That if Gentlemen gave their blood, and the people their ſweat and labours for the welfare of the Kingdom, they day and night did pour out tears at the feet of Altars to diſarm the wrath of GOD. Upon ſuch reaſonings as theſe the Eccleſiaſticks have founded their pretences for poſſeſſing thoſe goods, of which, publick and private Piety had made them Proprietors, without concerning themſelves for what ſucceſs the general affairs of the State might have.

But this is not all, they have tried by divers reiterated attempts, to make themſelves maſters of all the Temporal Juriſdiction, and draw Civil cauſes unto their Tribunal: nor have they forgotten any pretext which they thought might promote this dangerous enterpriſe; ſometimes they have pleaded, That the Church alone having right to judge of the Validity of Marriages, as being a Sacrament, all that depended on e'm ought to be handled before Eccleſiaſtick Judges. Sometimes again, That Chriſtians binding themſelves in their Contracts by an Oath, the cogniſance appertain'd to them. Such Kings as perceived that theſe attempts did tend to the overthrow of their Authority, withſtood them with a right Kingly vigour. But what difficulties were there not of neceſſity to be overcome for a full attainment of their end? and what reſiſtance did not the Church-men make to maintain themſelves

ſelves in ſo unreaſonable an Uſurpation? Our Hiſtory affords us examples of it, which I cannot call to mind without grief and wonder. Their obſtinacy hath gone ſo very far, that they have forced our Kings to grant them Declarations upon unequitable and diſadvantagious conditions; and ſo capitulate with them both for the Tenths and Acknowledgments of the Lands which they poſſeſs; as alſo for the Rights of Mortmain and Indempnity. I cannot tell by what name I ſhould call theſe proceedings. Our Sirs of the Clergy could not doubt, but that being born Subjects of the Crown, nothing could releaſe them of this duty; and that the priviledges which they have, or rather which they have invaded, being founded upon the holineſs of their Character, could not extend to theſe temporal goods, which always are the States. Yet the old error is ſo potent, and their imagination ſo ſtrongly prepoſſeſs'd for theſe immunities, that they can ſcarce acknowledge the Kings Soveraignty to this day. What clamour did they not raiſe about the Arreſt of the laſt Commiſſion of Oyer in *Auvergne*? With what fervour did they charge their Deputies to remonſtrate to His Majeſty concerning it? Yet this Arreſt innovateth nothing; but is, in all reſpects, conform to the preſcript, and purſuant to the uſe of *Charles* the VIII. his Pragmatique.

tique Sanction, Kings and Emperors, never practic'd otherwise in such cases. Nor can it be deny'd, but that Religion coming, among others, under a Political consideration; and Kings being Protectors of the Church, of it's Doctrine. and of it's Canons, it's a part of their Office to notifie to men the Laws of GOD. The Tables were consigned to the hands of *Moses*, not to the hands of *Aaron*; and in the Temple of GOD, the Law of GOD was often heard by the people, from the mouth of their Kings. 'Tis upon this account that *Melchisedec* was both King and Priest; and 'tis from this intention that the Emperors confirmed the first Synods, that They sometimes gave judgments contrary to Synodical decisions; and that other Christian Princes have had liberty to receive, or not receive Councils, though legitimate and universal. Nothing is more consentaneous to perfect equity, than that the Gentlemen of the Clergy be obliged to contribute to the publick charges: They receive vast sums from the State; and what they pay to the King out of e'm, amounts not to a sixth part of what they duly ought to pay.

But to reduce them gently to reason, approaches must be made by degrees; and in ways that may be to them unperceivable. First, they may be calmly told of the right of Mortmain, which being part of the ancient

cient inheritance of the Crown cannot be alienated. They may ever and anon be put in mind, that Reſidence is of Divine Right; that it is unbecoming a Prelate, or an Eccleſiaſtick, to keep a great Table, to have a multitude of Pages, Horſes, Dogs; intimation may be made them, that the King intends to reſtore the ancient Law of Fiefs; by which all ſorts of perſons concerned, are obliged to ſet forth, at any time, a certain number of Soldiers, equipped and paid at their charge. In fine, they may be required to make a new valuation of ordinary Rents. For what pretext will they have to complain, or be diſcontented? Can they find any fault at all in it if His Majeſty doth put things in their Primitive State; which is the foundation of all publick Order and Diſcipline? Other inſinuative means may be ſet on work, which ſhall make no ſhew at firſt, yet may prove in the ſequel, of incredible advantage to the King's Affairs.

While I ſpeak here of the Clergy, I pretend not to ſpeak of any but Biſhops, Canons, Pariſh-Prieſts, and Chappellans. I know well, that taking the word *Clerus* in it's ancient latitude, it may be ſaid to comprehend all Chriſtians: but I extend it not ſo much as to Monaſticks; who in truth were, at their riſe, ſo far from having particular and conventual Churches, as now they

they have, that they were reckoned Laicks, that is, of the people, and had their places ſeparate from the Prieſts.

Whatever care Kings hitherto could poſſibly take to hinder frauds in Beneficiary matters, they have not been able to find means effectual for it: Their prudence hath been ſtill ſurmounted by the pravity of men, which never wanteth artifice and expedients in occaſions that concern their profit. However, theſe frauds are of ſuch a quality, and ſo important, in reference to the ſalvation of all Chriſtians, that the charitable ſagacity of the Laws ought to be indefatigably exerciſed about them: neither pains nor authority ſhould be ſpared, in a deſign whoſe accompliſhment is ſo neceſſary. And indeed, what miſchief doth not follow; for example, when a wicked man, by intruſion, gets poſſeſſion of ſome Benefice with Cure of Souls, all his Sacerdotal Functions are ſo many ſacriledges; (for he is a ſuſpended perſon, *ipſo facto*) all the Abſolutions he gives are null; the fruits of the Benefice cannot be his, becauſe he is not the lawful Guardian of it; and ſo his appropriating them to his uſe, is a continued Larceny; for which he is indiſpenſibly bound to make reſtitution. But be it a Biſhop that commits this act of intruſion; and all the Conſecrations of Prieſts which he ſhall ſolemnize are null, whence will reſult a nullity of all the Abſolutions thoſe pre-

pretended Prieſts ſhall give. What a concatenation of crimes? what a dreadful ſeries of evils! Simonies, Confidences, and other bad means which are uſed to finger Benefices, do tend to the ſame Conſequences. Sure, the cure of this malady, mortal to ſo many thouſands of Souls, is an atchievement worthy of a King.

I am of Opinion then, that to cut up the root of all theſe diſorders, the King might create a Secretary in his Council of Conſcience; and when this Officer is in poſſeſſion of his charge, a Declaration of His Majeſties ſhould come forth; by which, to obviate the great abuſes that have crept into Beneficiary matters, it ſhould be ordained, that all the Benefices in the Kingdom beRegiſtred by the ſaid Secretary of thatCouncil, and no diſpatch there made until the Deeds, upon which a Benefice is claimed, have been ſeen and ſigned,and placed in theRegiſter by the ſame Secretary, upon pain of the nullity of all that may have been petition'd for, and granted; Cognizance of all cauſes ariſing in conſequence of this Declaration, muſt be given to the Grand Council, and this addition of juriſdiction would facilitate the verification of it.

This Declaration would produce ſeveral advantages. One is, that there could be no more fraud uſed, in order to demiſſions, or to reſignations; and the Bankers of the Court

Court of *Rome*, would no longer have means to promote the cheats of pretenders to Benefices. Another is, that the King would exactly know all that the Church do's poſſeſs in *France*; which is a matter of extreme neceſſity, both for the regulating of the Tenths, and alſo for other conſiderations. A third advantage would be, that in proceſs of time this Secretary of Conſcience might make a Bank in the *Roman* Court, which is, to the King, of unſpeakable conſequence: for by this means, all the mony that goes into *Italy* out of *France* would be known; and upon ſuch knowledge it would be more eaſie for him to take his meaſures with the Pope and Colledge of Cardinals. A fourth advantage is, that the King, by degrees, might become Maſter of all the Benefices of the Kingdom, in the ſame manner as the Pope is Maſter of the Biſhopricks and Abbies; which would augment the Royal Authority. That I may explain my ſelf, I will reſume the thing from it's original. In the firſt Age of Chriſtianity, the firſt Biſhopricks were conferred without any Bulls from the Pope at all. Afterward He bethought Him, to ſend or write unto the Chapters, who then choſe the Biſhops, and recommended to them, to reſpect the merit of ſuch or ſuch a one, when they ſhould proceed to the Election. I think that *Alexander* the III. was the firſt inventer of theſe kind of

Letters; and they were called Bulls, because they were seal'd up with the Popes Seal, (*Bulla* being Latin for a Seal.) At the beginning, these Letters which the Popes thus sent, were but simple Letters of favour and recommendation: but it happning that the Chapters reverenced them, and that here and there, at least, one, who had obtained them, was chosen; all pretenders to Bishopricks came to believe, that it was necessary to obtain them. Thus, what was at first but, as hath been said, a recommendation, became at length a point of right and duty. Such was its rise. Now this being certain, there may be use made of the example: and thus, when a considerable Benefice should be vacant, the King might order, that a Letter be written to the Patron, and some person recommended to his nomination. There is no cause to doubt, but the Patron will nominate whom His Majesty hath thus recommended; so that insensibly it will grow a custom, to take the Kings recommendations, as other while persons did those of the Popes; and as the Bulls became at length necessary for Bishopricks and Abbies; so the King's Letters shall become necessary for all sorts of Benefices, and He render Himself Master of all Church-men. The King, in this, will have sufficient reason, because He being Protector of Religion, which is the prime Pil-

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lar of every State, it is His intereſt to know whether they that ſhall be provided of Benefices, be Orthodox and of good life; leaſt they ſpread ſome bad Doctrine among the people; for Hereſies and Scandals do cauſe diviſion in the Common-wealth, as well as Schiſms in the Church. Beſides, it concerns the tranquility of the State, that Curates, who have the direction of Conſciences, be well-inclin'd for the good of the Kingdom, and ready to keep particular perſons in their duty.

To deſcend now unto the caſe of the Monaſtick Religious, and find out a way (for rendring them uſeful to the State) to take them off from that lazineſs and loathſome beggery in which they live, as alſo reduce them to ſuch a number as may be proportionate to other ranks of men in the Kingdom. It is to be noted, that there are three ſorts of Monaſticks. The firſt is made up of the orders of S. *Auguſtin*, S. *Benedict*, *Bernard*, and *Premonſtrey*. Theſe are they that poſſeſs the bulkie riches of the Church, I mean the Abbies and Priories. The ſecond ſort comprehends the *Carthuſians*, the *Minimes*, the *Cæleſtins*, the *Feuillans*, and ſome others, who poſſeſs goods with propriety, and beg not but by toleration. The third kind is that of the meer Mendicants, who ſubſiſt by Alms, as do the *Jacobins*, the *Cordeliers*, the *Carmelites*, and their branches,

that is, the Reform'd, as they term e'm, who are iſſued from them. Theſe, notwithſtanding their vow of Monaſtick poverty, yet are not deſtitute of ſome foundations: but they plead for themſelves, that the Pope is Proprietor of the goods, they do but take the profits; which certainly is a vain and frivolous ſubtilty. The Female Religious being compriſed under theſe three kinds, there is no need to make of them a ſeparate Article.

There are too to many Monks. Its an abuſe ſo prejudicial to the Kingdom, that the King can no longer diſſemble it: it is time to take it ſeriouſly and effectually in hand. For Monks live in ſingle ſtate, they raiſe no Families, get no Children, and ſo are barren grounds that bring forth no fruit to the Crown. Beſide, the blind obedience by which they are tyed to the pleaſure of the Pope, doth form a forraign Monarchy in the very bowels of *France*; and into it they train along the credulous people, which is a thing of very great conſequence. This Politie is founded on the abuſive and pernicious maxims of *Rome*; which too are purely Political. For, that the obedience which Monaſticks give the Pope, is Religious, there is no colour to pretend: nor is there a Chriſtian but ſees what his duty binds him to in this caſe; and is altogether ſubject to his Holineſs in Doctrinals, with

out need of making particular vows to oblige him. The name of Religion in the matter, is but a phantasme, and a false pretext which the Court of *Rome* assumeth, to augment its temporal power, and to have its creatures in all quarters. By consequence the abuses ought to be retrenched, as was done by *Charlemagne* in his time, and sundry other great Kings.

But for the effecting of this I should not at all advise, that the attempt be openly made. For that would be to draw upon the undertakers, the importune clamours of all the Monks, and their Zealots; nay, to draw *Rome* upon their backs, which might cost them some trouble. In fine, it would be to draw on them the People; who are ever fond of novelties that surprise them, or are prejudicial to them, and always averse to those which they have foreseen, and are profitable for them. 'Tis therefore by-ways that must be taken. The first which seems to me fit to be pitcht upon, would be, to require of the Monastick communities, that they dispatch missions unto *America*, and the *Indies*, to convert the Salvages, and administer the Holy Sacraments to Christians. The Monks, who are commonly imprudent, will strain to set forth the greatest number of their fraternity they possibly may, in hope to make considerable establishments; thus there will be forwardness enough

enough to embarque. The preſent juncture is advantagious for this deſign. For they are charged with more perſons than they are able to maintain; charity being evidently cooled towards them. A ſecond means may be, to debar them the converſation of Women. It is ſcandalous to ſee Religious men receive viſits from them in Churches; and there, in preſence of the Holy Sacrament, ſpend whole Afternoons with them. For remedy it might be ordained, that they ſhould have Parlours, where women might go to conſult them. The thing is a point of decency; and Parlours, the *Carthuſian* Friars, and all Nuns, generally have. The third means might be, that the Fathers of ſuch as enter into Religion, ſhould pay an annual penſion to the Order, by way of Alms, during their Sons life; which is the practice in *Spain*. This Penſion, ſome will ſay, cauſeth in *Spain* an huge multiplication of Monks. But 'tis not the Penſion that fills the Cloiſters in that Country; 'tis the licence the Monks have to do what they pleaſe. In *France* they are not upon ſuch terms. A fourth means, is to oblige the Monaſticks to abide in their Convents, and not go abroad but very rarely, and for urgent affairs: ſo do the *Carthuſians*. A fifth, to embroil the Monks with the Biſhops; for which they are ſufficiently diſpoſed. A ſixth, to prohibit that children

of

of sixteen (when as yet they know not what they do) bind not themselves by vows, which engage them for the whole remainder of their lives: but remit that Ceremony till their 22*d.* year of age. The seventh means would be to suppress that Congregation, as they call it, among Monastick persons, (as for instance, there are the Congregations of S. *Maur*,) and command, that the Religious who make profession in an house, do there fix; not courting from Lower *Bretannie*, for example, unto *Paris*; nor incessantly changing, as their wont is, unless some indispensible necessity does oblige to such changes. The *Carthusians* keep in their houses, and run not from place to place: Nuns do the same. The Voyages of Monks, and all their transmigrations, have no other end, but to get an universal acquaintance. Beyond all this, it may be declared to the Monks, (at least 'tis a thing that should be done in its season) how that the King understands not their Monastick Profession does Exempt them from his Jurisdiction. Thus the Orders being purged from their impurities, will resume their ancient lustre, and be true seminaries of Doctrine and Sanctity. In fine, no person will doubt, but the King may take cognisance of all that concerns the external Policy of the Church; because this is in such sort annexed to the Government

of States, that not a Patriarch, nor eve
the Pope himſelf, can make any regulatio
of it without His Majeſties conſent.

That reaſon of State which preſſeth for
retrenching of the number of Monks, doe
alſo reflect upon Nuns; and that with th
more Juſtice, becauſe the greateſt part o
young Women, who become Votaries, ar
driven thereunto by the violence of thei
kindred. There will never want juſt mean
to hinder this abuſe from having a longe
courſe. As for inſtance, young women ma
be declared incapable of making vows be
fore 22 years of age at the leaſt. It ma
be enacted, that they never ſhall be Pro
feſſed, [*i. e.* ſetled of the Order] in th
Convent where they have had their Educa
tion, either as Penſionaries or Novices. Thi
would be well enacted. For oftimes th
Nuns, in hope to be gainers by their porti
ons, do flatter the ſilly maidens, and per
ſwade e'm to live with them. All kind o
humane inducements muſt be remov'd, an
the inſpirations of the Holy Ghoſt, left t
their full operation. It may again be or
dained, that Recluſes do take no mony, a
a portion, but only ſimple penſions yearl
for life, and thoſe likewiſe cautiouſly limi
ted. A Law too may be made, that th
Goods which might fall to a Daughter from
her Parents, and her collateral kindred
ſhould, at their deceaſe, fall to the State
and

nd the King by repreſentation, be inveſted with the ſame right to the Goods of the eceaſed as this Daughter had had, to re-ompence the Publick for the loſs ſuſtained y a Recluſe, being incapacitated to raiſe a amily. Further, a general regulation ight be made of all marriages of young omen, with due reſpect had to the quali- of each of e'm in particular; and it ight be ordered, that in caſe any of them ould take up a Religious life, they ſhould arry as much with them into Religion, as nto the married ſtate. For if the Order was, hat Daughters becoming Votaries, ſhould ave leſs Portions than thoſe that married, Fa-hers, ſo hugely covetous they are, would com-ell them to the Cloiſter. But when they ſhall ind no profit in taking this courſe, they will ather chooſe to diſpoſe of them in mar-iage, and make Alliances by that means.

This ſubject inclines me to ſay ſumma-ily, that the moderating of Portions is a iece of the ancient Civil Law of the *French*, nd of divers other Nations, in which Daughters had nothing at all. Thence it is, as ve ſee in the Cuſtoms, that a Nobleman is li-enſed to marry his Daughter with a Noſe-ay of Roſes, and ſhe becomes diſabled to retend to any other Portion, provided the Match be ſuitable and fitting. This moderati-on is neceſſary: foraſmuch as the vaſt wealth which is given to Daughters in marriage,

does incommode the richeſt houſes. More-over, Gentlemen themſelves would no more Contract undue Alliances; and ſo the Nobility recover their ancient eſteem. Young Womens Birth, their Beauty, their Diſcretion, their Virtue, and their Ability in the management of Domeſtick affairs, would be to them inſtead of Wealth. They would make it their care to lay up a rich ſtock of ſo many precious things, that perhaps it may one day come to paſs, that Men will, as heretofore they did, give mony to have Wives; whereas at preſent, Women do ſo to purchaſe Husbands. I have ſpoken here of Marriages occaſionally, I am well aware that the matter ought to be reſerved for another Chapter. To conclude, its a great ingredient of the Glory of a King, to honour the Holy See; to love and protect the Biſhops, to maintain the *Gallicane* Church in its Liberties; never ſuffer that any propoſitions be advanced any way, that may wound the Authority of the Canons; and employ all the rigour of his Ordinances againſt perſons, who ſhall have the raſhneſs to publiſh a ſuſpected or erroneous Doctrine.

Additions

Additions to CHAP. IV.

1. That Bishops ought to be near the King. 2. Of the Pension to be paid the Order for a Monk enter'd. 3. Monasticks cannot Alienate: therefore neither sell a Rent-charge. 4. They shall not have power to purchase.

I Have affirmed *Chap.* 4. That Bishops are obliged by command of GOD, unto residence. This is true: yet forasmuch as they are also the Kings Subjects, and Royal Dignity requireth, that His Majesty have Bishops about him, as the *Roman* Emperours after *Constantine* had; it is fit to ordain, That each Bishop be at Court three months every year, attending His Majesty, to honour Him; during which time they may negotiate their affairs; and the rest of the year abide fix'd in their Dioceses; the King assigning to each of them the months in which their presence will be needful.

In the same Chapter, I have said, That to prevent the vast number of Monks it should be ordained, that the Parents of such as enter into any Order, should pay an

an annual penſion to that Order during the perſons lives. The effect of this Law would be, that ſuch a penſion being a Monachal Right in form of Clericature given by act of State; they that would have Revenue enough to be Monaſticks, would have enough to be Secular Prieſts. And ſo perſons, whoſe Devotion ſhould incline them to take Orders, and conſecrate themſelves unto GOD, would rather chooſe to remain Seculars, than ſhut themſelves up in a Cloiſter all the remainder of their lives. Now the more to fortifie this Law, it ſhould be added, That Biſhops make no more Prieſts upon the Title of Poverty, upon penalty of maintaining them: the reaſon againſt it, as to Secular Prieſts, being as ſtrong in reference to Regulars; becauſe it is no leſs a diſparagement to the Clergy, that a Prieſt Monk do beg, and fall into extream poverty, (which may happen) than that one of the other rank do ſo.

It is manifeſt, that Monaſtick communities have no power to Alienate any thing; and that Monks do daily re-enter into their Eſtates, which they poſſeſſed heretofore. Hence it follows, that neither can they charge them with any Rents for mony taken up: foraſmuch as by theſe kind of Contracts, they Mortgage their Lands: but to engage an Eſtate in ſuch a manner, is to make a kind of Alienation.

'Tis

'Tis a fetch of the Benedictine Monks to take up mony for Rent to be paid by them; that so they may appear always poor, and have pretexts to solicite the liberality of devout people: also that they may have protectors; for the greater the number of their Creditors is, the greater is the number of persons interessed in their conservation.

Yet there is nothing more unjust than this custom: for there are Monastick Communities that owe more than all their Goods, moveable and immoveable, are worth. The Monks care not though their house be ruin'd, nor though they ruine some of their Creditors, provided themselves subsist. For by passing from one Convent to another, they are quitted of all the Debts they have created.

It greatly concerns the Publick to prohibit these kind of Contracts, that Monasticks may be kept from defrauding any man for the future; and to decree, that the Contractors shall pay the Rents Contracted for, and they bound to do it, both all in common, and each of them in particular: then that the Notaries be fined and declared incapable of bearing any office: or if insolvent, condemned to the Galleys for 101 years: moreover that the purchasers of such Rents shall, for their part, pay a mulct of 3000 *livres* to His Majesty, and the principal mony be converted to His use.

Besides,

Beſides, it would be very fit to require all Notaries, all Creditors of Monaſticks, and the Monaſticks themſelves to make Declaration of the Sums and Rents charged upon them, bring in the Contracts for the ſame before Commiſſioners nominated by the King to be Regiſtred, and this within a time expreſly limited; which being once paſs'd, no more ſhall be received; and all Contracts not Regiſtred, remain null, and as if they were cleared. This courſe would be very ſevere, but excellent to reduce the folk of the Cloiſter to reaſon.

There is an important obſervation to be made too, namely, that all the Contracts which Church-men have made, are utterly null, unleſs their Creditors can make it appear, that the mony they lent did turn to the profit of the Church, and that there was an authentick permiſſion to make ſuch Contracts. This Doctrine is a point of Law; for the Church is ever a Minor, and all that it poſſeſſeth hath come from the liberality of particular perſons; without whoſe conſent, or at leaſt the Magiſtrates, and ſuch as are capable of it, the Eccleſiaſticks can make no alterations in the Eſtates they have received. So that the King may not only forbid Contracts for the future; but alſo declare thoſe to be diſſolved which have been made heretofore, and diſcharge the Monaſteries of them. Debts have been

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annulled for leſs reaſons often. It muſt likewiſe be prohibited to Monks, and to the Church, to purchaſe any Eſtate in Land, or high-rents, upon pain of ſuch Contracts being null and void in Law; and the Sellers and Notaries incurring the fore-mentioned penalties.

Our Lords the Prelates have lately bethought them, and reſolved to compell ſuch Gentlemen as have Chappels in their Houſes, where the Sacrifice of the Maſs hath been at any time performed, to profane the ſaid Chappels, or endow them with Land for the maintenance of a Prieſt. This would be a means to gain the Church more than Two Hundred Thouſand Livres of Rent at one blow; wherefore it will be fit to ordain, that this enterpriſe of the Biſhops do not take effect; except in caſe of Chappels built hereafter, and built for other perſons.

CHAP. V.

1. *Of the* Huguenots; *and whether it be for the good of the State to put them out of* France. 2. *Politick means to extirpate their Hereſie.* 3. *Of their ancient Confeſſion of Faith.*

A King cannot have a more Illuſtrious Object of his Cares and Application, than the preſerving of that Religion which he hath received from his Anceſtors in the States he governs: becauſe diverſity of belief of Divine Service, and of Ceremony, doth divide his Subjects, and breeds Animoſities among them: whence ariſe Contentions, War, and in the end an univerſal defiance. Unity of belief, on the contrary, knits men together; and 'tis ſeldom ſeen, but that fellow-ſubjects who call upon GOD in one and the ſame Temple, and offer at the ſame Altars, do alſo fight with the ſame Arms, or under the ſame Banners. If this maxime be generally true in Chriſtian Politicks, and the Religion we profeſs the only one, as it is, that we can ſavingly embrace, the Princes are obliged to maintain it with all their Might,

ight, and employ that Soveraign Power
or the Glory of the true GOD, which they
old of his goodneſs. The *Pagans*, whoſe
articular conduct was ſo prudent and juſt,
nd who have left us ſo many Examples of
iſdom and virtue, made it their principle,
ot to ſuffer in their Republicks any novel-
y that thwarted the common and popular
elief; and they adher'd ſo peremptorily
nto it, that they would not ſo much as
ermit any man to undeceive them of their
rrors. The Books of *Numa Pompilius*,
which had been found near his Grave, and
ontained the ancient Religion of *Rome*,
he Senate cauſed to be burnt; becauſe the
retor *Rutilius*, who had been commiſſion'd
o read them, affirmed upon Oath, That
he Contents of e'm tended to ſubvert the
Religion which the People obſerved at that
ime. They refus'd, even to open their
eyes unto the light of truth, though known
o them, when they apprehended it would
e novel to the people. They rather choſe
o ſtick to Fables, which length of years
ad conſecrated among them, and the mul-
itude was through cuſtom addicted to.
Thus too the *Athenians* thought they did an
ct of neceſſary Juſtice in condemning *So-
crates* to death, for having taken on him
to perſwade the people that there was but
one only GOD. They knew however,
that in truth this Philoſopher was the Won-

der

der of his time, the Honour of the City and of all *Greece:* the diſcerning men amongſt them were convinc'd of the ſolidity of this Doctrine, and the Sect of the *Stoicks* made profeſſion of it; ſo that it muſt be confeſs'd, the fall of *Gentiliſm*, and ſubverſion of Idols, is an effect of the hand of GOD, who alone can work miracles of Grace and Omnipotence.

The Kings, His Majeſties Predeceſſors have ſet themſelves with unwearied diligence to preſerve the Catholick Religion inviolable: They have never failed to be Protectors of the Apoſtolick See, and the Church. They expelled the *Arrians*; they turned their Arms, and expoſed their lives againſt the *Albigenſes*; they vanquiſh'd e'm; they deſtroy'd e'm; they puniſh'd the Poor men of *Lions*. In fine, they have provided that Chriſtianity receive no harm in any places unto which their Authority extended. The laſt Age produced a new Monſter to oppoſe the Church. *France* ſaw him born in her boſom, and unhappily bred him up, with ſeveral complices of his Impiety and Revolt. Hiſtory will tell Poſterity how much blood was ſhed during the courſe of well nigh Fourſcore years to quell this dangerous Sect: and the world well know, that the Zeal there was to reduce Hereticks to their duty, did take up the Reigns of Six of our Kings; the glory of cutting off the laſt head

ad of this *Hydra*, being reſerved for his eſent Majeſty. But it is expedient to ſee at weapons muſt be uſed for an executi- ſo long expected.

There is no cauſe to doubt, but that upon Principles of Chriſtianity, and Maxims Policy, its neceſſary to reduce all the ngs Subjects to one and the ſame belief: d though they that make Profeſſion of pretended Reformed Religion, be now thout Arms, without Strong-holds, with- t Treaſure, without an Head, and with- t Allies; yet they are not out of caſe to feared. They ſtill retain a remembrance their boldneſs, and by-paſs'd Rebelli- s: they look back on the Towns they nce ſeized, and out of which they could ot be driven but by force of Arms, as if cy were their proper Inheritance, and had en unjuſtly pluck'd out of their hands; ey bear in their hearts the ſame averſion Order and Diſcipline, that they ever d; and their minds are always inclining revolt, and to Confuſion and Anarchy. diſquiets them not to think who ſhall ad them; they have Soldiers of their wn number, whom they can advance to Captains by giving them Authority to mmand e'm. They perſwade themſelves, at if they were in Arms, they ſhould want neither Mony nor Friends. They be- eve, that the Glory of the King attracts

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as much Envy on him as Admiration; and that his Virtue raiſeth in his Neighbours more leſs Anger than Terrour. In ſhort, there is ground to think, that he will have more than an Hundred Thouſand men of his Enemies in the heart of his State, while there are *Huguenots* in *France*; they too, perhaps, do but wait an occaſion to make their Muſters. Thus they are perpetual Obſtacles to the Deſigns that might be formed; and though weak, may notwithſtanding be dreaded. 'Tis true, the honeſt men of their Communion do well know that they cannot be in a calmer repoſe than they now enjoy by the Grace of the King and under the ſecurity of his Edicts; but in theſe matters the multitude carries it. Theſe are a Torrent, that by its Rapidity overturns Rocks which ſeems unmoveable.

It will be ſaid, that the good treatment which the *Huguenots* receive, doth preſerve the friendſhip of the *German* Princes for *France*; and if favourable Juſtice ſhould be no longer done them, the King would loſe the moſt potent and moſt conſiderable of his Allies. This diſcourſe is but a ſound and void of all ſubſtance of reaſon: for beſide that the Princes of *Germany* are not of the Religion of our Hereticks; They need not the Kings protection for maintaining the *Huguenots* in their pretended liberty

rty of Conſcience: but the *French* Arms curing them againſt the power of *Auſtria*, d principally of the Emperour, who hath vers pretenſions upon them; they cannot cede from the Alliance they have made ith his Majeſty; nor will they do it, ough the laſt man of the *Huguenots* was ought to the Scaffold: nay, forasmuch as e Kings Forces are ſo uſeful to all thoſe roteſtants, it would be their intereſt not all to Arm themſelves for the *Huguenots* reſervation, but far otherwiſe, even to pro-ote their expulſion out of *France:* and e reaſon is, becauſe if this party were in condition to raiſe ſtirs, the King would ave his hands full of work to repreſs hem: and ſo his Forces being diſſipated, he Emperour might take his time to en-arge his Domination: the thing that *Charles* the Fifth did, when *Francis* the Firſt was not in a poſſibility to ſuccour the Princes. It being therefore certain, that the Liberty of *Germany* hath its ſupport and rop in the Arms of the King; they are ot ſollicitous there for the affairs of the *Huguenots* in *France:* and ſince the Prote-tants of the Empire are knit to his Majeſty y other engagements than thoſe of Reli-gion, they will continue the ſame Deport-ment; and his Majeſty on his part, will al-ways have the ſame reaſons to ſuccour them, though the time ſhould come that he ſhould

have

have no more *Huguenots* in his Kingdom
No ſuccour neither may they hope for from
England; thats a State too weak to make
any trial of ſtrength againſt *France:* all the
Engliſh there are muſt paſs the Sea; and the
Iſle be diſfurniſh'd of Soldiers and Provi-
ons; yet this all would be nothing to pur-
poſe: mean time their affairs would lye ex-
pos'd to the Levity and Lunacy of the
people. *Holland* and *Swedeland* are of like
conſideration; and they both have other
Intereſts to Negotiate with the King, than
thoſe of the *Huguenots*. *Denmark* is de-
fective in power. The *Calviniſts* mount
unto a ſtrain of Policy above ordinary,
when they would have us believe, That
whatever is not of the *Roman* Communion
is of the Opinion of *Charenton:* the *Lu-
therans* of *Germany*, notwithſtanding, ſym-
pathize with them leſs than with us. Thus
the King hath nothing to be afraid of from
the pretended Allies of the *Huguenots*. Yet
theſe men, as I have already ſaid, are to be
feared; and they would be ſeen ſtoutly to
beſtir themſelves, if ſome extraordinary
commotion ſhould happen in *France*, as a
Civil War, or ſome great Invaſion by for-
raign Enemies; in ſuch a Juncture they
would do as they did in the War of *Paris*:
they took up Arms, and reſpectfully pro-
teſted they were for the Kings Service; but
if the Peace had not been ſoon made, they
would

uld not have forborn to think themſelves ceſſary; and to make all the Propoſitions t they could imagine advantagious to ir party. They would have re-demand- their places of Security; they would ve preſs'd for a reſtoring of their Tem- s, for an augmentation of their preten- Priviledges, and for a free exerciſe of ir Religion: and, according to their d old cuſtom, have uttered Complaints Menaces. But if by ill chance a Victo- us Army of Strangers, whether Catho- ks or Religionaries, ſhould enter the ngdom, the King muſt reſolve to ſee Hereticks declare againſt him, or elſe ntent them in all their pretenſions, which uld prove an engaging of his State in e Calamities, as our Fathers in their time w.

It ought to be ordained, that they ſhall actly follow their ancient Confeſſion of ith which was permitted them in *France*; d that ſuch as vary from it, ſhall be no ger reckon'd in the number of thoſe of Proteſtant Reformed Religion, who ve Liberty of Conſcience given them.

Theſe *Huguenots* have no ground at all plead the Edict of *Nantes* ſo loudly and vingly as they do: they extorted it by olence, and with Sword in hand: yet as it but ~~an~~ *Interim*, an Order taken, un- they ſhould inform themſelves of the truth;

truth; which they have had time enough to do. But did they not violate it themſelves by the War of *Languedock*, that other of *Sevennes*; and again by that of *Rochelle?* nay, they call'd the Enemies of the State unto their ſuccour, and took a courſe to bring Fire and Sword into all parts of the Kingdom. Shortly, in matter of Government, that which is good at one time, is frequently not ſo at another; all things muſt be accommodated to the general rule of Policy, which is, that the good of States be inceſſantly procured. When the Edict of Pacification was accorded, there was proviſion made for the welfare of *France:* if that welfare does now require that the Edict be revoked, there is no remedy, revoked it muſt be, or neglected.

From all this which I have ſaid it follows, that the King hath moſt juſt cauſe to ſecure himſelf from the Profeſſors of the Proteſtant Reformed Religion, and put them into ſuch a ſtate, as he may have nothing to apprehend from their particular. Perhaps it will be ſaid, that 'tis expedient there be *Huguenots* in *France*, becauſe they oblige the Church-men to ſtudy, and to live with the greater circumſpection, and a more exact obſervance of the rules of their Profeſſion. But this conſideration is not worth the conſidering. The Church of

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OD will never be ſupported by theſe hu-
ane means. He is in the midſt of it, and
verns it Himſelf by His Holy Spirit,
hich animateth and filleth it. At what-
r time there ſhall be no more *Huguenots*
France, there will be fewer bad, and a
ater number of good men; which the
ng ſhould particularly deſire; ſince
tes are always ſuſtained by people that
e Virtue, *&c.* It paſſeth therefore for
ain, that it is fit the King do diſable
Religionaries, as to their doing any
m, and as to their giving cauſe of ſuſpi-
n.

It remaineth to examine what way may
ſt readily & moſt commodiouſly lead unto
s end. I would not adviſe that theſe People
the other Religion ſhould be compell'd
depart out of *France*, as the *Moors* were
of *Spain*; which proved in the ſequel,
prejudicial to the whole Country.
would be a piece of inhumanity to drive
Huguenots in that manner: they are
riſtians, though ſeparated from the Body
the Church: beſides, this courſe would
rive the State of not a few good Fami-
, and put the unhappy numbers of e'm
of all hope of Converſion and Salvati-
ſo that the King, in this concern,
uld do well as ſeems to me, to imitate the
urch, the common parent of all Chriſti-
; who, in the Remedies She prepareth,

ever mingleth mildneſs and Mercy, with Ju-
ſtice, and Compaſſion with Correction.

The firſt means then which the Kin
might employ, ſhould be to provide, tha
the *Huguenots* might frequent the converſa
tion of the Catholicks with more familiari
ty than they do. For by this converſatio
they would, in time, be undeceiv'd of th
Opinion with which they are pre-poſſeſs'd
that we hate them; they would put off th
Averſion they have for us; they woul
know our Deportment; and be informe
of our Doctrine in the points that offen
them; becauſe they underſtand not th
Myſteries of them; which would indu
them to confeſs, as St. *Auguſtin* did on th
like occaſion, That the Church does no
teach things as they once thought it di
Nothing is to my underſtanding, or can b
more effectual for the Converſion of th
Hereticks, than this frequent converſation
it is not poſſible, but that at length, th
ſpirit of the men ſhould yield unto impre
ſion; the plumage of the Eagle, 'tis ſai
conſumes that of other Birds; Light diſ
pates Darkneſs, Truth triumphs ov
Falſhood.

The ſecond means ſhould be, to confe
recompence of Honour upon Convert
and to make a Stock for this purpoſe, whi
might never fail. I ſhould think it wou
be none of the beſt courſe to exclude t
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Huguenots from all Employments; they muſt enter into leſſer Offices, though not at all into the greater. The reaſon is, becauſe if they be put off from all kind of publick buſineſs, they will accuſtom themſelves to tarry at home idle, and their ambition will be extinguiſh'd in ſuch ſort, as perhaps they will make it a point of Religion to do nothing; whereas, being taken to ordinary Offices, they will habituate themſelves to a living among Catholicks, and their ambition will awaken, when they ſhall compare themſelves with their Superiours.

The third means I offer is, to ſelect ſome particular men, and create them ſuch buſineſs referring to Religion, as may conſtrain them to attend the Council, and keep following the Court. Buſineſs of that kind may be ſtarted to Gentlemen, upon the Exciſe they have in their houſes. There is not one of them but is obnoxious to a Proceſs in that caſe; and the Biſhops will, with joy, be the proſecutors. Beſides, the Kings Procureur (or Attorney) General is concern'd to know, whether Marriages, Baptiſms, and Burials, be ſolemniz'd with due accurateneſs in theſe private houſes; and whether good and faithful Regiſters of them be kept or no: Great defects herein being eaſily ſuppoſeable, the ſame will be juſt matter of complaint againſt the

Owners, as negligent in obſerving the con-ceſſion made them, of having Exerciſe in their Caſtles. The like may be done, if others, contrary to the Edict, be admitted to theſe Preachings beſide the Domeſticks.

A fourth means would be, to oblige the Religioniſts to put again in due ſtate the an-cient Chappels of their Houſes, which they have demoliſh'd or profan'd; the purſuance whereof ought to be by the diligence of each Biſhop in his Dioceſs. There muſt not be made a common affair of it to all the *Huguenots* in general, but divers particulars only be fix'd upon. And the thing it ſelf is as reaſonable as any. For they had no right to deſtroy Temples that had been a-along deſtin'd to Divine Service, accordin-to the Religion of the King, receiv'd by a-the Kingdom, and alſo profeſs'd by our Progenitors.

The fifth means is, that when an Affair of ſuch quality as I mention'd, comes before the Council, the Deputies which the *Hu-guenots* have at Court in the name of them all, be not permitted to intervene in it. There are three reaſons for the putting by of their interventions: The firſt is, that the *Hugue-nots* cannot conſtitute a Body in *France*, nor aſſemble without the Kings expreſs permiſſi-on. The ſecond, that private and particu-lar affairs ought not to be ſet up in the ran-of thoſe that are general and publick. The

third

hird, that the King will do Juſtice without heir intervention. The Deputation ſhould ot be all at once abrogated out-right; but o regard muſt be had to what the Deputies preſent in the name of all the party.

The ſixth means ſhould be, that the King o take effectual order the *Huguenots* may o longer have their dwellings, nor their xerciſe in places not Royal; at leaſt ſuch have any Lords of the Proteſtant Reformed Religion for Proprietors. As for example, *Vitrey* in *Bretannie*, belongs to *Monſieur* the Prince *de Tarante*, who is of that Religion; and it belongs to him by a Deniſe made him of it by *Moſieur de la Trenouille*. The *Huguenots* have there a Temple and a Religious Exerciſe: this Town hey muſt exchange, and have another for given them; reaſons will not be wanting o colour ſuch permutations: there is nohing that may contribute more to their Converſion. For it will be an incredible iſpleaſure to them to live among people vith whom they have no Acquaintance, or any Union, either by Intereſt or Blood.

A ſeventh means is, to ſuppreſs by natural death, all *Huguenot* Counſellors. The Chambers of the Edict are now of no more ſe.

The eighth is, to give them for their Synods Catholick Commiſſaries; ſuch as are

ſomewhat vers'd in the Controverſies, and have the skill to favour the Wrangling that are continually among them. Their Commiſſaries were heretofore all of them Catholicks. Particular Synods, when Petition'd for, muſt not be deny'd them; but National ones ſhould never be granted: and at the cloſe of all their Synodal Aſſemblies, mony ſhould be demanded of the Miniſters for the Kings Affairs, by way of Loan, or of Tenths, or under ſome other pretexts.

The ninth means is, to get them proſecuted for their common Debts, and ſo cauſe them to ſell, by Decree, ſome of their Temples, which ſure cannot be judged to be in Mortmain, or Un-alienable.

A tenth is, to Prohibit that any Subject go out of the Kingdom without the Kings Permiſſion. For the *Huguenots* muſt not depart out of *France*; and they will be compris'd under a general Prohibition.

The eleventh is, to take order the Confeſſors may intimate to the poorer ſort of Catholicks, that it is a point of Conſcience to ſerve *Huguenots*.

The twelfth is, to oblige them on a Political account, unto an Abſtinence from Fleſh, upon thoſe days which the Catholicks do ſo obſerve, in like manner as they are already obliged to heed the Feſtivals, out of reſpect to the Publick Religion: then hereupon, ſeverely puniſh ſuch as ſhall tranſ-

ranſgreſs in the one or the other of theſe wo things.

The thirteenth means is, to endeavour he marrying of Catholicks to the *Hugue-ots*, and cauſe the Children iſſuing from ich Marriages, to be Educated in the *Ro-an* Religion.

A fourteenth may be, to hinder the *Hu-uenots* from ſelling any Eſtate they have in and: for this kind of poſſeſſion does tye hem to the Intereſts of the State.

The fifteenth and laſt, is, to change the lace of that Academy which they have at *aumur*, and fix it in ſome other Town, s *Vange*, or *Beaufort*. There is a Preſident or ſuch a change in the tranſlation of the ike Academy from *Montauban* to *Puilau-rens*. The pretext for drawing them out of *Saumur* is, that this Town being a Paſs on the *Loire*, and maintaining the Commu-nication of divers great Provinces, the King cannot be too well ſecured of it: be-ſide, this planting an Academy at *Saumur*, is an Uſurpation; the *Huguenots* having never had a Patent for it. It would ſignifie nothing, ſhould the *Huguenots* alledge, that they have it for a place of ſecurity: For they are now as the Kings other Subjects be, who do not at all demand any. What would come of it, if all Collective bodies ſhould demand places of Security? 'Tis a madneſs.

Further yet, it might be declared, That Proponents, who aſpire to the Office of Miniſters, ſhould be obliged to teach a courſe of Philoſophy, or two years in Theology. Thus there would be fewer Miniſters than there are; and at length, their number being diminiſhed, the number of *Huguenots* would infallibly diminiſh alſo. The King might likewiſe ordain, That the Proponents ſhould be examin'd in preſence of ſuch Commiſſioners as He ſhould pleaſe to appoint; to the end they might undergo a rigorous Trial. For His Majeſty is concern'd, that theſe Miniſters be perfectly well ſtudied, leſt they prove promoters of Sedition, and not Paſtors. At the time of their Examination, the ſame Proponents ſhould be obliged to anſwer all the Catholick Doctors in any controverſial queſtions they ſhould think fit to move. The *Huguenots* cannot refuſe this Propoſition; becauſe their Proponents ought to be prepared in all matters: and ſince the *Huguenots* affirm, that their Miniſters are their Biſhops, there muſt no perſon be a Miniſter who hath not attained to the age of twenty ſeven years at leaſt. Theſe are ſummarily the humane means that ſeem to me moſt conducible to the Converſion of the Profeſſors of the Pr. Reformed Religion.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

1. *What Nobility is.* 2. *Of the Nobles of* France, *of their Degrees, and the Ranks of Gentlemen.* 3. *Of the Orders of Knighthood.* 4. *In what reſpects Gentlemen may be uſeful to the King.*

HAving examined what relates to the Clergy, the Firſt of the Three Orders that compoſe the Body Politick of *France*; it is time to ſpeak of the Second, which is that of the Nobility. Nobility is a Quality that renders the Poſſeſſors of it Generous, and ſecretly diſpoſeth their Soul unto an affection for Honourable things. The Virtue of Anceſtors does make this excellent impreſſion of Nobility upon perſons; and there is in ſeminal matter, I know not what ſpirituous and energetical principle, that tranſmitteth and propagateth the inclinations of Parents unto their deſcendants: as is obvious to remark, not only in men, and in all the Animals, which have a natural generation; but alſo in Plants, and in things evidently moſt inanimate. This Anceſtral Virtue, verily, gives us the firſt tincture in order to a right Noble Accompliſhment;

and every man iſſued from great and illuſtrious Perſonages, does continually feel a kind of elaſtick impulſe in the ſecret receſſes of his heart, which thruſts him on to imitate them; and their memory ſpurs him on to Glory, and brave Actions: but if through negligence, or the degeneracy of an ill nature, it ſo comes to paſs, that he anſwers not the hope which the Grandeur of his Progenitors gave ground to conceive of his Deportment; in this caſe, all the Luſtre of their Ancient Reputation which environ'd him from the inſtant of his birth, and whether he will or no, accompany'd him all along the courſe of his life, it does I ſay, by making him be noted, for (*Nobilitas a noſcendo dicitur*) but promote his ſhame, and the more conſpicuouſly ſhew his defects unto the augmenting and juſtifying a contempt of his perſon. Thus an actual Virtue is neceſſary for Gentlemen, that they may be able to bear up the weight of their condition, which otherwiſe preſſeth them quite down. The greater the Rank and Honor of their Houſe is, the greater their Diſhonour; and ſo much the deeper that Precipice into which their diſſoluteneſs doth caſt them.

There are uſually noted three kinds of Nobility. The firſt is a Nobleneſs of Blood: when the ſource of a great extraction is hidden in the obſcurity of a long ſucceſſion of years, and cannot now be diſ-

co-

over'd. This kind is in greateſt eſteem among men: and indeed we call things that are left us of this quality, Venerable, and do bear a ſort of Religious reſpect to them: we are generally poſſeſs'd too with a perſwaſion, that whatever is unknown, is full of Myſteries; hence Objects of ſuch a nature are apt to ſurpriſe us; and we hereupon are awed at them, and do admire them. Such effects, the greatneſs of an unſearchable high-deſcending Pedigree does produce. Nor need we much ſcruple to affirm, that this Kind is the only proper and genuine Nobility; and that the two others are only Nobilitations. What difference is made between a perſon Noble, and one Ennobled, is familiarly known. This firſt kind of Nobility is thought to require a poſſeſſion of the Virtue of Anceſtors, and withal a poſſeſſion of their wealth; this too in ſo eſſential a manner, that if each of them be not jointly poſſeſs'd, the Nobility is extinct. We daily ſee proofs that evince the Juſtice and the Truth of this Notion. Be it intimated by the way, that the Virtue here mention'd is the Military Art.

The ſecond kind of Nobility is that which takes its riſe from Offices and eminent Employments, unto which the Laws have annexed this mark of Honour.

The third is acquir'd by the Prince's Letters, which are called, *Letters of Nobilitation.*

tion. It is a right peculiar to the King to give such Letters; as the *Roman Panegyrist* once said to the Emperour *Trajan.* It belongs not but to *Cæsar* to create a Nobility. It is for none but the King to Honour brave and valiant Subjects with this Quality. This third and last kind is least considered: because the person who acquires it hath not the Virtue of Ancestors for a foundation and caution of his own. Yet it is sometimes more considerable than either of the two others; and *Marius* in *Salust* had great reason to tell the Gentlemen of *Rome*; that he had rather begin the Nobility of his Race, than faintly continue it, or unworthily lose it; and that it was more glorious for him to transmit to his Posterity a sparkling virtue, hard to be follow'd, than plod slowly on upon the slight and almost effaced tracks of a common Virtue which his Ancestors had left him. In all these three kinds of Nobility, there must be the personal Virtue of the person invested with 'em: for when all is done, it is but Virtue that confers effective worth.

All Nations have had a particular esteem for Nobility, nor can any well-order'd Common-wealth be named, which hath not invented some singular mark of Honour to make it conspicuous. The *French*, in this point, have surpass'd and out-done all People upon Earth; as for the first Antiquity,

quity, *Cæſar* obſerves, that the Nobles, that is, the Gentlemen, had among the *Gauls* as much power over the *Plebeians*, as Maſters at *Rome* had over their Slaves. After *Gaule* was reduced to the State of a Province, Nobility preſerved its ancient Prerogatives; and the Emperours knowing, that the Nobles loved Glory, and ſought it above all things, ſtiled them *Honorati*, and gave them an abſolute precedency in all Aſſemblies of the *Gauls*. For the *Romans* had thought it neceſſary to weaken the Authority of the *Druids*. In the time of Chriſtianity the ſame Order was continued; and the Nobility gave their ſuffrage apart in the Election of Biſhops, expreſly before the people; yea, even before the Clergy themſelves. Upon the declining of the Empire, the Gentlemen did, in *France*, judge the cauſes of their equals; and hence, without doubt, came into uſe the Parliaments, Courts and Aſſemblies, which our Kings held of their Peers and Barons, that is, of the qualifi'd Gentlemen of their Kingdom, when a caſe of ſome Peer or Grandee of the State was to be tried. The Nobles were diſtinguiſh'd anciently from *Plebeians*, by their hair, which they wore long, for a mark of their ancient Liberty; and when any one of them committed a fault that was unbeſeeming his Birth, the reſt ſentenc'd him to depart the

the Country, or cut off his Hair; This was therefore a no leſs puniſhment than Exile. In *Charlemagne's* time, the Gentlemen of *France* named themſelves *Franks*, by way of Excellence. In fine, the *French* Nobility hath always had ſuch an high degree of Excellency, and ſo great a pre-eminence, that it was preferr'd in all caſes; as when vacant Biſhopricks or Abbies were to be provided for; or when the principal Magiſtracy and ſeats of Judicature were to be fill'd up, or the Government of important places, War-like employment, and the Leading of Armies, were to be diſpoſed of. To conclude this matter, it may be affirm'd, that Kings did take the Gentlemen into a partnerſhip with themſelves, as I may term it, in the Regality; they honour'd them with part of their power, by conferring on them Fiefs, and by intruſting them with the charge of doing Juſtice, and of Commiſſioning Officers to that end.

Hereupon it was neceſſary to put a gradual difference between Gentlemen themſelves: nor is it indeed ſufficient that they all have ſo many excellent Prerogatives above the vulgar, or common ſort, as we call them. For nature is alike in every man, and all men are born equal. Fortune on the contrary, and Virtue, diſtinguiſh one from another. But natural reaſon requires there be Order in all things. 'Tis Order

that

hat makes the beauty and ſymmetry of the Univerſe. Now as a Muſical Conſort doth ot make a perfect harmony, but by a diverſity of Notes; ſo a Political State can be either comely nor compleat, unleſs there e a difference between the parts that compoſe it. I know, that Nobility, being as Philoſophers call it, an Inherent Quality, loes lodge with its whole Eſſence, in each f its Subjects: as the quality of a Soldier s, for its Eſſence, in the perſon of a Corporal, as well as of a Captain or General-Officer. Yet there is a great diſtance, nd many intervening degrees, between a General and the meaneſt Muſquetier in an Army. Thus the meaneſt Gentleman in he Kingdom is Noble; and to ſpeak after he common Proverb, is Noble as well as he King; but the one is ſevered from the other by an immenſe graduation. So, hough all Gentlemen be equal in Nobility, yet they are not ſo in Riches, in Lands, in Alliance, in Friends, in Offices, in Authority, in Age, and in Reputation. Again, they are not equal in Spirit, in Knowledge, in Experience, nor in Wiſdom; therefore it hath been with much prudence ordered, that they ſhould have ſome external marks of theſe differences; and for this end, there have been created Princes, Dukes, Counts, Marqueſſes, Barons, Knights, Batchelers, Eſquires; leave hath been given

ven them to bear Helmets and Crowns upon their Armories: in ſhort, no pains have been ſpared to find out things that might any way adorn their Quality; and their Valour hath been publickly rewarded, for an excitement of others to a generous emulation.

Here, I cannot forbear to blame thoſe Gentlemen who give themſelves the Title of Knights, of Marqueſſes, or of Counts, by their own private Authority. This is a ſhameful Uſurpation; and ſo far from heightening the Luſter of Nobility, that it injures them. For a Gentleman who takes upon him the Quality of a Marqueſs, and well knows he is none, makes a perpetual lye, a thing directly contrary to his Honour, and to the profeſſion he makes, of being a devoted conſtant defender of truth. Beſide, this huge number of Marqueſſes, Lords, and Knights, does bring thoſe Qualities into contempt; and is a cauſe, that true Marqueſſes are not conſidered now as they of right ought to be. 'Tis therefore extreamly important, that proviſion be ſpeedily made in the caſe. For this confuſion deſtroys the uſefulneſs of thoſe Dignities, they being ſuch as His Majeſty ſhould keep in his own hand; and husband them with deliberation and frugality; that they might be diſtributed on occaſion, to men of Honour, and ſuch as have evidenced a Zeal for

or His Service, and for the good of His Kingdom; that the persons also to whom they are granted, might fully enjoy them, with all the Advantages and Prerogatives that are by custom annexed to them. I will not omit, that it is necessary to give the Nobility the greatest respect that may be; to the end, that Citizens may conceive the greater desire to become Gentlemen; which should be granted them, when they have rais'd themselves to a Worthiness of it, either by just acquiring a remarkable Estate, or doing some Illustrious Exploit in War.

The whole constitution of the Nobility is Military: nevertheless, there have been instituted in *France*, particular Orders of Knighthood, of which the King is Grand Master Himself; and into which He admitteth such Gentlemen as He accounts most Worthy of it. Such are the Orders of the Holy Ghost, and of S. *Michael*. There are others, of which the King is barely Protector; The Order of S. *Lazarus* is of that nature. But this is of no great advantage to the State: because all Beneficences, all Favours, all Honours and employments, should come directly and immediately from the hand and bounty of the King. For the continuation therefore of this Order of S. *Lazarus*, His Majesty might unite the Grand Mastership of it to the Regality, as the King of *Spain* does.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

1. *Of the Third Eſtate.* 2. *Of th*
Husband-men. 3. *Of Artificer*
4. *Of Merchants.*

MY beginning to treat of the three O
ders of the body Politick of *Franc*
as the Clergy and the Nobility, leaving th
Third Eſtate to be laſt ſpoken of, is a m
thod like theirs, who having ſome Edifi
to examine, do begin at the top; and ſett
to conſider the upper Stories, before th
look on the Foundations. In truth, th
People are the baſis upon which all Repu
liques have their ſtanding. 'Tis they th
manure the ground, and cauſe it to be
Fruit. 'Tis they that pay the Subſidies
that breed Work-men, and furniſh the Me
chants. Yet that which we call the Thir
Eſtate, does not conſiſt of Paiſants, or th
meer rural ſort; 'tis principally the Fre
men, and Communalties of Towns, an
Officers of Juſtice, that compoſe it. Th
Third Eſtate was not called to the Gener
Aſſemblies of the *Gauls*, either in the tim
of the *Romans*, or during the Firſt and Se
cond Race of our Kings; it was well fo
ward in the Third before they had that pri
viledge. I believe, not until the Reign o
Phil

Philip the Fair. But it is not upon this matter that I am now to insist.

However, in speaking of the Third Estate, the whole Popular body is to be considered; and it may be divided into three parties of men; namely, Husband-men, Artificers, and Merchants. Of the Officers of Justice we will speak in the next Chapter. The least-infected, and best party of the people, are the Husband-men that daily labour; which takes up their Heads and Hands, all the year long without intermission, keeps them in simplicity and obedience. There cannot be too great a number of e'm; especially not in *France*, by reason of the Fertility of the Country; and our Corn being transported into Forraign parts, we ought to make great Stores of it, and have as much as may be in a readiness. Exact care must be taken, that these men may always be in a condition to take pains: and that they have but little converse with Townsmen, whose little labour, and other manners, might corrupt their innocence. And, that ease and plenty do not render them insolent. For there is nothing more dangerous and insufferable, than a sort of rich Paisants. No less care must be taken, that in extream penury do not reduce them to extream misery. For too great Poverty lying on them, they no longer have either Men or Cattle: they are ty'd up to ill Diet,

lodge

lodge on the ground: ſuffer Hunger and Cold: their Children periſh for want of Food; there are Epidemical Diſeaſes bred among them; they are not ſuccour'd; they dye away: by this means the Country is diſpeopled; and being void of Inhabitants the Grounds are unhusbanded, and abandoned. When I ſhall come to diſcourſe of the Finances, I will point out a way to preſerve Country-people in a moderately-commodious eſtate: at preſent I will only ſay, that it would be to very good purpoſe to create a Superintendant of Husbandry; who ſhould have his eye on thoſe affairs, and ſee, that the Grounds be cultivated, Vineyards well kept, and Meadows fitly ordered: in like manner as there are Maſters of Waters, and Foreſts, who take care that the Woods be not damnifi'd; and Surveyors for the High-ways; and in fine, Jurates for every Craft.

The Second party of the Popular order is the Handicrafts-men, or Artificers; theſe are no leſs uſeful to the State than any others. For, beſides that Manufactures do keep men at work, and engage them; they are the cauſe that the Silk, the Wool, the Skins, the Flax, and the Timber, and the other Commodities that grow in *France*, are made uſe of; and that Country people have the means to barter theſe things, and put them off; eſpecially being wrought into Wares

not

ot made in forraign parts, we ſhall grow
o be further principal Manufacturers, as we
ready are of Hats for *Spain*, and Stuffs for all
urope: which is a matter of exceeding
reat conſequence: and in proceſs of time,
hen the work is once on foot, things will
aſs from hand to hand, and oft-times go
ut of the Kingdom. All this quickens
rade, and makes mony paſs to and fro:
hich promoteth the Publick, and there-
ithall at once, every ones private wel-
re.

'Tis not enough to have Husband-men
nd Artificers in a Kingdom; there muſt
f neceſſity be Merchants alſo: for with-
ut their Induſtry, the Artificers Shops
ould be Stores never emptied; the Gra-
aries would remain full of Corn; and the
ellars, of Wines; and nothing be gone.
We will more largely treat of this, when
we come to the Article of Commerce.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

1. *Of Officers of Juſtice.* 2. *Of Parliaments, and other Supream Courts.* 3. *Of Preſidial Courts.* 4. *Of the Kings Council.* 5. *Uſeful means for the good of the State, in relation to Officers of Juſtice.* 6. *Of Sollicitations.*

IF men were entirely juſt to one another and each of e'm (in the phraſe of one of the greateſt *Greek* Philoſophers) a Law unto himſelf; there would need neither Law nor Magiſtrate to keep them in perfect tranquility. But Nature being corrupted, we no longer conſult that Original Righteouſneſs, which is inſeparable from reaſon and which without intermiſſion, inwardly preſſeth us to render to all their due, as exactly, as we would ſhould be done to our ſelves. Always ſelf-love, often neceſſity, ſometimes hatred, avarice, or one paſſion or other, does blind us, and induce us to violate this eminently holy and equitable Law; in ſuch ſort alſo, that we ſuffer our ſelves to be tranſported unto exceſſes hard to be believed. We equally uſe fraud and force to content our injuſtice and irregula-

ular desires. Whereupon it hath been commodiously done by wise men, to form, as may be said, a new reason, which they called Law. But because Laws are of no use, except they be armed with Correction to punish such as despise them; and have some soul, and living principle; therefore Magistrates have been created, who are to pronounce the Oracles which those Laws inspire, to put the Laws in execution, and maintain the Authority of them. These Officers are chosen of the best and most intelligent men in a State; and if Commonwealths be duly regulated; ordinarily the richer are preferred before the poor, and Nobles before *Plebeians*; because 'tis supposed they have a greater measure of knowledge and virtue; and by consequence are less capable of certain mean things, in which a necessitous condition, and a mean extraction, might engage them. Thus Ministers of Justice, in *France*, call'd *Men of the Robe*, are in truth necessary in Publick Society. For if there was no evil-doer, Laws and Magistrates would be of no more use, than Joyners, and the doors they make for the security of Houses, if there were no Thieves: whereas, should not a man in a whole Kingdom ever swerve from right reason and pure equity; there must nevertheless be Priests for Religion; Soldiers for defence against forraign invasi-

ons

ons that might happen; and people who may ſome of e'm till the ground; others apply themſelves to Trades and Manufactures, that men cannot be without. So that theſe three ſorts of perſons are inſeparable from a Common-wealth; and they make up the Three Eſtates we have ſpoken of, which have been receiv'd without any conteſt.

Yet it ſeems, that of late, the Parliament have ſought to infuſe into ſome green heads that they compos'd a Fourth Order in the Kingdom; and the ſame, not only diſtinct from the other Three, but altogether ſuperiour to them, by reaſon of their Soveraignty, and of the power they have to deliberate upon the pleaſure and Edicts of the King. If they ſhould not be brought off from this opinion, perhaps they would draw the other Soveraign Courts and Officers of Judicature into the ſame errour; an union of them all not being deniable; becauſe otherwiſe the affair of Juſtice would, in *France*, form two bodies; which may not be. But from allowing this Fourth Body in the State, namely that of Juſtice, a ridiculous inconvenience would follow; to wit, that a Sergeant (or Catchpole) of a Village, would be a member of a body ſuperiour to that of the Nobility; and by conſequence, in ſome ſort ſuperiour to a Marqueſs. For in matter of

f Hierarchy, the laſt of a more excellent rder, is greater than the firſt of a leſs exellent one: as the loweſt of the Archanels, is greater than the higheſt of the ngels.

But to clear the difficulty before us, it uſt be remembred, that heretofore in *rance*, the Eſtates which were called Paraments, did aſſemble twice a year for two nſiderations: one was, to judge of Apeals, that were made from judgments ſs'd by inferiour Officers. The other, to ve the King Counſel when He demanded eir Opinion about Government of the ate. For alway, during the firſt and ſend race, the Kings did diſpoſe of Publick ffairs, as of Peace and War; And this is much a truth, that if thoſe ancient Parments had had the diſpoſing of the State, ey would never have ſuffered, that the ildren of *Lewis*, when they had divided e Kingdom among them, ſhould have len to make War one upon another; hich could tend to nothing but a publick ſolation. They would as little have pertted the enmities of *Brive*, *Haudet*, and *edegonde*. In like manner under the Send Race, they would not have endured t the Sons of *Lewis* the Mild, ſhould act h outrages on their Father, that *Charles* Bald ſhould have given *Neuſtria* to the *rmans*. In the Third Race, that *Lewis*

the Gross should have ruin'd so many great Lords; who made up the greatest part of the Parliaments: that *Lewis* the Younger should have yielded up *Guienne* by the Divorce of *Eleonore*: that the Count of *Burgundy*, and the Duke of *Bretannie*, and some others, should have leagu'd together against Queen *Blanche*. In fine, there are a thousand and a thousand examples in History, which do evidence that these Kings always had the free and Soveraign administration of their State: nor will there one be found to prove, that the Parliaments ever contradicted them. They presented themselves at the feet of their Princes, with Petitions, and humble Remonstrances: they made no resistance, nor exercis'd Authority. So that our Kings have been Kings indeed, always absolute Masters: and for proof hereof, it will be sufficient to look into all the Statutes; there it may be seen how they spake, and what part the Estates had in them. The principal end of Parliaments therefore was, to end the Law-suits of particular persons; and people perceiving that Appeals brought to them were received, and sentences invalidated; many, to try Opinions in their cases once again, became Appellants: by this means affairs were multiply'd; and that contesting parties might not have the trouble to come up from the remotest parts of the Kingdom, Deputi-

of the General Parliament were appointed, hey also stiled Parliaments, and to be am-ulatory. The Commission they had, was ometimes for three months, sometimes for x, according to exigence of State; but lway by the Command and Letters of the ing. These Parliaments went into the rovinces, to judge the causes that were rought them; almost in like manner as e now see done at the Extraordinary Ses-ons: which instead of diminishing the umber of Causes to be dispatch'd, as had een conceiv'd, really augmented them. hilip the *Fair* saw cause to make such a arliament sedentary at *Paris*, another at ouen, a third at *Thoulouse*; and succeed-g Kings establish'd others in other Cities, they are at present. From this faithful count it resulteth, that the Parliaments e not a Fourth Body in the State; but be tracted out of the Three ancient Orders; first they were taken out of the Clergy d Nobility only: because the Commons that time were not considerable: after-rds, These also were received in. Other veraign Societies are but Images of these rliaments. As to the Soveraignty of the rliaments themselves, it neither is, nor r was other, than an emanation of the veraignty of the King, in whom that ality is natural, and indivisible. The liaments can pretend to no more than

His Majesty may please to impart to them.

The sale of Offices of Judicature having been introduc'd, there followed divers creations of new Officers, both in matter of the Revenue, and also in that of Justice: among others, those of Presidial Courts were instituted: which perhaps was done only out of a pecuniary interest; a needless degree of Jurisdiction being thereby set up, and such a one as tendeth to the involving and oppression of the Kings Subjects. These Courts are so many petty Parliaments, in judging supreamly, and finally in some cases: yet by the trick of petty-fogging practice, ways are found to get Appeals from judgment pass'd, to be received and new processes begun, to the vexation and undoing of the parties concern'd. There have been in all times, chief Judges in Towns; as Bailiffs and Seneschals; a thing of indispensible necessity for keeping the people in order: all the fault that can be found in it, is by reason of their number, which certainly is excessive.

'Tis not enough that the King hath Parliaments and other Officers to determine differences among His Subjects: there must also be a Counsel about His Majesty; by whose Advice, He may correct all ill Administration of Justice; may reverse all sentences given against the mind and intention

of the Statutes; and maintain Order through the whole extent of His State. This Counſel is the *Sacrarium* of the Monarchy: and the perſons admitted into it, (who may juſtly be ſtiled the Eyes, the Ears and Hands of the Prince) ought to have a profound knowledge in affairs, acquired by long and approved experiences: they muſt love the Kingdom, the Kingly Power, and the Kings Perſon. They are the ſeminary, whence are taken Intendants of Provinces, Embaſſadors and Miniſters for Negotiations with Strangers. The Council is compos'd at preſent of Gown-men only. It would not be much amiſs, nay on the contrary, it would be very well done: if the King pleaſed to communicate this Honour unto other Profeſſions, when there were found perſons capable of it: becauſe this Preference gives the Gentlemen of the Long-Robe too much Authority: whereas there is need of retrenching what they have already; much rather, than of conferring any new advantage upon them, as we ſhall ſhew hereafter. As for the Royal Privy Council, in which ſecret affairs are debated, and which ought to be of very few perſons, that matters may be kept in ſilence, and not untimouſly divulged; I will not ſpeak of it in this place; nor ſay, in what manner it ought to be compoſed: becauſe this depends upon the pleaſure of

the Maſter of it; and each King takes a different courſe in it. There have been Princes who committed the principal care of all affairs to one ſingle perſon: and *France* hath ſeen, for inſtance, the Cardinals of *Amboiſe* and *Richelieu*. Others have parted employments, and ſhared them among as many perſons as there were different affairs. So did King *Henry* the Fourth. This, in my opinion, was the more wiſely done; for that in matter of Government, the great ſecret is to divide Authority, and hold the ballance even between a plurality of perſons. Hiſtory teacheth us of what conſequence it was to our Kings of the firſt Race; that they had but one Maire of the Palace; and how dear it coſt their poſterity. Upon a like reaſon of State the *Roman* Emperors divided the charge of the *Pretorian* Prefect. But Miniſters, whatever for number, muſt for qualification, be men of virtue and approved ſufficiency: they likewiſe, after the manner of the *Ægyptians*, ought to be reprehended and puniſh'd for all that the King does amiſs, and contrary to Law.

The incredible number of the Miniſters of Juſtice in *France*, is in truth, ſomewhat monſtrous: neither is there any diſorder in the State, more preſſing, or requiring a more ſpeedy Application of the Royal Authority. The truth is, if a man conſider this mul-

titude

titude of Magiſtrates, will he not have ground to ſay, that the *French* are extream hard to be governed, ſeeing ſo many great perſonages are employed in governing them? Again it may be ſaid; that this Nation, ſo illuſtrious by the glory of its Actions, and by ſo many Victories wherewith its Arms have been honoured, is yet incapable of virtuous inclinations; ſince there is need of force to reduce them to the rule of the Laws: though GOD never gave men a more precious preſent. On the other hand, can it be affirmed, that our Legiſlators wanted wiſdom, or did not ſufficiently ſhew it in making the Laws? Yet if reflection be made upon the multitude of Law-ſuits, whereof the vexation is a grievance to the Kingdom, may not a man perſwade himſelf that Equity is baniſh'd thence, and upright dealing utterly diſcarded? Should it then hereupon be taken for granted, that the private ſort in *France* are not good condition'd people; can it be imagin'd that the Publick Government is any thing reaſonable and proper for its due ends? But if a man proceed to penetrate further into the internals of the State, and there behold what a deſolation the corrupting of Juſtice hath made, looſning and breaking the moſt ſacred tyes of friendſhip; in fine, if he obſerve how the Monarchy hath often been in

danger of ſubverſion, will he not wonder that the Publick fortune hath held out, and Families been born up in the Storms that have ſo many times turmoiled them?

The exceſſively-great multitude of Officers, being the principal cauſe whence ſo many miſchiefs take their riſe; the remedy muſt be firſt apply'd thereto. And this remedy is nothing elſe, but ſuch a retrenchment as is expedient, or to ſay better, neceſſary to be made. The fewer Officers of Juſtice there are, the more Soldiers and Artificers, and Merchants; and the fewer litigious actions will be. For it is manifeſt that buſineſs of that kind has ever multiply'd, as the number of Officers hath been augmented: in like manner, as the more Phyſicians, the more Patients. To arrive at the end propos'd, it would be convenient, that after mature deliberation upon the eſtate of *France*, the number of its Inhabitants, and the quantity of Law-buſineſs, it be adviſedly ſtated in the Kings Council what number of Officers were fit to be reſerved, and of what Quality they ſhould be; then that the reſt be ſuppreſs'd gradually, as the perſons dye away, or at once by a Declaration. What, in my opinion might particularly be done, is as follows.

Firſt, The Preſidial Courts being compos'd of Officers that are needleſs to the

State

State, a charge unto the People; having
lſo but a novel interloping Juriſdiction,
he fruit of an evil counſel given to King
Henry the II. and a mere invention to get
nony; the extinction of them is not to be
loubted of; but effected by a ſubſtraction
f the Officers Annuities. By this means
he King will ſave that pay, which amounts
nto a ſum conſiderable to the State; and
he Royal Juriſdictions, each in its pre-
inct, may do what thoſe Preſidials, upon
hich they depend, are wont to do. The
reſidial Clerks place, its being engaged,
or bound for ſecurity to one or other)
s is uſual, ſhould not hinder the execution
f this affair: and when by deceaſe there
re no more Officers left, care ſhall be taken
f the concern of thoſe to whom the places
ere Engaged, the regulating whereof will
y that time have no difficulty in it.

Secondly, Of Sergeants, two thirds
holly muſt be ſuppreſs'd.

In the third place, all Proctors, that are
ot Advocates; and a certain number of
dvocates ſhould be appointed in each Par-
ament and Juriſdiction, who might do
he Office of Proctors. This is not incom-
atible. For the thing is already in uſe in
any parts of *France*. The benefit of this
egulation is manifeſt; in that the Proctors
re very ignorant that have but a ſleight
ncture of practice; yet out of Covetouſ-

neſs they often draw up Writings for their Clients, and make them pay as dear for e'm, as if the beſt Advocate had taken the pains. Mean time theſe Writings, for the moſt part, are nothing worth; and the poor ſuitors frequently loſe good cauſes, through the naughtineſs of their Proctors, and for want of being well defended. Again, ſuch an order taken, another advantage would accrue, namely, that Advocates being Proctors, they will be obliged to follow what the Judges ſhall preſcribe them; whereas at preſent they make a jeſt of it, and will not plead but when they pleaſe. There cannot be a regulation made in *France* more profitable in matter of Juſtice; and if the King, in a neceſſity of State, would make a mony matter of it, which might at any time be done, there would be rais'd out of it, for all *France*, more than twenty Millions. But it had need be gone about with a great deal of addreſs. A third advantage by this regulation is, that all Advocates being Proctors, there would no more ſlip into the Court a ſort of young men, who ſhelter their ignorance and idleneſs under a Lawyers Gown, and a ſquare Cap.

In the Fourth place, All the Maſters of Requeſts belonging to the Palace, or Court (of Juſtice) of *France*, ſhould be ſuppreſt. And the truth is, it ſeems to me a contradiction,

diction, that these Officers should be Counsellors of supream Courts, yet not impowered to judge any thing supreamly. But that the Commoners of the Kings-houshold and other priviledged persons, may not be depriv'd of the benefit of the *Committimus*, power must be given them by special privilledge, to commence their Actions, and prosecute them in a Chamber of Enquests. I say, by special priviledge, because I know the Parliaments take no Cognizance ordinarily, save of Appeals: but in the case now expres'd, this special priviledge shall superadd to them this new kind of Jurisdiction. And it will be highly advantagious to those Commoners and Priviledg'd persons; for by this expedient they would get a decree speedily upon one trial, and finally end their business. It is to be noted here, that the first stating of cases in order to an hearing, is not so incompetent to Parliaments, but that they do the thing for substance, upon demands incidentally made. Yet this is meant only in behalf of priviledged persons, and all such as claim the right of a *Committimus*.

Fifthly, The Judges Provosts of Towns are to be suppres'd, and they laid to the Seneschalsies and Bayliwicks. For, what are so many different Officers in one and the same Town good for?

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In a Sixth place, All the Courts of the Aides ſhould be united to the Parliaments; and this done, when the Officers of the Supream Court in each kind, have been reduc'd to the number which its judged meet to retain. I will ſay more of this in the Chapter of the *Finances*.

Seventhly, All the Elections are to be ſuppreſs'd, and the Aſſeſſing of Pariſhes, done by the Treaſurers of *France*; of the Seneſchalſies, by the Lieutenant of the Province. I ſhall ſpeak more plainly of it in the Chapter of the Finances and Taxes. Where alſo the ſuppreſſion of Store-houſes of Salt, and of the Gabells, ſhall be treated of in the Article of Gabells. Beſides, the Chamber of the Treaſury, and the Court of Moneys, ſhould be joyned to the Chamber of Accompts; and half of all the Chambers be ſuppreſs'd likewiſe. For thirty Officers may do all that the Chamber of Accompts, the Treaſury, and the Court of Monies now do. In fine, it is for the Kings Service, and the good of the State, that all the Preſidents places be ſuppreſs'd, as well thoſe of Superiour Courts, as of others: and the Office of Preſidents be diſcharged by Commiſſion. 'Tis to be conſider'd, that this new Order would much augment the Kings Authority. For what will not Counſellors do to obtain a Commiſſion to preſide? and having obtained

tained it, what will they not further do to keep and confirm themſelves in it? 'Tis pertinent to recall to mind here, that the mighty Prince *Philip the Fair*, at His making the Parliament ſedentary, made the Count of *Burgundy* firſt Preſident of it. And that anciently, the Firſt Preſident of the Chamber of Accompts was the chief Butler of *France:* likewiſe, that at that time, and long after, the Chancellors of *France* were of the Church, or of the Sword; and great Dignities not given to men of the Robe privatively. Which being done ſince, without doubt gives them too much credit, and leaves the Nobility too little. It is important that the thing be not continued, but on the contrary, all reſtored to Primitive Order. As for Country Courts, 'tis fit they be narrowly limited, and brought to be meerly predial and dominial; that is, for Rents and the Fealties of Lordſhips: not capable of determining an Inventory, or receiving a ſuit between parties, for more than three *livres*. To conclude, the ſhortning of proceedings in Law, would much conduce to the reduction of Officers.

Let it not be objected, that this reduction of Officers, and ſuch a multitude of ſuppreſſions, will ruine a multitude of Families. For though it were ſo, yet ſhould not the thing be ſtuck at; the Reformation

of

of a State being concern'd: now is the ill of particular persons to be put to accompt, when the weal of the publick is in question. GOD Himself, who is King of Kings, and Eternally Just, how many men did He destroy by that universal deluge for the Reformation of the Universe? How many *Israelites* did He cut off in the Wilderness, to save the gross of the people? There is plenty of examples in this Kind; and Soveraigns have a right to do like things with like Justice, when the general welfare of their Subjects is concern'd. Kings are Eagles to whom GOD gives His Thunder-bolts to carry: the strokes that come from their hands do come from the hand of GOD, whose Images and Instruments they are.

To conclude, its a thing which cannot be dissembled, that the Parliaments, constituting an Aristocratick Government in part, as they do, are quite contrary to Monarchick Government. Aristocracy is adverse to Regality; because of all Governments it comes nearest to it. As, to use the very terms of *Hesiod*, a Potter envies, and is against a Potter. Be it remembred here briefly, that *Theopompus* King of *Sparta* having created the *Ephori*, at last after a great deal of time, *Cleomenes* was fain to put them to death; when they had slain King *Agis*. The Senate becoming too potent, overthrew the first *Roman* Monarchy, and

nd in one word, what hath our Age seen n the trial of *Chenailles* ? and what did a ormer in that of Chancellor *Poyet* ?

A second source from which the evils of tigious suits do arise, is the sale of Magi- racies. The Emperour *Alexander Severus* ound this mischief in his Empire ; it ha- ing been introduced by *Domician*. S. *Lewis* w cause to weed the abuse out of His ingdom ; it having got in through the onfusion and trouble of some precedent eigns. It will be glorious for the King o do in His State what the Emperour *Se- rus* and S. *Lewis* did in theirs, with great- st glory to their memory. But as Policy equires, that in such enterprises, way be ade by degrees, and greatest events brought n by small beginnings : so it is necessary ere, to proceed leisurely, and with mea- ured steps. The fixation of Offices hath een much advanced already : for though hat hath been done seemed to signifie an uthorizing the sale of them : yet in truth, here hath been ground gotten. To conti- ue the work, and bring it to perfection, here must a Decree pass, or a Declaration e made, and publish'd at the Seal, by which the King declares, that he purposeth o longer to admit any opposition in matter f title to Offices. This is just ; for the ing ought to be ever Master, and have the berty to bestow the charges of His King-

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dom on whom he pleaſeth, and thinks worthy of e'm. Thus no one will be alarmed: but this Declaration will extend unto the price it ſelf, by a conſequence eaſily deducible; namely, ſince the principal and eſſential right to Offices conſiſteth in the Title, and the price is but an acceſſory, as they term it: 'tis reaſonable, that the price alway follow the Law of the Title: as the Title to a Benefice brings in the Revenue of it; And as in Marriage, the Validity of the Sacrament makes the Validity of the Contract, and of the civil effects. Thus receiving no more oppoſition at the Seal for the Title; there neither will be any in reference to the price: and hence it will come to paſs, in tract of time, that Offices will be no longer ſecurity for mony; which will diminiſh the price of them, and inſenſibly bring it to nothing. But it is very juſt too, that the mortgaging of Offices, as hath been done hitherto, be obſtructed for the future. For the Officer may dye before he hath paid the *Paulette*; whereby his Office is extinct; or if of Grace the King revives it, the value of what ariſeth from the caſualty, is much leſs than the ſum for which the thing was engag'd: ſo that there muſt loſs certainly accrue. But if the King make a new creation of an Officer, all engagements are gone: for 'tis then no longer the Office that formerly it was.

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Let it not be ſaid, that without the Sale of Offices, the Caſualties will be worth the King nothing. For the contrary is true: and if the Caſualties be worth Him Two Millions, by reaſon of that ſale of them, His Majeſty will make Four Millions of e'm, if they be no longer ſaleable. Forasmuch as in this caſe, they will be no longer Hereditary; and being no more Hereditary, they will revert to the King upon the deceaſe of every Titulary: and ſo the King may diſpoſe of e'm in favour of the perſon that is moſt acceptable to Him, and if it pleaſe His Majeſty, the new admitted Officer may fine to the Coffers of His Treaſury Royal, as the Officers of Gentlemen do to the profit of the Monaſticks. As to the Objection, that by ſuch ſuppreſſion of Officers and Juriſdictions, and taking away the ſale of Offices, the King will loſe the Revenue of many of His Clerks places, and of the *Paulette*; The Anſwer is eaſie; For as to the Clerks places ſuppreſs'd, the King will be recompenc'd by the greater value of thoſe that ſhall remain; and as for the *Paulette*, the retrenchment of the wages of the Officers ſuppreſs'd, will be much more conſiderable.

A third cauſe of vexatious Law-driving is, that Offices of Judicature are gainful to thoſe that execute them. An evil this, the dangerouſeſt of any that can affect a State; for

for all becomes ſuſpected, all becomes corrup where profit is to be made; avarice and am bitioncreep in; juſtice, uprightneſs, and truth depart: whereupon we may conclude wit the ancient Proverb, *That money doth ma things which the Devil cannot do.* For a entrance upon a Reformation in this matte it would be good to ordain, Firſt, Th Judges not the Kings, ſhould take no mor Spices. Secondly, That Judges in the Roy Courts ſhould not decree Executions fo their attendance againſt the parties that ar in conteſt. Thirdly, That if Spices, (o Fees upon ſentence obtained) be allowe the parties ſhall give what they will, as th former cuſtom was, and not be compelled Fourthly, That there be no more tranſact ing by Commiſſaries in Soveraign Courts.

Judges ſhould be forbidden to admit an ſollicitation from parties at Law; eve though it be but to let them know the dif ficulties of their affairs, and put them in way to clear the ſame. For a Judge ough not to be prayed to do his Office, in favou of a man whoſe caſe is good, much leſs o one whoſe caſe is bad.

CHAP

CHAP. IX.

1. Of ſome general Orders in Government. 2. Of puniſhment and recompence. 3. Of Royal Virtues.

IN the Chapters now diſpatch'd, I have inſerted many things which may be of uſe for the Kings ſervice, for the general good of His State, and of every of His Subjects in particular. In the Chapters that are to follow, others very conſiderable ſhall be added. However, I judge it not amiſs to make here a diſtinct Chapter of ſome important points, which I cannot eaſily rank any other where.

It hath been long in diſpute, whether it be good to alter Publick Laws? and upon debate of the Queſtion to and fro, 'tis concluded, that there is oft-times ſo preſſing a neceſſity, that it cannot be forborn: but withall, that ſuch alterations muſt be inſenſible to the People, who hardly come off from old Cuſtoms; and cannot be brought to any new obſervance, but by a long circumference, and ways to them unknown. Legiſlators are Phyſicians of Commonwealths, and in this caſe ought to imitate the

the ordinary Artists of that Profession, who seeing the whole habit of a body out of order, and that to preserve the Patient from perishing, 'tis necessary to change it, do prescribe remedies, which the more slowly they operate, the surer their effect.

Now the first Law, which in my Opinion might be made, or rather renewed in *France*, is to banish thence all Usuries, of whatever quality, except among Merchants; and those should be expresly prohibited, which arise from personal Obligations, under pretence of damages and interests; even interests adjudged by sentence not excluded; this pretence being but a means to authorize Usury, and defraud the Law, which forbids it. Usury was strictly prohibited among the ancient Inhabitants of *Candie:* but the coveting of Riches, to elude the severity of this Statute, disposed the borrower, that he should seem to have stollen the money he had need of; and which in reality was lent him. By this artifice the Debtor was constrained to pay the Interests; which were not adjudged to the Creditor on the account of any Loan, but in hatred of Robbery, which he said had been committed upon him. This means cannot be used in *France*; for that Theft is there a capital Crime, both in Religion and in Policy. But the spirit of man being unbounded, and having more craft when bent to

transf-

transgress, than the Law hath prudence to hinder evil doing, the taking of damages and interests hath been introduced amongst us; which is an equivalent to the *Cretan* expedient. For the feigning a detension of money against the owners will, as is done in *France*, and the Debtor thereupon condemned to pay the Interests, can be no other thing for substance, than the feigning a Robbery, as was done in *Candie*.

There is not any Nation of note, in which Usurious Contracts have not been prohibited among the Subjects. 'Tis known what the Law of the Church in this behalf is, and what that of the Old Testament, so often repeated in Scripture, was. Usury sure, hath caused the greatest disorders that have hitherto troubled the tranquility of States. The *Athenians*, the *Spartans*, and the *Romans*, did not forbid it only; but were also forced to abolish Debts contracted; and for publick benefit, rescind the compacts and promises that private men had made, though they seemed inviolable, as having been made under the Authority of the Laws, and upon the security of general custom, which they were not wont to over-rule. An act of very particular consequence. All Usurious Contracts should be annulled, yea the culpable and complices as to the crime of Usury, put to death; the

the Uſurer, in *Plato*'s opinion, being worſe than the Thief.

The ſecond Law ſhould be, to permit Contracts for annual Rent out of Land; yet with charge, that they be publiſhed for publick ſecurity; as I have ſaid elſewhere when I treated of the ſhortning of Law-ſuits. Withall, regulating to a denier, the Arrerages, which are a kind of Uſury, but the moſt tolerable of any, ſeeing there is an Alienation of the Land; and it is a fiction prudently hit upon by the Popes *Calixtus* the Third, and *Martin* the Fifth. As for the Declaration in form of an Edict which is to be made herein; Contracts, even the formerly made, ſhould be reduced to the Thirtieth denier. The *Romans* limited Uſe to the hundredth, afterwards to the Two hundredth, and at length aboliſh'd it altogether.

A third Law ſhould be, that no ſum lent to any Son of a Family, or to others under 25 years of age, without the conſent and authority of their Relations, do produce any action; no not though the Contracts be ratified by the Debtors, after they come of age. *Veſpaſian* made a like Ordinance; and there is nothing more effectual to repreſs the greedineſs of Uſurers, or the debauch of young people: whereupon they would ſet themſelves to labour, to exerciſes and ſtudy. The profit which theſe Laws would

ould yield the State, beſide their ſtopping e courſe of great evils, would be, that erſons who are alway concern'd, and im-atient to be getting, ſeeing they could not ut out their mony at Intereſt eaſily, and at the Intereſt of their Contracts would at too low a rate, muſt of force apply emſelves to two things, each of which is ninently advantageous to the Kingdom. or they would addict themſelves to rades and Husbandry; or put their mony the hands of Merchants to make benefit it, if not enter into partnerſhip with em, which they ſhould be permitted to . For Uſury in matter of Commerce, as never forbidden, and is the Secret that e *Hollanders* have found, to make all their eople Merchants. On the other hand, the *enoeſes* have engaged themſelves in Traf-k, upon obſerving the profit it yielded.

The fourth Law might be, that Gentle-en be diſabled to ſell their Fiefs or Inhe-tances, until they have made declaration their Poverty in open Court. Among e *Iſraelites*, Lands engaged reverted to eir ancient owners at the Jubilee. The *partans* Lands were not divided at all; I ean thoſe 7000 portions which *Lycurgus* d lotted out. The *Locrians* in like man-er, ſold not their Eſtates: the ſame is ob-rved in *Flanders*. The Fiefs of the great ouſes of *Bretannie* are never parted out.

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Substitution of Heirs in *France* doth hinder the Alienation of Lands. In *Spain* Gentlemen cannot sell their Estates: And lastly, the Demesne of the Crown in *France*, is in-alienable, which may prescribe a Law for all Noble Families. This Ordinance would make Gentlemen good Husbands. When the *Jews*, the *Lacedemonians*, the *Syracusians*, the *Romans*, and all civilized people, made a partition of their Lands, they consider'd the benefit that might thence redound to their States, and very wisely provided, that all such as possess'd Inheritances should fix in the Country: having an Estate there which they could not carry away, they would love the places where they had their subsistance; and every one defending his own possession, all would jointly defend the Common-wealth, and fight for the Publick Interests.

The Fifth Law should be, that a Gentleman being ruin'd, and having acknowledged his Poverty in Court, should be no longer Noble; there being no Estate so shameful, as that of a man of Quality reduc'd to an extream misery. On the contrary, that a *Plebeian*, when he hath rais'd himself an advantagious fortune, which might be limited at 50000 Crowns should be ennobled; provided always, that the profit had been made by laudable and lawful means.

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A ſixth Law ſhould be, to hinder the publick begging of the poor, by appointing the greateſt penalties upon it; and ordain, for that end, that every Pariſh both in Town and Country, do maintain their own poor, not ſuffering them to wander; puniſh all that make a Trade of it; ſend the ſtouteſt of them to the Galleys, and ſet all the reſt on work according to their abiity. This is a means to fetch out that idleneſs which is among the meaner ſort.

The ſeventh Law might be, to render Fathers reſponſible, as to civil intereſts, for all the faults and crimes their Children ſhould commit while they depend on them, and under 25 years of age; or, however, whilſt they dwell in the Fathers houſe. The mulct to be allowed for afterwards in the Patrimony of thoſe faulty Children. This Law is in force in *Bretannie*, and was ſo at *Rome*. Maſters, in like manner, for the faults of their Houſhold-ſervants; and paying an Arbitrary fine beſides, becauſe they ought to correct them. In the third place, Provoſt Mareſchals and their Officers, for all Robberies and Murthers committed on the High-ways, Burglaries, Counterfeitcoyn, and other the like crimes within their diſtrict, if they took not up the Malefactors, and brought them to their Trial. This Law would hinder well-nigh all miſchiefs of this nature: it being, as may be

ſaid, of publick notoriety, that Provoſts hold intelligence with all perſons of ill life. Again, all Lievtenants criminal and Judges, for the Crimes committed in their Towns; by the ſame reaſon. Maſters of Inns and Houſes of Entertainment, for the Crimes committed by their Gueſts, while they are in their Houſes. Owners of Houſes, for the Crimes committed by their Tenants during their term; becauſe they ought to know, and anſwer for the good abearing of ſuch as they entertain. Captains and Officers for the Crimes of their Soldiers; the Inhabitants of an Houſe for thoſe committed in it. This is done in *Spain*. In the *Turkiſh* Towns, the Towneſ-men of each Street are reſponſible for what is done there: and if a man be ſlain, the Townſman before whoſe door he falls, is ſentenced to pay for his blood. This Order is excellent. For aſſoon as there is a noiſe in the Street, all run thither, and the Authors of the Fact, whatever it be, are ſeized, brought before the Judge, and forthwith puniſh'd according to the quality of the Crime. In paralel to this rule of government in *Turkie*, ſevereſt penalties muſt be impoſed upon ſuch as tranſgreſs the Laws, and eſpecially the Laws that relate to Publick Order and Policy; thoſe penalties alſo ſpeedily inflicted; otherwiſe the ſaid Laws will be of no uſe. For example; The ordain-

rdained in *France*, that no Lackey wear a word; that no Townſ-man have Arms; r that Bakers make their Bread of a certain eight, or other things of like nature. hey that obey not, muſt be inſtantly puiſhed, the rich by pecuniary fines, the oor by corporal penalties. The *Turks* cauſe fenders who have not money to pay their nes, to be beaten with a Lath.

A eighth Law, All Printers and Bookllers muſt be forbidden, and that upon in of death, to Print, Sell, Diſperſe, ſet Sale, or Keep, any Book of what uality or Subject ſoever, without its ving been Approved, and Licence gin them under Seal in due manner; er which may nothing be added to the ok.

But as it is juſt to puniſh bad Subjects, it is reaſonable to reward the good: and m that out of love to their Country, emy themſelves in advancing its Reputatiand Glory. The King ought to be the Maſter and Arbiter of all rewards; and fer them himſelf, ſo as they that receive Beneficence of His, may be convinc'd owe it to His Bounty. This would n infallible means to attract to Him the e of His Subjects, and together with heir reſpect, whereupon every one ld ſtrive to pleaſe Him, in doing his , and no body promiſe himſelf any

Grace or Advantage, but by his Merit, his Services and Diligence. There are several kinds of Rewards with which His Majesty may honour His Subjects; I say, honour them: because a Subject, in receiving a benefit from the hand of the King, receives withall a mark of the Esteem which is had of his Person, and of the Satisfaction he hath given in his Conduct. Nothing can be more glorious to a man of worth; nothing can yield him a truer contentment. A gift from an ordinary hand is many times somewhat shameful to him that takes it; and hence comes the adage, That it is better to give than to receive. But when the King is the Donour, the Dignity of the Royal Hand doth add to the Gift a new quality, which augmenteth the Worth and Excellency of it: whence it is, in such case, no less praise to receive than to give.

This now which I have affirmed, cannot be doubted of: yet it may be taken for evident, that of these rewards, there are some purely Honourable, others only Profitable, and a last sort, both Honourable and Profitable too. The reward purely Honorary is when the King confers upon a Subject some Dignity which he had not afore; as upon a *Plebeian*, the quality of Gentleman, upon a Gentleman that of Knight, or Marquis, *&c.* and permits him to carry *Flourdelis*

in his Coat of Arms, or ſome other memorial of a great Action: Or grants him the priviledge to wear a Crown in his Creſt, or the like. This kind of reward is unlimited, becauſe Soveraignty is a ſource from whence new Honours and Dignities inceſſantly flow; as projections of Light do every moment iſſue from the Sun, without exhauſting its fecondity; and on the contrary, the more rayes that it emitteth, the more reſplendent is it in it ſelf; ſo the more Honours a King confers, the greater Luſter He adds to His own Royal Majeſty. The *Romans*, of any people upon earth, did moſt abound in conferring rewards of this nature: and on that account, brought into uſe Crowns, Triumphs, Statues, Rings, Inſcriptions, Publick Praiſes; and ſtuck not to grant Deifications, Temples and Sacrifices: ſuch a love they had for Virtue; and ſo ingenious were they to inhance the merit of their Fellow-Citizens: thus inciting them to worthy Performances, and principally to an advancing the power of the Common-wealth. For any man that hath a Noble Spirit, and is Virtuouſly diſpos'd, does more to merit a juſt reward, than he would to gain the Empire of the World: becauſe in the iſſue, 'tis always Virtue that triumphs; and oft-times but Fortune that rules. In conformity to this example, which both Antiquity, and the

Authors of it, and Experience, do render Illuſtrious, the King may Honour ſuch as ſerve Him beſt, with Honourable Titles; but ought to puniſh all thoſe, who, without His permiſſion, dare aſſume and uſurp them. 'Tis neceſſary that there be a difference of rank between perſons; and the diſtinguiſhing of them by their merit, is to be preferr'd far before all diſcrimination made by their wealth.

It would alſo be very commodious, that as the Honour of Knighthood is purely Perſonal, ſo the King ſhould make the Dignity of Baron, of Marqueſs, of Count, &c. Perſonal likewiſe; not real, or annexed to Eſtates; the ſaid Dignities to become extinct by deceaſe of the perſons inveſted with them. This Expedient, to recompence men of worth, being well managed, would produce a marvailous effect; and an whole race, thereby become men of Merit. For, what would not the Son of one of theſe perſonal Marqueſſes do, to prevent falling from that degree of Honour which his Father had? and how could he chooſe but preſs vigorouſly on in the Court of Honour that has been thus mark'd out to him? But in this caſe, there is one thing to be further done, which might much profit the State, by laying a more Expreſs Obligation on the Nobility to ſerve the King: and that is, that the King do give His Letters

ers for personal Marquesſates, in ſuch form s they may be verified in the *Pariſian* Cham-ber of Accompts, and the perſons honou-ed with them, do homage to His Majeſty hereupon. Such kind of Homages have been done heretofore for Offices, and even for Penſions, though but of two hundred *Livres*. The Emperour in *Germany* hath, n this manner, made Gentlemen, and Counts of the Empire, as for example, the ate *Count de Guimene*; who had not a foot f Land within the Emperours Juriſdicti-n. The King of *England* creates a Gen-leman, Baron, and Earl of a Barony, or County, in which the Gentleman poſſeſſeth nothing.

The ſecond kind of Gratifications and Rewards, is of thoſe that are purely gain-ul and pecuniary; as Penſions, Tickets for money, Acquittances by Patent, Ranſoms, Confiſcations of deceaſing Strangers goods, nd the like. Theſe however, carry a great eal of honour with them, as I ſaid afore. The third kind, is of thoſe that are at nce both gainful and honourable, as Great Offices, Governments, *&c.*

Upon this matter of Rewards, there is his further reflection to be made; namely, hat a King never be inform'd of a good Action, but He gratifie the Actor, either with Praiſes, or with Benefits. In fine, all hese favours muſt be regulated by conſide-

ration of His Service, and the welfare of His State. GOD, in giving Princes a Soveraign Power, inſpires into them Affection for their People. But His will is, that it be a Paternal Affection; that a King do open His Boſom to His Subjects, as His very Children; and that all His Counſels and Deſigns be levell'd at their Felicity; without which, Himſelf cannot be happy. 'Tis principally for this great and glorious effect that Kings are Images of GOD, and be fortified with His Spirit.

I have ſaid, that Monarchs are in their Kingdoms, what the Soul is in the body of man, that external Goods cannot enrich them; that Virtue alone is their proper Portion, as it is of GOD Himſelf. It now remaineth I ſhould ſay what kind of Virtue it ought to be.

'Tis neceſſary that a Great Prince have Piety, to give His Subjects an Example of it; and bettering of them in this, is the ſecurity of His State. He muſt be juſt to govern them. A Government never is of long duration without Juſtice. This Queen of Virtues comprehends, (as *Ariſtotle* judiciouſly noted) all the reſt. A King, I ſay, muſt be Juſt, to render unto every one, and unto Himſelf, what is reſpectively due. The third Virtue of a Prince, is Prudence, to foreſee of Himſelf what may betide His States. Thus a wiſe Pilot hath

the skill to foreſee Calms and Storms: he knows by ſecret notices, whether the winds will be favourable, or contrary to his Voyage. The fourth Virtue is Magnanimity; a weight this, that keeps the Soul always in the ſame poſition, and gives it ſo ſetled a firmneſs, that neither good nor bad ſucceſſes can put it out of place; and a King appears unalterable: He thus bears up the hope of His Subjects; they look upon Him as an aſſured ſuccour againſt Fortune, and perſwade themſelves, there is ſomewhat of Divine Quality in His Perſon. Of Royal Virtues, a fifth is Clemency; It pertains to the greatneſs of a King, that He be benign, and do commiſerate the weakneſſes of His Subjects, who are Men as He is. Miſchances are pardonable, and it ſeems to me, 'tis too much rigour to puniſh a poor wretch for a crime committed out of imprudence, or by neceſſity; and of which he is leſs guilty, if I may ſay it, than his ill deſtiny. 'Tis to Criminals of this kind, that Grace ſhould not be deny'd: and when a King gives one of His Subjects his life, who hath been condemn'd to death, He ſhould rejoice more at the feeling in the ſecret of His heart a will to pardon: than at the having in His hand the power to puniſh. To give a man his life, is in ſome ſort to create him; and the preſerving of His being, is a giving of

it. It would be, 'tis true, a great fault, to ſtop the courſe of Juſtice, in caſe of publick crimes, and ſuch as have diſturb'd the peoples peace: Yet in ſum it is Noble, that a King be inclin'd to compaſſion and mercy. 'Tis an action appropriated unto GOD, to diſarm His Anger: Upon this ground the *Roman* Poet ſaid, That thoſe Thunder-bolts which *Jupiter* throws, might be diverted.

The ſixth Royal Virtue is Liberality. One of the Ancients pronounced, that it was leſs diſadvantageous for a King to be overcome by Arms, than by Liberality. A Poet introduceth *Mark Anthony* excellently ſaying, That he had nothing left him but the Benefits he had conferred. And to ſay true, a Great Prince never enjoys His Wealth, but when He hath given it. Liberality enricheth Him, and makes Him purchaſes of ineſtimable value. For thereby 'tis, that He wins the love of His own people, and becomes admired of all others. When I ſay Liberality, I mean a judicious Liberality, ſuch as is a Virtue, not an exorbitant profuſeneſs; a Liberality alway exercis'd with Advantage, and with Glory.

To conclude, in ſhort; when I conſider other Virtues, I do not find any one of them all improper for a King; but it is impoſſible a King ſhould have thoſe which

have mention'd, without having every one of the reſt; ſince they are inſeparable Companions, and muſt be united to make a Virtuous man.

CHAP. X.

1. *Of Finances, or a Princes Treaſure.* 2. *Means to make the Subjects more numerous.* 3. *Of the Officers that manage the Kings Treaſure.* 4. *Of the Kings Demeſnes.* 5. *Means to recover the Demeſnes.* 6. *Of Taxes.* 7. *Means to eaſe the People.* 8. *Of the Free Cities.* 9. *Of the* Gabells. 10. *Means to augment the Receipt of the* Gabells, *and eaſe the People.* 11. *Of the Salt-free Country.* 12. *Of the Countries of State, and free gifts.* 13. *Of the expending of mony.* 14. *Of the reſerving it.*

THE Art of Finances, or the Treaſury, is a principal part of the Politicks; and ſo much the more neceſſary in

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a State, in that Money is the ſoul of all affairs. A Common-wealth is no further powerful, than proportionably to the richneſs of its publick Treaſury, and the greatneſs of the yearly income that maintain it. This the *French* name plainly importeth; for *Finance* is an old word, ſignifying Power, and comes from the ancient verb *Finer*, which is to be able, to may or can.

Three particulars are here to be conſidered. Firſt, Juſt and eaſie means to make money. Secondly, The prudent expending it. Thirdly, the keeping it in, and laying it up for neceſſities that may happen; as Famine, Peſtilence, War, Fire, Shipwrack, and ſuch like.

We have in *France* three general means to make money; The Kings Demeſnes. Impoſitions on the People. Merchandiſes. *&c.* Of this laſt I will ſpeak in the Chapter of Commerce. I will ſay nothing here of Conqueſts, which may come in for a Fourth means of getting; I will treat of them elſewhere.

Before any further advance into this matter, it will be pertinent to obſerve; that the fundamental wealth of a State conſiſts in the multitude and plenty of Subjects. For 'tis men that till the ground; that produce Manufactures; that manage Trade; that go to War; that people Colonies;

and

and in one word, that bring in money. To make way in *France* for multiplying of men, and oblige them to marry, the King may at once do two things, after the example of the Emperour *Auguſtus*. Firſt, He may decree Priviledges and Advantages in favour of ſuch as ſhall have divers Children; exempting them from Guardianſhips, from being Collectors, from Commiſſions to look to the fruits of ſequeſtred Lands, and other burthenſome Offices: He may diſcharge them from Subſidies, and even give them ſome Eſtate. Secondly, He might impoſe penalties upon thoſe that marry not before a certain age: and take part in the ſucceſſions of all ſorts of perſons, who in contempt of Law and Wedlock, live ſingle, not having impediment by any natural infirmity. 'Tis upon a like conſideration, that I ſaid in a former Chapter, the King, to reſtrain Parents from compelling their Daughters into Cloyſters, might declare, that the right of all Recluſes in any ſucceſſion, was veſted in Himſelf: And 'tis for the very ſame reaſon that the ancient Earls of *Flanders* were Heirs to all the Prieſts that were their Subjects.

Now to that which *Auguſtus* did for the inducing of his Subjects to marry, the King might add two particulars. One is, that the firſt year a man taxable did marry

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the first time, being under twenty six years of age, he should be exempt from all Subsidies and Impositions, and publick charges, even quartering of Soldiers, in case he kept house apart, and was setled in a dwelling of his own. If the newly married be the King's Officer, his Office should not fall into the King's hand, if he died within the year. Commanders also, and Soldiers, should be dispens'd with, as to their serving for that time, unless on urgent necessity, or some important occasion. The other particular which in *France* had need to be added to *Augustus*'s Ordinances, is, to take effectual order, that persons onee married, be not so easily separated again as they are. For 'tis to no purpose to contract marriages, if they be not stuck to, and the coupled parties cohabit not.

A strange abuse in this matter of separation hath crept in of late, nor know I how the Officials have become so favourable in it, or how the Parliaments have suffer'd it. Now a days, a woman that would have, as they say, her swing, and without controll practice all that her giddy, witless, and oft-times wanton humour prompts her to, raiseth stirs in the house, at length tires out her Husbands patience; hereupon she complains of his vices, hath Servants suborned for her purpose; a Divorce comes to be adjudged

dged upon their Depoſitions, the Hus-
and is ſentenced to yield her up her Goods,
nd not only do that, but alſo to let her
ave poſſeſſion of her Dower, or of a
ood part of it; at leaſt to allow her a
reat Penſion. Then this woman retires,
akes an houſe, and lives after her own
aſhion, which is not alway the moſt com-
endable in the world; her Husband the
while, ſinking under the whole weight of
is Houſhold affairs. Had ſhe counted upon
nothing elſe, but that of neceſſity ſhe muſt
ive with her Husband, and in his Houſe,
he would have formed her ſelf to it, and
not have play'd her vexacious pranks; ſo
he had promoted the happineſs of her Hus-
band, and of the Children, and together
with it, her own. For application there-
fore of a remedy in this caſe, it muſt be a
Law, That a Wife ſhall not ſue for a ſepa-
ration, as to perſon or habitation, but by
the advice of four of her neareſt kindred,
men of known integrity: and that a ſepa-
ration being ordered, either by ſentence in
Court, or by accommodation between the
parties, ſhe ſhall be bound to enter a Mo-
naſtery, without egreſs again; nor ſuffered
to admit a viſit from any man there; it be-
ing contrary to Publick decency, that a
woman who hath loſt her Husband, (for to
be ſeparated from him, is to loſe him)
ſhould appear openly, and maintain com-
merce

merce with other men. On the other hand her Sex, and all ſeemlineſs requiring, that in this eſtate ſhe hide her ſelf, and hide withall her ill fortune, and her grief for it. I would too that a very ſlender penſion be adjudged her. And ſince Husbands will be found in fault on their part likewiſe, and diſcover their ill husbandry, it would be very juſt, that the diſpoſal of their Eſtate be not left to them, nor the poſſeſſion of more than a part of e'm: as is the caſe of Wives: and that ſuppoſing they have Children, the money ariſing from the remainder, ſhould be received, employed, and adminiſtred by a Guardian: He to account for it to the ſaid Children in due time. If there be none, the Revenue exceeding the penſion ſhould be laid out on Hoſpitals, and other neceſſities of the State. This Law ſhould extend to ſeparations already made. And ſuch rigour being practic'd in matter of Divorces, there would be no more of e'm. Husbands and Wives would be under a reciprocal obligatiou, to live together, and to live together diſcreetly: ſo they would breed up a Family that might prove the contentment of their life, the comfort of their elder years; and be beneficial to the whole Kingdom.

There is a further conſideration to be made in the matter of the Finances; and it is this, namely, that it is expedient the

King

King ſhould declare, that for the future He will be Creditor, and Donatary to His Receivers and accomptable Officers, for their Wives dotal money, and marriage ſettlements, and for their Childrens Portions and Donatives: then explaining the late Ordinances to take away all difficulty, declare further, the crime of miſemploying the publick money to be puniſhable by death; and ordain, that the Intereſts, Amends, and civil Reparations adjudged againſt Criminals of that kind, ſhould fall upon their Heirs or Legatees. This Law is rigorous; yet it is juſt and neceſſary: forasmuch as it will ſtrike terrour on the Financiers: who having no hope to eſcape Juſtice, could not entertain a thought of committing a fault that would ruine all that is deareſt to them. Beſide, the *Romans* puniſh'd even with death, the very friends of thoſe whom they condemn'd for Crimes againſt the State; the Hiſtory of *Sejanus* affords unqueſtionable proof of it.

That which we call the Demeſne of the King, and of the Crown, cannot be Alienated, nor is it liable to any charge or encumbrance. This Law is fundamental in all kind of Common-wealths, as well as in *France*. But here things are judged to belong to the Crown three manner of ways from all Antiquity: As the Soveraignty, the power of War, Subſidies, and the like.

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By Declaration; when the King, by His Letters, declares ſome particular united to the Crown. By Confeſſion, when for the continued ſpace of ten years, the Receivers have accompted for it to the Chamber. There are many queſtions propoſable in reference to the Demeſne; but it is not our buſineſs to State them. *Chopin* may be conſulted, who hath learnedly written of this Subject.

In neceſſities of the State, divers things have been engaged by the King to the uſe of private perſons, who have paid in ſums thereupon. Yet theſe perſons cannot hinder but that the things may be recovered. And there are two equitable ways to effect this. The Firſt is, by making a Principal of what is due to thoſe Creditors, and aſſigning them Rents upon the Town-Hall of *Paris*, or ſome other place; of which there are examples. For when the King had ſold, or rather engaged ſome Rights of His unto particular men, they have been reſum'd by Contracts for a Rent-charge. Now thoſe Rights were Demeſne, upon which, to recover the Demeſne, Rents were charged. The ſame courſe then may be taken again. Nor could the Engagees have any cauſe to complain; for the engagements made to e'm, are but to ſecure their due, and give them not any propriety: their ſecurity therefore will be as great when

when they have Contracts for Rent. For the one and the other pertains to the Demeſne ſtill. And ſuch kind of Impoſitions in like manner, the power to impoſe them being Royal and Dominical, the Engagees concerned will by this means have ſecurity for ſecurity, and Rent for Rent. But that the King may reap advantage from this exchange, it is neceſſary to ſettle a Stock for the raiſing of theſe new Rents; and to that end, a new Impoſition muſt be laid upon the Clergy, the Countries of State, Cities, Commonalties, Companies, Colledges, Merchants, and other members of the Kingdom, the Engagees themſelves paying their proportions. There is in this no inconvenience at all: becauſe the Demeſne having been engaged for the preſervation and defence of all the Corporations in the Kingdom, it is natural, that they all contribute to free it again.

The ſecond way to diſengage the Demeſne, would be, by giving ready money inſtead of Rents, and making an Impoſition for this end, which might be more eaſie. A reimburſement ſhould be compleated in five or ſix years. Mean time, and before all things, the Engagees muſt be put out of poſſeſſion, and order given, that the Receivers of the Demeſne do take up the profits. For if any condition be propos'd while the ſaid Engagees are in poſ-

poſſeſſion, they will make a thouſand difficulties at it; and on the contrary, if they no longer poſſeſs, they will readily conſent. But that the matter may be tranſacted with leſs noiſe, it ought to be expedited in each Parliament apart: or at leaſt the Receivers commanded, by virtue of a Decree of the Kings Council, to receive all the profits, and even thoſe of the engaged Demeſnes. If there be not made a new impoſition, in order to recover thoſe Demeſnes, the affair will not be of advantage to the King; and there may one be very juſtly made for the reaſons now alledged, and for the putting of things again in order, Let us paſs unto the art of the Tallies:

The Impoſition of the Tallies [or Taxes] is a kind of Subſidy or Aid laid upon the people. Under it, (in *France*) are comprehended the Tallion, and the Subſiſtance; as they term them. The Tallie is hugely equitable; it is ancient; it is neceſſary; and in uſe all the world over. For there never was people that paid not to defray the publick Expences. In *France* it is ſo moderate, and may be ſo eaſily paid, that it hath been known to be higher than now it is: becauſe the ſums that make it up are receiv'd without much trouble: Yet at preſent, though it be conſiderably diminiſh'd, the people is ſcarce able to pay it, and the Country extreamly incommodated by it.

The

The prime cauſe of this is, that the ratable perſons conſidered, the rates are not duely proportion'd; the rich Paiſants, the Juſticers of the Villages, the Gentlemens Farmers, the Eleus, and other perſons of power, are ſo eaſed, that they pay almoſt nothing, and the pooreſt of all do bear all. A ſecond cauſe of the miſchief is, that they who are commiſſioned to receive the Tallies, do ſo run up the charges, that they far exceed the principal, and thus draw money out of the peoples hands, which they can part with but once. When the Sergeants of Villages need a Cow, or Corn, or ſome piece of Houſhold-ſtuff, they go to the Paiſans houſes where they know the ſame is to be had; there they make Seizures, and then Sales at what price they pleaſe. They ſeize and ſell whatever they find, to the very Houſhold-loaf of Bread that hath been cut, and is in uſe: upon this, the poor Ruſtick hath nothing left to help himſelf, but is utterly diſtreſſed, and can no longer do his work. The greateſt part of theſe Officers muſt be ſuppreſs'd; the more there are of them in the matter of the Finances, the more diſorder and oppreſſion there is. For all of them look for profit; and they ſpoil all by their avarice and ignorance.

To remedy the two evils that have been mention'd, effectual order muſt be taken that the Paiſans may pay equally; that is,

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in proportion to the eſtate they have; and pay witnout charges ſuperadded. Firſt, all the Taxes ſhould be made real, as they are in *Languedoc*, that every one may pay. Secondly, The Tax ſhould be levied in kind of the fruits that are receiv'd from the Lands and Tenements, as Wine, Sider, Beer, Corn, Cattle, and the like; the quantity that is to be taken being ſtinted and fix'd, for example, to a Tenth part. A Paiſan that might have ten buſhels of Corn, would very willingly pay one to the King, and might do it without inconvenience. But when for payment of Forty Sous in mony, which he hath not, the Sergeants and Collectors ſeize upon, and ſell the ten buſhels of Corn, which too are priz'd at an extream low rate, and all is ſpent in charges, doth he not really, inſtead of Forty Sous, pay Twenty Livres? This turns not at all to the profit of the King, and tends to the undoing of his people.

Under the name of Lands and Tenements this Tenth might be extended unto Houſes in Cities, Towns and Villages, and they ordered to pay a Tenth part of the money they might be let out for; which ſhould be very low rated. In like manner a Tenth or Twentieth part might be taken upon Contracts for a Rent-charge. For theſe are ſtocks, and a real Eſtate. The Eccleſiaſticks, who have ſure been wary men, have

have taken their Rents in kind, and these sorts of Rents are now infinitely augmented. The greatest part of the Revenues of the *Romans* and *Ægyptians* themselves, was paid in Fruits. They paid their Armies and Officers with them. Many Kings have taken a Tenth of Estates, oft-times a Fifth, sometimes a Third. It is not necessary that the People have money; but they must have Fruits for sustenance of life. The King might have Farmers of this Tenth in each Parish, or in each Election, who might let out under-Farms of it to the Paisans, as is done in the Tythes of the Church.

If it be thought fit to take things in kind, there must be Magazins in Cities, as there are Store-houses for Salt: in them the Receivers should sell the Fruits, or reserve them, as *Joseph* did in *Ægypt*. The King will need them for Armies, for Fleets, for Victualling places of strength, for Transportation into forraign parts; especially in case of a Famine. This is practic'd in many Countries abroad, and particularly in *Italy*. What is done in a petty State, may be done in a great Kingdom. It is not to be doubted, but that if the Tallie were thus rais'd, it would go further than it does, and the people suffer no incommodity by it at all. But one thing which presseth more at present, is, the setting of the Country in case again. For this

this end, the rich muſt be permitted to give Cows, Sheep, and other Cattle, upon terms to the poor Paiſans. This is done in very many places, yea, in the greateſt part of the Kingdom. The too ſevere, and over-ſcrupulous Pariſh-Prieſts prohibit it; but they will not any longer be able to do ſo when the thing is publickly permitted.

It ſeems unreaſonable, that ſome certain Cities ſhould, upon imaginary priviledges be for ever exempted from the charges of the State; and mean time, the Country bear the whole weight of them. The pre-text of theſe Franchiſes hath induced di-vers of the Peaſants to retire to theſe places. Order muſt be taken in the caſe, and all theſe Cities obliged to contribute to the ex-pences of the Kingdom, which they are ſo conſiderable a part of. They may then be brought to pay, under colour of Subſiſtance, or Loan. There ſhould be Garriſons ſent them, or Soldiers quartered upon them, that all the Beams of the State may bear their part in publick affairs, and ſo the weight be more eaſie to them, whereas one alone would be over-charg'd, and break under it.

The third means the King hath to bring Him in money, conſiſts in the Gabells. Some have ſaid, that the Gabells are not of the nature of the Kings Demeſne: and their reaſon is, becauſe the Ordinances ſo

he firſt impoſition of them do import, hat it was not the Kings intention they hould ſo be. The contrary might be true. or, beſide that the Salt-pits did hereto- re belong to the Emperour, as goods of he Empire, the ſums that are raiſed out f them, are raiſed by publick Authority, nd turn to the profit of the whole King- om: as hath been done for many Ages. ut however that be; not to enter into a iſpute, which can be of no conſequence ere, I will conſider the Gabells according the preſent ſtate of things. I will not y when this kind of Impoſition did com- ence in *France*; nor upon what examples Antiquity our Kings did ground them- ves. Nor will I explain, how, beſide e Gabells of *France*, which are call'd *The and party*, there are the Gabells of *Pro- nce*, *Dauphine*, *Languedoc*, and *Lionnois*; cauſe the thing is known, and makes not our purpoſe.

The Gabells are paid in *France* by two fferent means. Firſt by Impoſitions; ſo places neighbouring on the Salt-free untries. There, for fear the Subjects uld not take Salt at the Kings Garners, Officers ſee how many Minots each Pa- ought to take: then a rate is made in Pariſhes for it, as for the Tallie. The ond means is without Impoſition: this he uſe in places remote from the Salt-free

Countries. There, becauſe prohibited Sa
cannot be brought in, every one fetche
from the Garners at the price currant.

The King receives a great deal of mon
from theſe Gabells; but the people pay e
ceſſively beyond what comes into His C
fers. The infinite number of Officers b
longing to a Store-houſe, the Receive
the Commiſſioners, the Archers, t
Charges, the Portage, the Fees of Office
to whom Preſents are alſo made, do ſw
low up huge ſums, which the King fing
not, and the People do pay. For there
not a petty Gabeller but lives handſom
by his employment: not a Commiſſion
but makes him a Fortune, and grows r
upon it, making good chear, and greate
pences. 'Tis of very much importa
that a remedy be apply'd to the malad
and in truth, the vexations which the Kin
Subjects do ſuffer under pretext of t
Gabelle, are not to be comprehended. T
Archers enter into Houſes, to ſearch (t
ſay) for concealed Salt: in obedience
Authority the doors are open'd to the
mean time themſelves covertly convey
ſome bags: hereupon they form a Proc
and the Maſter of the Houſe is exceſſiv
fin'd: nor do they depart till they h
pillag'd all they can lay hands on. If
trance be deny'd them, they force
houſe, and act all Hoſtilities: nor dares

one complain; all are at their mercy; and thus they ruine the poor perſons whom they ſingle out. This is no way beneficial to the King's affairs, nor is it His intention, that His Subjects ſhould be ſo ill treated. But it is eaſie to break them of this courſe.

Firſt of all, it muſt be debated in the Kings Council of the Finances, what ſum is fit to be taken for the Salt; this ſum being determin'd at ten or twelve Millions; for example, two ſeveral parts of it ſhall be ſet out, to be yearly paid: one for the Country-Pariſhes, another for the Cities. Each of theſe allotted parts ſhall be ſent into each Generality, and thence to the places where there is a Store-houſe of Salt. The allotment for the Country ſhall be divided by the Pariſhes, as is now done for the Tallie, the Subjects among themſelves rating every one's proportion. The Gentlemen, the Church-men, the Monaſticks, and others, muſt be engaged in it, and bear their part: becauſe they are charged by reaſon Salt is ſo dear as now it is; and by conſequence, the King making a change to the profit of all, all ought to be taxed, to recompence the diminution that will follow in the Finances.

The ſecond ſum allotted for the Cities, ſhall in like manner be ſent to the Generalities, and Salt-Garners, that ſuch Rents as

the Towns are to pay the King may be di-
vided; The houſes may be meaſured b
the Perch, and the Rents aſſeſſed accord-
ingly; much like to what is done fo
cleanſing the Streets at *Paris*. The Citie
that claim a Freedom, as *Angers*, *Orleans*
and *Paris*, ſhall enter into this contribution
for the ſame reaſon that the Eccleſiaſtick
and Gentlemen do; inaſmuch as they wi
notably profit by the ſuppreſſion of th
Gabells, and abatement of the price o
Salt. For it is to be obſerved, that th
meaſure which now coſts at *Paris* five an
forty livres, might amount not to tw
Crowns, and ſo proportionably in oth
Cities.

Now the number of Perches in each Cit
being known, (having been taken by Com
miſſioners of the Kings, who might b
Citizens,) it will be very eaſie, on an
neceſſity, to raiſe an aid from the Cit
upon the proportion of the ſaid Perches, b
way of Loan or Subvention, or under ſom
other title. And that the Citizens m
not oppoſe the Kings intentions in the m
ter, permiſſion muſt be given to each Cit
to treat every year with what Merchan
they pleaſe; and agree a price for the S
that ſhall be there ſold through the wh
year; He to ſell it, who will oblige hi
ſelf to afford it beſt cheap; (except t
Citizens had rather leave it free for all M
cha

chants that would, to bring in,) always underſtood, that there be no power to compell any one to buy. The like may be done in every Village; the Gentleman cauſing Salt to be ſold in a Servant's name, and making the profit of it. This courſe will, without doubt, be gain to the people; and Salt being ſold in ſuch manner, it may be brought to paſs, that the commodity its ſelf ſhall pay the Rents which ſhall be due to the King, and they the while, buy it at much a lower rate than they do: So that clearly, all ſorts will receive ſuch a propoſal with applauſe. To augment the cheapneſs of Salt, it ſhould be ordained, that it be free from paying to Lordſhips, and by the Load, and from Impoſts.

The thing being reſolved in the Council, the King ſhall make a Declaration in form of an Edict, by which His Majeſty ſhall take off the Impoſitions upon Salt, on condition the Towns and Pariſhes will pay him yearly the ſums He ſhall reſolve upon in His Council: and that until the Declaration be executed, the Gabell ſhall continue its courſe. It would be needful to ordain, that theſe ſums be paid into the hands of the Receivers of the Tallies. For there would be no more need of a Receiver of a Salt-garner. What are ſo many Receivers good for. but to conſume all? In this caſe the Receivers of Salt muſt be

otherwise disposed of. This Declaration would include a suppression of all the Officers of the Gabells; for when Salt should be freely sold, the King would have no more use of e'm. As for their re-imbursement, provision might be made, either by continuing their wages during their lives, or by assigning them Rents, which might be redeemed for little and little; or by giving them ready money. The people too might be charged with this re-imbursement, in favour of the suppression of the Gabells. This affair might be worth the King a great deal, and can never fail of being beneficial: the People will gain six Millions by it, beside the quiet it will yield them. It being put in execution, the King may purchase the Salt-pits, upon the greatest part of which, He would previously have the tenth part of the Salt, if He took the Tenth of all Revenues, as I said afore. Again in doing as hath been shewed, He would have an Army ready raised: for all the Gabellers must be led into the Field. There are in their Companies notable stout men, who also have been in action.

As for the Salt-free Countries which have bought out their freedom, no one dare touch them hitherto, by reason of the strength of the *Huguenots*, the Civil and Forraign Wars, and other considerations as the Minority of Kings, *&c.* But now that

hat the King is Maſter, and in a condition o make Himſelf be obeyed; 'tis reaſonable, hat he do oblige ſo many great and rich Provinces to bear a part of the burthens of he State, in proportion to their ability, or the eaſing the reſt of *France*. And to his end, one of the three following Propoſitions may be made them. Firſt, to ake a re-imburſement of the ſums paid by hem; which re-imburſement ſhall be made, y granting them a diminution of the Talies, without putting hand in purſe other ways. Hereto may be ſubjoyn'd, that the King may not wholly diſcharge them: ecauſe ſuch a diſcharge tendeth to the opreſſing of his other Subjects: that a King may indeed augment and diminiſh Subſidies, as ſeemeth Him good, but not extinguiſh them; it not being poſſible, that a Kingdom ſhould ſubſiſt without publick incomes: that it muſt be remembred on this occaſion, how *Nero* propoſing to take off all the Impoſts that were paid at *Rome*, the Senate oppos'd it, as a thing that would be the ruine of the Empire. The ſecond Propoſition might be, that theſe Provinces be obliged to pay the King a yearly Rent, by way of ſupplement, and in confirmation of their ancient Treaty. The third, that the Tallie, and other Impoſitions on them, be augmented, to even the ballance, which cannot be done any other way.

There are certain means to maintain the Finances; among others, the Free Gifts that are presented to the King by the people of those Provinces, which are called *Countries of State*. No other order need be taken with them, but to hinder as much as may be, that the principal Members of these States be not in the Offices they bear unjust at the Publick cost. Yet they must make their advantages in them, otherwise the States would come to nothing; which would occasion no small confusion, and a retardment of the Kings Affairs. His Majesty might make Himself Master of the Deputations, and gainful Commissions which are given to the States; as for example, in *Bretannie*, *Monsieur* the late *Mareschal de la Milleraye*, nominated alone, or rather, caus'd to be nominated whom he pleas'd; and there was no more deliberating after he had given order; 'twas one way he had to gratifie his friends. *Monsieur* the Duke *Mazarin*, does the same still; which may, in His person, succeed well: but the King may cause whom He will to be nominated, and the Liberty of the States will not suffer by it any prejudice, or innovation at all: for such is the condition of things in these places. I will not speak here of the Farms of Iron, nor of others of like value. These things run in ordinary course.

But

But having ſpoken of the bringing in of money, I muſt ſpeak of a due laying out, and a like due laying up thereof. The advantage of an Exchequer doth not conſiſt in the bare getting in of money; but alſo in a meet expending of it; and there is no leſs profit in giving of it forth, than in receiving of it. 'Tis neceſſary the King ſhould ſpend to maintain His Revenues. For if all the ſums that come into His Coffers ſhould not iſſue thence again, no one, in the end, would be able to pay Him any thing. The Kings of *Ægypt*, who took a third part of their Subjects Eſtates, caus'd the Labyrinth to be built, the Pyramids to be Erected, the Lake of *Meotis* to be dug up, and other Fabricks raiſed, which are incredible to Poſterity. Their deſign was to diſperſe among people, the Treaſure they received from them; and withall, baniſh ſloth and idleneſs out of their States. Theſe two vices, ſo dangerous in Kingdoms, the *Ægyptian* Laws did ſo ſtrictly provide againſt, that there were particular Magiſtrates appointed, unto whom every private man was obliged to give an Accompt every year of all that he had done throughout the year; which was executed with ſo much exactneſs and rigour, that if any one had taken an ill courſe to live, or not preſerv'd his Eſtate, he was ſeverely puniſh'd for it. The ſame thing was done at *Athens*, and the *Romans* had Cenſors,

who took the like care; they had it in charge, to make a review of all the people every fifth year, and inform the Senate of all that was amiss in the Commonwealth. I have often wondered, that there is no such Officer in *France*: and that each ones Estate is not precisely known, which 'tis hugely important, it should be; becaufe in difficult times, when the Kingdom perceives it self involv'd in urgent necessities, succour must be drawn from every one in proportion to his interest in the publick Fortune, that is, in proportion to what he possesseth in the Kingdom.

Expence must be made with good Husbandry; and a judicious parcimony observed in it; that it run not out to a profusion on one hand, nor shrink into a sordid avarice on the other: if measure and rule be not kept in the issuing out of money, all the Gold of *Asia* will be but a small matter. *Caligula* found the way to consume in his debauches in one year, the immense Treasures which his Predeceffor had been heaping up all along the whole course of his Empire. Thus it is expedient, that a King do cause the sums to be paid which are charged upon the Receipt of His Finances; and also that He give liberally; but always so order the matter by His Prudence that nothing go out of, or be kept in His hand, but for the preservation and prosperity of His Subjects.

I said in a former Chapter, that there were too many Officers in *France*; that the wages they draw from the King were unprofitable, nay, prejudicial to the State. Since the sale of Offices was introduced, divers new creations have been made. All these Edicts were meerly to get money in some pressing occurrences; and nothing but the conjunctures of the time rendered them tolerable. Now that those occurrences are over, and the conjunctures pass'd, things must be reduc'd to due order, by suppressing all those new Officers.

I noted, that wherever Magistracy brought gain, disorders would creep in; the reason of which is very clear, and very natural. For it is infallibly certain, that Judges will augment the number of suits, while those suits will bring them in profit. Consequently, useless Officers being suppres's'd, and provision made in the case by a due reduction, sufficient Salaries must be allowed them, and they forbidden to take any thing of the Plaintiff, or Defendant, upon the penalties expres's'd in the ancient Statutes. And that the King might make a stock to raise those Salaries, without charging His Finances, it should be ordained, that such as go to Law shall, when they commence their suit, depositea certain sum into the hands of the Clerks: this, to be done in all the Royal Jurisdictions. As

for

for other Judges, they ought to take nothing at all: the proprietary Lords muſt defray the charge of their Courts, if they will keep up the power to hold them: they having it of the King upon this condition, from the firſt grant of the Fiefs.

In matter of the Finances, it is not ſufficient to have the Secret of getting money, and the skill of duly expending it: but there muſt be alſo a right courſe taken to make reſerves of it. The *Romans* had a publick Treaſury, where every year they laid up certain ſums for the neceſſities of the Common-wealth. Other Nations were no leſs provident. Hiſtory tells us of the Stores of *David*, of *Cræſus*, of *Midas*, and many others. The King having ſetled an order in His Finances, both as to expences and receipt, it will be very prudently done of Him, to limit what He ſhall think fit to reſerve: and this reſervation ſhould make the firſt Article in His Finances, and be continued until He hath in His Coffers, in ſome ſecret place, the fourth part at leaſt of all the Coyn in the Kingdom: the reſt (if well us'd) may be ſufficient for all the people to maintain Commerce, and pay the King's Revenues. I ſay, this reſerve ſhould be in a ſecret place, and known only to perſons of approved Fidelity. For if many had notice of it, ſuch a ſtore might occaſion Seditions, and Civil Wars. Now

a fourth part of the money being once laid up apart in the King's Coffers, ſome addition to it ſhall be made continually from year to year, in proportion to what comes in anew.

Yet liberty muſt be left to perſons, for ſome time, to have gold and ſilver plate: yea, it would do well, to augment the uſe and mode of having it, if it may be; and that for three reaſons. Firſt, becauſe the Goldſmiths perceiving hope of gain, will not want inventions and induſtries to get into *France* as much mettal as poſſibly they may, either in ingots, or barrs, or coyned pieces. Secondly, becauſe by this means riches will be kept in the Kingdom, and when a ſeaſon for it comes, all they that are owners of ſuch Plate, may be commanded to carry it to the Mint, and there receive the price of it. The third reaſon is, becauſe the Goldſmiths having wrought up, and made Plate, contrary to the direction of the Statute, (which undoubtedly they will do) a ſearch may be made in the caſe, if affairs require; a ſearch highly juſt, and no leſs advantageous.

Two regulations muſt be made for the Goldſmiths, and they injoyned to obſerve them, upon pain of forfeiting Life and Goods; and ſo ſtrict an hand held over them, that of all who tranſgreſs, not a man be pardoned. The firſt is, to prohibit

bit their working upon any piece of Gold, or Silver Coyn. The ſecond, that they do not change the form of any prohibited Plate: rectifie and mend it they may. At the ſame time, all perſons that have any ſuch, and would put it off, muſt be commanded upon great penalties, to carry it to the Mint, where ready money ſhall be paid them for it, at the current price; they making proof that they are the true owners; and this to avoid Thieveries which may have been committed. Theſe two regulations will oblige the Goldſmiths to make uſe always of new Silver, or forraign Coyns, and thus they would cauſe a very conſiderable quantity of either to enter into *France*.

The State would receive no ſmall profit by taking a due order in matter of Coyn. It ſhould be ordained therefore in the firſt place; that no more be made any where but at *Paris*; and all other Mints, and their Officers, ſuppreſs'd as uſeleſs. The *Romans*, who had ſo much money, had but one place to make it in, which was a Temple of *Juno*'s at *Rome*. *Charlemain* forbad any money to be made otherwhere than in His Palace. And the truth is, ſhould all the money of *France* paſs through *Paris*, the King would much better know what quantity of it was in His Kingdom. Secondly, the *Court des Monnoyes* muſt be ſuppreſs'd, and

nd united to the Chamber of Accompts, s I have ſaid heretofore. In the third lace, the value of braſs money muſt be bated; this kind of Coyn being the ruine f the State. It cannot be believ'd how any Liarts and Sous the *Hollanders* have rought into *France*. It would be conve-ient to ſet the Sous at two Liarts apiece, he Liarts at a Denier, and the Doubles at n Obole, (half a Denier:) but this ſhould e done by little and little, and the fall ade by degrees, that the people be not uin'd: mean time, ſilver pieces of ſix lanks, others of a Sous in value, and of welve Deniers, are to be ſtamped. Bra-iers, and workers in mettal, muſt be for-bidden to melt up any Sous, Liarts, or Doubles; or otherwiſe uſe them in work. For after the reduction, a Sou, a Liart, nd a Double, would be worth more in work than in money; and that quantity of hem which is in the Kingdom being pre-ſerv'd, would ſuffice for Commerce in ſmall wares; they alſo being leſs worth in money than otherwiſe, Forraigners would bring in no more of them. In the fourth place, 'tis fit that a Gold-coyn be made of the value of the *Lewis*'s; this Coyn to have on the front a Sun, the face thereof repre-ſenting the King, with theſe words about it, *Nec pluribus impar*, and the year it is made in: On the reverſe, a Croſs charged

or

or cantoned with Fleurdelizes; and the ordinary motto, *CHRISTUS vincit, regnat & imperat.* Of this Coyn there ſhould be half and quarter pieces made, as there are half Crowns of Gold. This new money ſhould be called *Suns*, and all Gold Louiſes made in *France*, forbidden. As likewiſe all cravens of Or Sol, and Crowns of the Queen. New Silver-coyn alſo ſhould be made; the pieces called *Monarques*, or *Dieudonnees*, or ſome other names; in them the Figure of the King crowned after the manner of Antiquity, with the Title *Ludovicus XIV. Franciæ Rex:* on the reverſe, a Croſs with Fleurdelizes, and the ordinary Inſcription. Of theſe pieces there muſt be ſome of twelve Deniers, others of two Sous, ſix Deniers: others of five Sous, of ten Sous, of twenty, of forty. And to have matter for them, all Louiſes of ſixty muſt be forthwith prohibited: becauſe a multitude of falſe ones go abroad. Afterward, the Louiſes of thirty Sous, made any where but at *Paris*, ſhall be call'd in; and there muſt the new Coyns be alſo made. They will be well received by the People; for that every one hath an extream affection for the King; and becauſe in *France* we account by Livres, or Franks, and have no ſuch money; the Quar-decues being no longer current. This new Coyning of money is likely to bring a great deal into the Kings Coffers.

Gold

Gold and Silver muſt be held in *France* at an higher rate than they bear among Strangers; that we may draw it nither: nothing hath brought us ſo much Gold from *Spain*, *Italy*, and other Countries, as the permiſſion ſometime granted, that light pieces ſhould paſs. The ſame thing ſhould be done awhile, for once again: it would cauſe all Forraigners to come and take off our Wines, our Linnen, and our Corn.

I ſhould not forget to ſay, as I put an end to this Chapter, that the Maſters of Accompts, the Correctors and Auditors, having wages of the King, ought not to take any other Salary for any thing they do, that directly refers to His Majeſties ſervice; I mean, for the Accompts of the Treaſurers of the Reſerve, and other Accomptable Officers: for they are paid for this by their wages: practiſing in the manner they do, they take, as the ſaying is, two Tolls of one griſt.

I ſaid, that it was not at all juſt, that the Maſters of Accounts, Auditors, and Correctors, take Fees for the Accounts they examine, foraſmuch as they receive Wages and Priviledges from the King: alſo this Cuſtom was anciently practic'd, and this would be to reduce things to the primitive ſtate. I well know, that the pretence of theſe Fees is founded upon the creation of ſome Chamber of Accounts, where thoſe pay-

payments are made that never go to the Chamber; but this pretext is frivolous; for the Chambers of Accounts of *Montpellier*, and elsewhere, ought not in like manner to take any money for examining the Accounts of the King: so these new Chambers take away no money from that at *Paris* that peradventure takes from them the homages, and the verification of gifts; but in this the Clerks only are the loosers, and the Master Auditors and Correctors are not concern'd.

Addition.

Of the fine gross Farms.

I said but a word by the way of fine gross Farms, which is one of the projects to raise money by; the fine gross Farms are let upon the Merchandise, and upon the receipt of the Kings Rights; to avoid the charge of all these, an agreement might be concluded with all the Merchants, to pay every year a certain sum to the King of *Paris*; and upon their doing this, they should not be molested in their passage on the Rivers, or by Land, for any Toll or Custom.

CHA

CHAP. XI.

1. Of Peace and War. Of Sciences, of Arts, of Laws, of Publick Edifices, and Shews. 2. Of Arms, of Arsenals, Artilleries, of Fortified places, and Governours. 3. Of Armies, of Conquests; how a Conquered Country should be preserved.

Either Calm or Storm, if perpetual, would alike unfit the Sea for Navigation. The Waves must not rage, and swallow up the Vessels they should bear: but there must be wind enough to fill the sails, and give convenient motion; nay some little Tempests are of use to quicken the Pilots skill; whom continual fair weather would entice into a dangerous idleness. Just so is it necessary, that there still be, in a great State, especially in Nations of the *French* temper, some moderate agitation, and that the noise of Arms produce an effect upon them, like that of the Winds upon the Sea. Peace, by general consent, is that at which all Politicians do aim; nor can it be deny'd to be preferrable to War, being natural, as Liberty is. Yet

War

War hath its peculiar advantages; and those to such a degree, that we may account it to be of Divine Right. To say true, what other right did GOD give His people against the Kings of *Canaan?* In short, War makes the peace of Kingdoms the more firm, as a Storm causeth the Air to resume a more setled serenity. The prudence of Laws therefore should have provided Expedients for the preservation of States in each of these seasons: and the Wisdom of Legislators hath been justly taxed, in that they have not sufficiently thought upon this provision. The Poet upon this ground, gives his *Ulysses* all along the company of *Minerva*, and distinguisheth her a great many ways, that she might not be parted from him. In sum, the Mythologists representing this Goddess armed and bearing both the Shield and the Thunder-bolt of *Jupiter* her Father, do therein let us know, that the Wisdom of a good King ought to serve Him both for Peace and War. And such was the manner of teaching, in deepest and most remote Antiquity: Philosophy then but growing up and bashful, durst not shew her full lustre unto deprav'd and ignorant men, to whom She was yet very much a Stranger. She accosted them veiled with the shadows of Fable; and went softly and secretly about the preparing of their reason to receive her illu-

illuminations and inſtructions. But to return to our ſimilitude; A Storm doth not reach to the whole extent of the Ocean; and whatever Tumults be in ſome part of a Kingdom, yet the whole doth not ſo feel the ſhock of War, but that in others, Peace ſubſiſts: ſo as the Glory of Arms, and the Contentments of a full Tranquility, may be had together. Nevertheleſs, ſince theſe two different times do require like different cares; each of which were enough to take up the whole application of an excellent King; it is expedient to conſider them ſeverally.

Peace is undoubtedly proper for the Cultivation of Arts and Sciences. Knowing men there muſt be in a Common-wealth; it being neceſſary that there ſhould be good men. For knowledge 'tis that enlightens our Soul, ſhews us Virtue, and inflames us with deſire to poſſeſs it. I joyn Sciences here and Arts; it being impoſſible that men ſhould have the one without the other. For as they are Images of G O D, they are mov'd by a natural propenſion, to produce one thing or other; ſo that having acquired general Speculative principles, they neceſſarily deſcend to Practical operations, which are performed by particular rules, from whence Arts take their riſe. This is done during a Calm; then the Soul, not interrupted by any violent agitation, enjoys,

and

and by reflections, which by its leasure a repose permit it to make, views its s 'Tis in these precious hours that it m come to know the Dignity of its Origin and be assured of its Immortality. At su a time, having and keeping its faculti united, it gathers the fruit of a solid W dom; which is unto the Soul, as the S is to the Eyes of the body; and being all goods the greatest, communicates self in precepts; whereof Law is the a stract and consummation, giving the sa spirit to all the people.

To proceed: it is important, that Cit be enrich'd with publick Buildings, Temples, Palaces, and other sumptu Edifices; because people have, by that mea the more affection for their Country. T *Trojans* regretting their defeat, were grie more for the ruine of *Troy*, than the su version of its Empire. And the *Jews* *Babylon* lamented the demolishing of t Temple, where they had offered their sac fices, more than they did the loss of th Liberty. This affection of people for th Country, is likewise augmented by t contentment they receive in it; and th Maxime was a principal reason why t *Greeks* and *Romans* exhibited to their Su jects publick shows.

'Tis in a time of Peace that a Prin should prepare His Forces for War: ye

He ought to be always in Arms, they being the Ornament of His Royal Majesty, and support of the Laws. A People not armed does degenerate; and we see, that Nations heretofore eminently redoubtable, are now bankrupt as to Valour and Reputation. *Crœsus* after his defeat, counselled *Cyrus* his Conquerour, in recompence for the favour which had been shewed him; to disarm the *Lydians*, and promote among them Musick, good Cheer, and Pleasures: so they would never revolt, nor fail of obeying His command. This Counsel of *Crœsus* was really good: For by that means the inhabitants of *Lydia* lost their former love for War, and forgat their ancient virtue. Yet it is not expedient that Arms, which are the Kings, (for He hath the power of the Sword) should be in the hands of all private persons alike: and the difference between a Citizen and a Gentleman, a Soldier and a Country-Labourer, not be discern'd: Arms therefore must be in their hands whom the King intends for that employment: and He being every ones Protector, securing all by His Authority, all others must be expresly forbidden to bear any, without His permission, upon pretence of Hunting, or Journey, or Enemies: and this upon pain of being fined, and in case of reiterated offence, sent to the Galleys. These penalties too must not be meerly com-

comminatory, but as they term it, *legal*, and of indiſpenſible neceſſity. Not that Gentlemen ſhould all be depriv'd of the liberty to wear a Sword: on the contrary, 'tis fit to be injoyn'd them, that they never neglect to do it; becauſe it is the mark of their Quality, and continually minds them of the Virtue of their Anceſtors. It may be prohibited them to carry Fire-arms; yet 'tis convenient to permit them to keep in their Houſes Muſquets, Fire-locks, Piſtols, and other Arms; for that they naturally are defenders of the State, and by conſequence ought to be furniſh'd for any occaſion that may be offered. For the ſame reaſon 'tis meet that Gentlemen be enjoyn'd to keep their Stables ſtor'd with good Horſes, to breed up and manage a number of them for their ſervice in War. But to this end, the uſe of *German* Horſes for the Coach, muſt be forbidden, and none of them ſuffered to come into *France*: but Mares only for breed.

Lawyers, Eccleſiaſticks, Citizens, Merchants, Artificers, Husband-men, ſhould never wear a Sword, becauſe 'tis not their Profeſſion; and I would as much approve a Gentleman's fancying to wear a Lawyers Gown, or a Prieſts Caſſock. But that no ſuch perſon do abuſe this honourable mark, it muſt be ordained as a fundamental Law of Honour, that whoever ſtrikes with a Sword

word, a man, who, (not being of ſuch rofeſſion) has none, ſhall be declared ctually fallen from all honour, and as a ery Plebeian, yea Villain, (to uſe the old ord) deprav'd from all Gentility, and duc'd to the rank of a Labourer.

Since Arms are the Kings, as I ſaid, it expedient that there be Magazins in di- ers parts of the Kingdom; they, com- itted to the cuſtody of ſafe hands, and erſons of unqueſtionable Fidelity: in them ſtore of all ſorts of Arms offenſive and efenſive; ready fix'd, to Arm 40000 men. here ſhould be Equipage for Horſes, Boots, urrs; One of theſe Magazins ſhould be ac'd at *Paris*, to cover *Picardie*, *Cham- gne*, and *Normandie*. One at *Lion*, for y occaſion that might happen on the ſide the *Mediterranean* of *Italy*, of *Suiſſer- nd*, or the *Franche Comte*. One at *Tho- uſe*, or ſome other City of *Languedoc*, for that might be apprehended from *Spain*, the Sea of *Guyenne*. And one at *Angers*, to cure the Coaſts of *Bretagne*, and *Poiction*. here need be beſide theſe, two Arſenals r the Sea; which I ſhall ſpeak of in their ace. It will be neceſſary to have in the agazins a good number of Cannon for ttery, and of Field-pieces ready mounted ith Powder, Ball, and Equipage for the orſes of the Train.

The King ſhould have, for the ſecuri
of His State, ſeveral fortified places in
Kingdom. 'Tis an ill piece of Policy
neglect them; and good heed had need
taken, that he that may chance to win
battel, and become Maſter of the Field,
not at the ſame time become Maſter of
Cities alſo. It is known what Revolu
ons *England* hath ſuffer'd by it. And on
contrary, *Flanders* clearly ſhews what
Country thick ſet with Fortreſſes is
Exceſs being every where Vicious, I wou
obſerve a mediocrity here. But above
there muſt be left no Fortifications in To
or Caſtles, which belong to particu
Lords: except the King places in th
other Governours than the Proprieto
Theſe kind of places embolden Perſons
Quality that poſſeſs them, to declare the
ſelves, and make Parties in a time of Ci
War: what paſs'd at *Taillebourg* in the
troubles, is an example fully authori
what I have propos'd. I will ſay more
ſtrong Places and Garriſons in the Chap
of the Education of Children.

It is not ſufficient to have ſuch ſtr
places, and them well furniſhed with G
riſons, and brave Soldiers; unleſs there
given them Captains fit to command the
and to be their Governours. In each pl
then there muſt be four ſorts of Offic
The Governour, the King's Lieutena

e Governour's Lieutenant, and the Major. hese all having their Commissions from is Majesty, it is expedient, that, as far as possible, their bearing Office be limited a certain time; to the end, that the ntinuing of e'm longer may be in nature a recompence for their Services. And ey thus attending with the greater dili- nce to their duty; I should also wish, that ing continued in employment, they should ange place: as for example, that a per- n, who hath been the Kings Lieutenant ree years at *Dunkirk*, should go serve as utenant Governour at *Peronne*, or elso- here. Not that such a change were fit pass upon all the Officers of a place at same time. But let their Commissions three years, and every year one be nged, that they may serve together one r only. It is meet too, after the man- of the *Turks*, that their Commissions pired, they be kept a year without em- yment, to see whether there be any com- int against them. These alterations would rk two effects equally advantagious to King's Service. The First is, that eve- one would stick to his duty. The Se- d, that the King always having such d of Employments to give, there would more persons to hope for them; which uld much more strongly engage them to l-doing. The same usage should be

introduc'd, if it be poſſible, in reference
Governours, the King's Lieutenants. Th
is a concluding obſervation to be mad
namely, that it being the cuſtom for G
vernours to have ſome Companies of C
rabines, which they call their Guards; t
give them Caſſocks of their own Live
I would have this order changed; and t
the King ſhould every year ſend each G
vernour a Troop of Horſe to ſerve ab
him for a Guard; they having the Kin
Caſſocks as a badge of their Commiſſi
and their Officers carrying the Staff in p
ſence of the Governour during their
of ſervice. This would be a means
augment the Authority of the Ki
and not diminiſh that of the Go
nours.

As to Armies, it cannot be preciſely
of what number of men they ſhould c
ſiſt; nor whether they ought to be ſtron
in Horſe or in Foot. This wholly depe
upon the enterpriſes that are made, u
the quality of the Country, and natur
the enemy. I ſhould adviſe, that a G
King do keep Troops on Foot, even du
Peace: nothing is ſo neceſſary to a Stat
old Soldiers. *Auguſtus*, after his Victo
did not caſhier the forty *Roman* Legio
which prov'd to be the ſafety of the Emp
Conſtantine, on the contrary, disban
them; and thence came, in the iſſue,

ſſolution of the Power of the *Romans*. *uguſtus* however, and the other *Cæſars*, mmitted a great fault in keeping the *Pre-rians* in a body, for the Grandeur of their erſons; and Hiſtory tells us what lamen-ble changes they made in the ſucceſſion of e Emperours. The *Turks* have fallen in-like diſaſters by following the like uſage. ſhould therefore judge it expedient to di-de the Troops into ſeveral Quarters, and eep them in far diſtant Garriſons. The ncient Kings of *Ægypt* had a great many oldiers perpetually in pay, and were al-ays apprehenſive of their inſtructions: ut found a way to ſecure themſelves from l ſuch Seditions of their Armies. Divi-ing them into bodies, according to the iverſity of Nations, they gave them diffe-nt Enſigns; as for inſtance, to ſome a rocodile; to others a Dog; to a third rt a Cat; and ſo the reſt. Now the *gyptians* being hugely ſuperſtitious, they ere eaſily induced to believe, that their utelary Deities were included in the figure thoſe Beaſts which were given them for nſigns; and that they had the ſame Anti-athies among them in Heaven, which thoſe eaſts that repreſented them had to one ano-er upon Earth. Thus under a Veil of eligion, thoſe People were poſſeſs'd with n averſion for each other, like thoſe Ani-als which they had been ordered to carry

in their banners; yet all were close-unite and perfectly at accord for the common d fence of the State: so nothing could be e ecuted against the intentions of the Princ because as soon as any should begin to st the rest would immediately have oppos them. Upon this example the King mig divide all his Troops by Provinces; a though there should be no engaging of R ligion in the case, yet much advanta would, without fail, be drawn from then For the Nations would strive to out-vy o another, with more zeal and ardor than t Regiments now do. These Regimen themselves might have names given the from the Arms of their Provinces; as th of the *Bretons* might be called the Re ment of the *Ermine*; that of the *Norma* the Regiment of the Leopards, *&c. Juli Cæsar* raised a new Legion among the *Gau* and gave it the name of the Lark. B what I say in this particular, is but the g ving my opinion. For I am not of t mind, that the order of the *Militia* shou be changed, or Regiments disbande which consist of the best and most war-li Troops that are in the world.

'Tis ordinarily a great question; of wh Soldiers an Army should be composed. W have Subjects and Forreigners. The Su jects are Gentlemen, and Plebeians. T Plebeians are Citizens and Rusticks. O

he other hand, of Forreigners, ſome are he Auxiliary Troops of Allies, which ſerve t the coſt of their own Princes: as when he King ſent ſuccours into *Germany*, and nto the *Hollanders:* Others are Troops hat ſerve at the coſt of the State which mploys them. The Ancients termed them *Mercenaries*. Such at this time are the *uiſſes*, and not a few *Germans*. All theſe ifferent ſorts of Soldiers may be uſed, as eceſſity and the conjuncture of affairs re-uires. The *Romans* did ſo. It is true, y their Treaties of Alliance they always bliged their Allies to ſend them a certain umber of Soldiers; but theſe were not in-orporated with their Legions; and it is lear, that Subjects are ever beſt; of Sub-ects, Gentlemen have ordinarily more cou-age than others. Of Plebeians, thoſe of he Country are to be preferred before the nhabitants of Cities; becauſe Paiſants are nore accuſtomed to Labour and Hardſhip han Towns-men are. Auxiliary Troops erve but for a time; and often, when ome continuation of ſervice is demanded f them, they impoſe hard conditions. Mercenaries will have money, and care not f a State be ruin'd ſo themſelves are paid. n fine, Strangers may on the ſuddain hange intereſts and party; ſo of friends ecoming enemies; and that in occaſions of greateſt importance. Mercenaries above all,

do ſerve without affection, and ſeldo
ſtand it out in fight unto the utmoſt. Th
puſh on a Victory indeed, but ſcarce ev
win a battail. In ſhort, Strangers ſhou
be as little made uſe of as poſſible: an
ſcarce for any other cauſe, but that enemi
might be deprived of their Aid. Whe
Strangers only are taken into Service, t
Subjects grow leſs War-like, and the mo
conſiderable of them deſpiſe War, as
done in *Spain*; and extreamly ill don
The *Carthaginians* were ruined principall
by the fault they committed in employi
Numidian Troops and other Strangers; an
not ſending out their own Citizens in the
Armies.

I will not here ſpeak of the Art of War
'tis a matter that deſerves a Chapter apar
Yet I will ſay curſorily, that the rules of
change as time and ſeaſons do. We ne
ther attack places nor defend them, in th
very manner that the Ancients did. The
is alſo a great deal of difference betwee
their way of fighting and ours; ſo tha
they had not the Arms which we now uſe
All of precept for the leading of an Army
that faileth not nor changeth, is, that Di
cipline be exerciſed; wherein Comman
ders ſhould never be remiſs.

The only School of War, is War it ſelf
and twenty years experience will bett
make a Great Captain than an hundred year
reading

reading. Not but that we have examples of General Command given to persons, who never were in Armies afore. There are elevated Spirits, to whom nothing is impossible; but the instances are rare; and 'tis too too hazardous a course to rely upon them. For a Captain must have, not only Spirit and courage, but also credit with his Soldiers; which cannot be gotten but by service. In fine, it is necessary for a great State to keep War on foot, and men of Quality must be employed in it: to the end there may always be a stock of good Soldiers, and a breed of Generals. These two things give a Nation marvailous advantages and esteem among Forreigners.

Though *France* now be a most powerful Monarchy, by means of its Extent of its Situation, the Fruitfulness of the Soil, the Number of Inhabitants; and though greatest States have not always most strength, as biggest men are not always stoutest; yet were it to be wish'd, that the King did add into his Kingdom, First, all the Low-Countries to the *Rhyne*. This Conquest would re-settle Him in possession of the ancient demain of His Predecessors, giving *France* again its primitive limits. It would make him Master of the Northern Seas, and by consequence, Arbitrator between the Crowns of *Sweden* and *Denmark*, *Poland*, &c. Conquest must not be aspired to out

of a thirſt of Empire, being an unjuſt thing, (if we believe *Ariſtotle*: for I would not determine, but that the right of War were a very lawful right, conſonant to what I have ſaid in the beginning of this Chapter;) but the deſire of Conqueſt ſhould principally be for the doing of good to all men; which is the end why GOD gave them Laws. The more Subjects and Power a juſt Prince hath, the better will it be for the world. Secondly, It were convenient that the King had *Strasbourg*, to keep all *Germany* quiet. In the third place, he need have the *Franche* County, to lay a reſtraint upon the *Swiſſes*, leaſt dividing themſelves between the Empire and *France*, or ſerving *Spain* in a War there, they ſtrengthen his enemies. In the fourth place, *Milan* is neceſſary in reſpect of *Italy*, to give the leſſer Soveraigns and Republiques protection, and ballance the Power which the King of *Spain* hath uſurp'd there. In the fifth place, *Genoa* and all its Territory, pertains to the King: nor would the *Genoeſe* have revolted, had it not been for the bad counſel given to *Francis* the Firſt, to diſcontent *Doria*. *Genoa* would make the King Maſter of the *Mediterranean* Sea; beſide, thoſe two Acquiſitions would keep the Duke of *Savoy* lock'd up within *French* Territories: So he would never depart from the King's Service, being entirely His de-

dependant. We muſt re-enter the Iſle of *Elba*, and into *Portolongone*, and *Piombino*, on the continent, to drive the *Spaniards* out of *Italy*. Here our nearneſs would keep the Duke of *Florence*, the Dukes of *Parma*, of *Modena*, and of *Mantua*, and even the State of the Pope, in a ſubmiſſion for *France*. *Corſica* would not ſtand out after the reduction of *Genoa*; and then *Sardinia* would be no difficult Conqueſt. This would ſtrongly favour any ſtirs on the account of Liberty or Diſcontent that might be raiſed in the Kingdoms of *Sicily* and *Naples*: nor would it be an hard matter to raiſe them in time.

On the Coaſt of *Bayonne* there would be need of *Fuentaravia*; and thoſe parts of the Kingdom of *Navarr* which the *Spaniards* have in poſſeſſion, might be juſtly re-demanded. The King might alſo carry His Arms into *Catalonia*: we have ancient pretenſions there; and the Conqueſts of it would be no leſs eaſily atchieved than it was in the time of the laſt War. *Majorca* and *Minorca* would follow without trouble. Thus the King would be abſolute Umpire of the Mediterranean, and of all the fortune of the *Spaniards*. If it ſhould happen one day that the Queen, or Her Deſcendants, ſhould have an Hereditary Right there, the King would be in a condition to do Himſelf reaſon in theſe matters. The means of making theſe

Con-

Conqueſts ſeverally, cannot be ſhewed without particular diſcourſes.

Mean time, what I have ſaid is not, in truth, to be done in a day: it would be an enterpriſe of many years. Yet there is nothing of meer fancy in it. I propoſe no Conqueſt to be made but what hath really been made, except that of the Iſles of the Mediterranean, which our Kings never minded; for that before *Charles* the Eighth they never were in caſe to ſtrengthen themſelves at Sea. *Bretagnie* was ſeparated from the Kingdom, the Wars of *Italy* took up every Reign unto *Henry* the Second. Then follow'd the affairs of Religion, which put a ſtop to all the deſigns that might have been formed in this behalf.

Here one thing I ſuggeſted in the precedent Chapter, is to be remembred; namely, That Conqueſts do afford a State one expedient to get money. In this the *Roman* Captains are to be imitated; who made it a point of Glory to lay up extraordinary ſums in the Publick Treaſury; and their Triumphs were as Illuſtrious by the wealth they brought home with them, as by the Enemies they had defeated in their Expeditions. It would be very material therefore, that Generals ſhould account it a Glory to them, to bring the Spoils of their Enemies unto the profit of the King and Kingdom; or at leaſt make the Conquered Coun-

Countries maintain and pay their Armies. But the difficult is not to make Conquests; the Arms of the *French* will be Victorious wherever they appear. All the trouble is to find out the secret how to keep what hath been gotten. It is fit to say something on this particular.

The means to preserve Conquer'd Countries which the Ancients used, and that with good success, are in a manner these. Transportations, and shiftings of the People. As when the *Chaldeans* led away the *Jews* to *Babylon*. The taking away of their money, of their richest goods, their Antiquities, their holy things and things of Religion; as was done with the ancient Idol-gods, and as the Ark of the Covenant, the Tables of *Moses*, and the *Israelites* holy Writings, were dealt withall. The same for substance might be done among us, by shifting of Saints Reliques, and consecrated Images, The leading away of the ablest men, and such as have greatest credit with the people. So did the *Romans* when they carried some of the *Greeks* out of their Country to *Rome*, and treated them there with all possible kindness and civility. In like manner as to Artificers: the *Turks* drew at one time 50000 work-men out of *Persia*. The *Romans*, out of their Enemies whom they had vanquish'd and taken in War, reserved those whom they thought stoutest,

ſtouteſt, and made them fight on the Theatre, the People being Spectators, deſtroying them by that means. Chriſtianity ſuffers not ſuch inhumanity. Slavery was alway practis'd in the caſe of Priſoners of War, and the ranſom we make them pay, is an Image of that old Cuſtom. Some people to this day ſlay their Priſoners, or ſend them away to puniſhment, after the faſhion of the Ancients.

To proceed, other means in reference to conquer'd Countries are, the mixing of the old and new Subjects by Marriage, the Conquerors accommodating themſelves to the manners of the Conquered, taking up their modes, eating with them, as *Alexander* demeaned himſelf towards the *Perſians*. Then again, the ruining the Fortifications of their Towns; the taking Hoſtages of them: the taking away their Arms, and keeping them weak; the abſtaining from their Wives; the giving them no jealouſie in matter of love. To have little converſe with them, eſpecially in their Houſes; and when any is, to ſee it be with ſeriouſneſs and decency; to honour them; to do them a pleaſure on occaſion; not play with them: not pick any quarrel with them: not touch their Liberty, nor the Goods that have been left them: not diſquiet them for matters of Religion. To do them Juſtice, maintain them

them in their Laws and Customs, and in their manner of Government, as the *Romans* did; who permitted the people whom they had subdued, to have their accustomed Laws. To be diffident of them, and shew a confidence in them. To appear not desirous of their secrets: not interrupt them in their pleasures: make them pay the Tribute agreed upon with them exactly, not at all augmenting it. To keep word with them in all things, seldom meddle in their affairs, except it be to accord them: to lend them no money; but owe them some, and punctually pay the Interests of it: not let them know the true State of affairs; not give them entrance into strong holds; which must always be well furnish'd with Men and Provisions. That the Governour never come among them without being strongest, or having Hostages. To prevent their assembling, and hinder as much as may be their having Commerce with Neighbours that are under another Prince's Dominion: to keep off all kind of Strangers from Houses, and severely punish such of e'm as shall cause the least trouble, or any motion that may tend to Sedition. If our Conquerors had practis'd in this manner, *Italy* and *Sicily* would have been *French* to this day.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

1. *Of the Sea, and its uſefulneſs.* 2. *Means to augment the Kings Power there.* 3. *Of Commerce.* 4. *Of Colonies.*

THE Waters of the Sea are wholly obnoxious to the humorouſneſs of Fortune; and the Wind that governs them turneth and changeth with as much inconſtancy as that blind Goddeſs. Yet it is certain, that thoſe States whoſe renown is greateſt in Story, did not eſtabliſh their ſupream Dominion, but upon the power they attained to at Sea: as if Virtue, ſtout and undaunted, had reſolv'd to combat and conquer her enemy in the very ſeat of her Empire. The *Romans* are one inſtance, (whoſe example is ever to be follow'd with as peculiar a diligence, as their conduct of matters was with ſingular wiſdom, and hard to be imitated:) They impoſed not upon the world their Laws, till they had forced the Seas to receive and acknowledge them. Had they not ſet out War-like Fleets, they had never accompliſhed their glorious Deſigns; they had never extended their Frontier beyond *Italy*; never brought down the pride of *Carthage*; nor Triumphed

umphed over all the Crowns on Earth. The *Ægyptians*, the *Perſians*, and the *Grecians*, conſidered the Sea as the principal ſupport of their Domination. *Xerxes* having caus'd the *Helleſpont* to be puniſh'd (as he termed it) with Stripes, accounted his Vanity ſatisfied in the ſight of all *Aſia*, which he drew after him into *Greece*, with ſo much magnificence and pomp, that it ſeemed as if *Jupiter* Himſelf was come down from Heaven. The *Venetians* ſtill renew every year their Alliance with this Element, by an old fond ſuperſtitious cuſtom, caſting into the Sea a Ring, as if they eſpouſed it: perhaps by this uſe they would inform all the particular Subjects of their Common-wealth, that they ſhould be content with the inconſtancy and infidelity of their Women, ſince the State in eſpouſing the Sea, eſpouſeth inconſtancy and infidelity it ſelf. The Riches of *Tunis*, of *Algier*, of *Holland*, and *England*, plainly prove the neceſſity there is for Princes to be Strong at Sea, and do ſhew the Profit which does thence accrue. Theſe are petty States, yet dare meaſure their Forces with thoſe of the Greateſt Monarchs. The former of them are *Turkiſh* Slaves, the others revolted Burghers; and how inſolent ſoever the *Engliſh* are, they muſt confeſs, that all the Britiſh Iſles laid together, do not equal the half of our Continent, either in Extent,

or

or in Fruitfulneſs of Ground, or for Commodiouſneſs of Scituation, or in number of Men; in Wealth, in Valour, Induſtry, and Underſtanding; yet they fear not to affirm themſelves Soveraigns of the Sea. Had they caſt up the Wracks they have ſuffered, and the Battails they have loſt; had they well examin'd our Ports and Havens: in fine, had they compar'd the Coaſts of *France* with thoſe of *England*, they would condemn their Vanity, as *Canutus*, one of their ancient Kings, did.

'Tis true, all States are not diſpoſed unto Navigation: either becauſe they are too far up in midland Countries; or becauſe the temper of the people ſuits not with it; or becauſe they want Subjects: but 'tis ſo far that any of theſe obſtacles ſhould hinder the *French* from addicting themſelves unto it; that on the contrary, all things conſpire to raiſe deſire of it in them; and to give them hope of advantagious ſucceſs. The work however is ſuch as muſt be leiſurably carried on, and perfected by little and little; ſo great a deſign continually alarming *Europe*, *Aſia*, *Africa*, and *America*, Friends and Foes. A precipitation of it would be its ruine. I ſay not what number of Veſſels would be fit for *France* to put to Sea. But I affirm, that the King may keep an hundred Galleys, and an hundred Ships on the Mediterranean; and a Fleet of

two

two hundred Sail upon the Ocean. The more Veſſels He ſhall have, the more enabled He will be to recover the expence made about e'm. As to the building of ſuch numbers, ſix or ten years of time may be allotted for it: and there is Timber in *France*, there is Cordage, there are Sails; there is Iron and Braſs; there are Victuals and Work-men; ſo that the Kings Subjects will gain the money which is laid out in e'm. Is it not far better for the King of *France* to build Ships for the employing and enriching of His Subjects, than it was for the Kings of *Ægypt* to build their uſeleſs Pyramids? There need be no anxious inquiry whence a Stock ſhould riſe for this advance; every year will bring in money; and the Veſſels once made, and their Guns mounted, it will not coſt the King a Quardecu for other Equippings. 'Twill be but to give the Captains places in the Ships and Galleys, on condition to fit them out; and there will more perſons come to take them, than there will be Offices and Places to be beſtowed. 'Tis true, Fleets being out, there will need vaſt Sums to maintain them: but the Sea will yield a maintenance for the Sea, either by Commerce or by War. Neither will it be always proper to keep ſo many Veſſels in ſervice. On the other hand, it will not be neceſſary to have ſo many Troops at Land as are at preſent. For *Spain* or

Italy

Italy will not dare to disfurniſh themſelves of their men; ſo there will be no need of a Land-Army but towards *Germany*. The number of Rowers will be made up by bringing men from *Canada*, and the *American* Iſlands: or by buying *Negro*'s at *Cape Verde*: or by ſending all Malefactors to the Galleys. And when things have taken their courſe, Seamen will be had; time, and the profit that will accrue, will afford ſtore, and bring them in from all parts of the world.

Hereupon the *Corſairs* of *Algier*, *Tunis*, and *Tripoli*; will not be able to keep at Sea; and the *French* being continually on their Coaſts, they will be conſtrain'd to tarry at home for the guarding of their Towns: ſo not in a condition to ſend out Troops for collecting the Tribute which they exact of the *Arabs*, and Princes who lye further up in *Africa*; the Tributaries will, without fail, revolt: and the King may in the ſequel, treat with them for their recovering their Liberty, and take them into His Protection. There is no cauſe to fear the power of the *Othoman Porte* in this particular. For beſide that the *Turks* are no good Seamen, the *Grand Signor* doth make no ſuch accompt of the Pyrats of *Algier*, as that their fortune is conſiderable to Him. The Friendſhip of the *French* is more neceſſary for Him, both in point of Commerce, and in reference to other Intereſts.

The

The Fleets which the King might keep upon the Ocean, would make Him Master of all the Powers and Trade of the North. Yea, though the *Hollanders* and the *English* should unite against *France*, they could not avoid their ruine in the end. For how should the one and the other make good their Commerce, which is all they have to trust to, if they were forced to maintain great Armada's to continue it? The point of *Bretannie* is the gate to enter into, and go out of the Channel. Fifty Ships of War at *Brest* would keep this Gate fast shut; and they should not open it but by the King's Command. *Spain* and *Portugal* would not be able to attempt any thing but by His permission, if there were kept a Fleet on the Coast of *Guyenne*. Thus there would need no War almost to be made for all these things; nor His Majesties Forces hazarded. It would be sufficient to give His Orders to Forreiners. Nor will it be difficult to cut them out work in their own Countries, and by this means stay their Arms at home, and make them spend their strength there. I shall say something of this in its place hereafter.

There is one further excellent means to strengthen the King at Sea: and it is, the taking order that no more of His Subjects go to *Malta*. To do this, there must be given in Fee to the *French* Knights of St. *John* of *Jerusalem*, some Isle in the Mediterranean,

terranean, as for inſtance, the *Iſle du Levant*, for which they ſhould pay an acknowledgment to the King, as they do for *Malta* to the King of *Spain*. There might be given them too on the ſame condition, an Iſle in the Ocean, as *Belle-Iſle*, *l'Iſle-Dieu*, or the Iſle of *Ree*: ſo that the *French* Knights fighting not but againſt the Enemies of their Country, they would make War upon the *Engliſh* as upon *Turks*; and keep the Iſlands at their own charge: whereas the King is fain to keep great Garriſons, and be at vaſt expence to do it. There is no cauſe to fear that they will ever give the King any trouble: for being *French*, they cannot fail of Affection or Obedience: and their kindred, together with the Wealth they have in *France*, will be perpetual Hoſtages to the King, and caution for their Fidelity. This project is juſt: for of ten parts of the Knights of *Malta*, no leſs than eight do come from the Commanderies of *France*; and it is eaſie to be put in execution; for there need be only a ſtopping the income of the Commanderies to effect it. The Order in general will find its advantages in it; both in that there will be an addition made it of two conſiderable Iſlands: and that the King will receive the Knights into a more particular protection than he hath done hitherto. The number of Commanderies may alſo be augmented,

by

by giving them ſome Maladeries, (or Hoſpitals for the diſeaſed) which are always uſurped by people that have no right to them at all.

Be it obſerved in the laſt place, that it is very requiſite the Office of Admiral, and Powers of the Admiralty, ſhould be united to the Crown. It hath been an ill Policy in *France*, and a Diminution of the King's Authority, to communicate unto a Subject ſo much of His Soveraignty at Sea as hath been done. He muſt reſume it to Himſelf, and be every way Supream alone: Then He may appoint a ſelect number, whoſe charge may be to give Him advice of the State of Maritime concerns; and hold a counſel from time to time upon them in His Majeſties preſence, if He pleaſe to aſſiſt. Theſe Officers ſhall in this Council judge of priſes, and other Sea-affairs; and when its neceſſary, be Commiſſion'd, ſome of them, to viſit the Ships, and make report, or ſend their acts in writing concerning them. Other Officers for the Marine ſhall be Military: they, to execute the King's Orders, and have the conduct of Deſigns and Enterpriſes in the uſual manner. It is important to the King's Service, that the Captains of Ships and Gallies, be honoured with Dignities and Rewards. There may be created Mareſchals of *France* for Armies at Sea: as there are for thoſe at Land, with the

the ſame Honours and Prerogatives. The *Romans* decreed a Triumph for Captains who had been Victorious at Sea, and called it, a Naval Triumph. They gave alſo Naval Crowns, as well as Mural and Civical. Theſe Honours would eminently promote the Kings intention as to the Marine. There muſt be two Arſenals erected: One in *Provence*, in ſome Town upon the *Rhoſne*, for what relates to Naval Expeditions on the Mediterranean: Another upon the River *Loire*, for all occaſions on the Ocean. By means of theſe two Rivers, it will be eaſie to bring out to Sea all the Veſſels that are builded: and all neceſſary Proviſions and Tackling whatever. Nor need it be feared that any Enemy ſhould get up theſe Rivers: they too may be ſhut up by Bridges, or by Chains, or by Forts.

His Majeſties Power thus ſtrongly ſetled on each Sea, it will be eaſie to ſecure Commerce in *France*, and even draw the Merchants thither from all parts. I ſay ſecure Commerce: for till all this be done, it will ever be uncertain and dangerous. Now 'tis unneceſſary to expatiate here, in proving what profit Commerce brings in to moſt-potent States; the thing is generally known, and all men convinc'd of it. Again, I know not why it hath been ſaid, that Trading is contrary to Virtue; except it be, for that Merchants are inceſſantly buſied in ſtudying in-

inventions to get mony, and be in ſort, Servants to the Publique. The *Romans*, the *Thebans*, and the *Spartans*, admitted not any Citizen of theirs unto the adminiſtration of Affairs, unleſs he had for ten whole years forborn Merchandizing: becauſe they would not have their Principal Magiſtrates accuſtomed to gain, and expert in the means to do it. Theſe kind of inclinations being blamable in perſons, who being deſtined to great Employments, ought to be above all conſiderations of private intereſt.

Commerce, in every Common-wealth, ought to take its meaſure from the temper of the people, from their ſtrength, their wealth, the fertility of their grounds, and the ſcituation of their Country. Therefore order muſt be taken, that things traded in be uſefull, and in a manner, neceſſary. For it is a rule in Oeconomie, that a man ſpend not his mony in what is pleaſing, though he needs it; but only in what is abſolutely neceſſary. But neceſſity is ſtated by the birth, the dignity and the eſtate of perſons; as for example, noble furniture is neceſſary for a great Lord; not ſo, for every meaner Gentleman: and thus in other caſes, proportionably ſtill to the rank and fortune of men. It muſt be judiouſly prevented, that commerce introduce not into a State, ſuperfluity, exceſs

and luxury; which are often followe
with Ambition, Avarice, and a dangero
corruption of Manners. And for as muc
as it is not ſufficient to Commerce, th
there be people to ſell, but Merchants mu
be had to buy, otherwiſe no wares can g
off; in which all the advantage of tra
doth conſiſt: it is meet, that Traders fu
niſh themſelves with neceſſaries, rather th
with things that meerly tend to eaſe,
magnificence. Among neceſſaries, tho
make up the firſt rank, which do ſuſta
life it ſelf, the ſecond is of them that a
for convenience; others are alſo neceſſa
to preſervation from diſeaſes, the injur
of time and violence of enemies, as Me
cinals, Dwellings, Arms.

There is every where a twofold Co
merce, which is viſible in *France*, m
than in any other part of the world. T
firſt is for things ordinarily found in
country: ſome of which are ſpent by
inhabitants themſelves, and others tranſp
ted. The ſecond, for forreign Merchan
ſes. We have in *France*, Wines, Co
Linnen and Salt, in ſo great a quanti
that we ſend them into the neighbour Ki
doms; and the quality of them is ſo
cellent, that ſtrangers cannot forbear
come and carry them out of our Ports.
have Cattle, Skins, Wool, Tallow, O
and other things neceſſary for man,
wh

which forreigners export very little, but our ſelves do in a manner ſpend them all: and this is the great wealthineſs of *France*, that we have enough to ſerve our turn without forreign Merchandiſes; but forreigners cannot do well without ours. We receive from other Countries, Minerals, Pearls, Precious Stones, Silks, Spices, and what ſeems to be matter of Luxury. Order ſhould be given, that in *France*, the Commodities we have be made uſe of, before any forreign Merchandizes be employed: becauſe this order followed would bring in the people mony, and take off their Commodities; which would incline every one to fall to the work of his Calling, and the whole Kingdom be thereby hugely benefited.

It hath been a queſtion offer'd to debate, Whether traffique in *France* ſhould be managed by the Subjects, or by Forreigners? Many reaſons might be produced in the caſe, upon each hand: but to make a ſhort deciſion; 'tis evident, that Forreigners muſt be allowed to gain by our Merchandiſes, if we would have them take them off. For if we carry them home into their Ports, we ſhall make leſs ſales, and be at greater coſt, then if they came to fetch them. Yet that our Merchants may ſhare in the profit, they may enter into Partnerſhip with them, or be their Commiſſioners here, or freight them themſelves, provided, they ſell at ſomwhat

cheaper rates, and ſo be content with mo-
derate gain; or take in payment, and ex-
change, the forreign Commodities.

By means of Commerce, as well as b
War, there may be *French* Colonies plante
abroad, and ſo the dominion of the Kin
extended, even to farr diſtant Countries
All the Nations of the earth are intermix'd
and may be termed Colonies, ſome of on
people, ſome of another: Of as many a
are known, few can be affirmed to be or
ginally of the places they inhabit. But t
plant Colonies out of danger, they mu
be ſeated in as much neerneſs ſtill as
poſſible: For if they be ſeperated at to
great a diſtance, it will be difficult to relie
them: and perhaps they may revolt, o
ſome one or other make himſelf maſter
them; and ſo the State will be in dang
to loſe it's Subjects. Secondly, it is n
ceſſary, that Colonies be placed in ſuc
Countries, as are able to maintain the
milies, that are deſign'd to make them u
otherwiſe proviſions, and mony it ſelf, m
be carried to them, which would cauſe l
and damage to the Common-wealths th
ſend 'em. In the third place, the Count
ſhould bear things that may yield profit
the State, which erects the Colony. Fourt
ly, the Scituation ſhould be ſuch, as the St
may have ſuccour, and forces from them
both for Warr, and for Commerce. In th

fifth place, the Country ſhould not be ſo fertile, and ſo much profit to be there made, that the ancient Subjects ſhould be drawn thither, and the State drein'd of people, as hath happened to *Spain*, by means of the *Weſt-Indies*. In fine, for prevention of the inconveniences, I have mention'd, means muſt be uſed to have always Hoſtages from thoſe of the Colonies, that they may be kept in their duty, and in the greater adherence to the intereſt of the State.

CHAP. XIII.

1. Of the Education of Children. 2. At what age it is expedient to marry them.

NAture gives us the firſt fundamental diſpoſitions for Arts, and all ſorts of Profeſſions; and we feel a certain propenſion leading us to one kind of life, rather than another. Some ſay, this impreſſion comes from the Power of the Stars, which by ſecret, influences from our temper; others affirm, that we derive our inclinations from our Anceſtors. However it be, 'tis certain, we have movings, the principles whereof are in our ſelves; we bring them into the world with us, and cannot quit

them: 'its true, rules may be appli'd to them, and they corrected, when faulty, but to change the quality of them, is impoſſible. This regulation, or amendment, is effected by diſcipline; which can only give an after perfection to the works of nature, keeping to her foregoing draughts, and deſignes, and compleating what ſhe hath begun.

A principal point then, in reference to Children, is to know their Genius, that they may not be put out of their natural order, but employ'd in things to which they are originally bent. The Philoſophers, to make known the difference of capacities, have told us, that as for Souls, ſome are of Gold, others of Silver, others of Iron; and that as a good Eſſayor muſt not miſtake himſelf, in diſtinguiſhing theſe three Metals; ſo a good Politician ſhould not fail in the judgment he makes, of the Children that are in the State: it's a piece of his profeſſion to diſcern, what each of them will be proper for, that the intentions of nature may be fortifi'd, and poliſhed by precepts.

There are no Common-wealths, but have in them Prieſts, Judges, Counſellors of State, Souldiers, Sea-men, Merchants, Artificers, Husbandmen; Children muſt be educated for theſe different Profeſſions, and timely enabled to diſcharge them. 'Tis fit,

ſit, that in the caſe of the younger ſort, three ages be diſtinguiſhed. The Firſt, from their birth, to the end of the ſeventh year. The Second, from that ſeventh year to the fourteenth. The Third, from fourteen unto one and twenty. Childrens firſt five years ſhould be ſpent in their nurſing up; and they not diſquieted with any higher documents. 'Tis good, to put them upon ſome gentle exerciſe, as they are growing, and cauſe them to endure cold; they will have the more Vigour, by that means. There are ſome Nations, that plunge their Children into running water, and give them ſlight clothing in the midſt of winter: ſo the ancient *Gauls* are noted to have done. The bodies of Children muſt be plyed to the acting of all kind of poſtures, and motions; this will get them a facility and dexterouſneſs for any thing. After the age of five years, unto ſeven, 'tis convenient to tell them ſtories, that may raiſe in them a deſire to do well in that profeſſion to which they ſhall be deſtinated. From ſeven years, unto fourteen, thoſe that are intended to be given to the Church, or to the affairs of Juſtice, or thoſe of the State, ſhould learn Latin, and Greek, becauſe in thoſe languages, they have the ſource of all the Doctrine they will be obliged to profeſs: as likewiſe after fourteen, unto one and twenty, they ſhall be taught Rhetorique,

Philoſophy, Theology, Law or Politicks: which muſt he continued alſo, after that age in the uſual manner. It is very neceſſary that Seminaries for Prieſts be erected in every Dioceſs, and our Lords the Biſhops ought to take all poſſible care in it. The young perſons, that are intended for the Wars, may be taught Italian, Spaniſh and High-Dutch: they that are deſign'd for Trade, ſhould know ſomewhat in thoſe three Languages: but ſuch as are thought on for Commerce, in further diſtant Countries, ought to learn the *Arabic*, or the *Sclavonian*, or ſome other of the general tongues that are current in *Aſia*, or in *Africa*, as the Latin is in *Europe*. There muſt be publick Profeſſors for theſe Languages, as there are for Latine, and Maſters places endowed at the Publick charge. After fourteen or ſixteen years of age, the Youths ſhould be diſpos'd of unto places, where they may learn the Art of traffick. As for thoſe that are deſtin'd to the Wars, whether Gentlemen, or Plebeians, they ſhould be ſent at fifteen or ſixteen years unto Garriſons, and the skill of ſerving on horſeback or on foot, there taught them; and they exerciſed once a week conſtantly; which would moſt conveniently be done on Sundays and Holy-days. They ſhall be taught to handle the Pike and the Musket, the uſe of the Sword, the Halbard, Partiſan, Broad-ſword, and other Arms; they

ſhall

ſhall be put to Run, and Leap, and Wreſtle. The *Lacedemonians* ordinarily exercis'd their young people; which was very providently done of them. For Strength and Expertneſs is not attained but by long and daily exerciſe. In the Gariſons ſhall be taught Fortification, the Mathematicks Dancing, Vaulting, Riding; and it would do well, to take away Academies and Maſters of Exerciſe, from places not garriſon'd, that the Garriſons may be the Academies, as I may term them, where theſe things are learnt. Yea, to the end, that all ſorts of perſons might betake themſelves to the Garriſons, it ſhould be ordained, that no private Maſters ſhall take any Apprentices, but in Garriſon'd places; and that no one keep a ſhop, or exerciſe any trade, in any City of the Kingdome, without a Teſtimonial from the Governour, that he hath ſerv'd his Apprentiſhip in a Garriſon Town: as we ſee, that no Phyſicians, or Advocats, are admitted to practiſe, but ſuch as have ſtudied in ſome Univerſity.

Order muſt be given, that Maſters cauſe their Lacquies to learn a Trade, and that for this, they give them, after four years ſervice, 200 *livres*, and a ſuit of clothes: or if they ſerve leſs time, a ſum proportionable after that rate. Nor muſt it be ſuffered, that Lacquies have wages given them as is done; becauſe they are ill husbands,

and lay up nothing. Their reward-mony must be put in a Publick purse, or into some Merchant's hands, who will be responsible for it. The share of Lacquies that dye, will serve for other Youths that shall be chosen. This would prove an excellent means, for the having of Souldiers: For the Apprentices would serve in their turn, on Military occasions: they would go upon the Guard &c. nor would this take them off from perfecting their skill in the Calling they had chosen. It would too, be profitable, that poor Soldiers have skill in one handicraft or other, and be made to work at it, when ever they are not on the Guard: by this means, they would avoid idling, and get money for a subsistance.

The Parishes both in Town, and Country might be obliged to set forth and maintain each of them a Souldier or two in Garrison, giving also a sum for their being taught a trade at the same time. There would be Parishes able to maintain a man and half, others half a man, the rest in proportion to the number of communicants in each of them. So the King would have 50000 men, welnigh in Garrison, and a nursery of Souldiers, without its costing Him a Quardecu; for none must have pay, but old Souldiers: 'its by taking this course, that the *Turks* raise their *Janizaries*, and they become their best men, and most warlike.

When

When the young men have been a while in Garriſon, that is, two or three years, they ſhall be ſent to the Army, if there be War on foot: and all recruits ſhall be rais'd out of the Garriſons: by this means they will be rais'd without any expenſe at all: for inſtance, if there need a recruit of 4000 men, each of the Governours ſhall be ordered to ſend, one an hundred, another two hundred: and the men being drawn out of the Garriſons, new ſupplies ſhall be put in, taken out of the Pariſhes, which ſent the former. Thus the Armies would be alway compos'd of none, but expert Souldiers; which is a matter of exceeding great conſequence. I will not preſcribe, in what Towns, or in how many places, it is fit to ſettle Garriſons; becauſe this depends on the Kings Will and Pleaſure: and Towns, to be choſen for this purpoſe, need not be nominated; the moſt commodious, and beſt ſcituated are known.

As to thoſe that ſhould be deſtin'd for Sea-ſervice, they might be taken out of the ſame Garriſons; and ſhould be taught principally Navigation: but it would be better, to breed them up in the Ships themſelves, that they might be accuſtomed to the Sea. It is fit that they ſhould underſtand all the practice of Mariners; and alſo be Handicrafts-men, as well as Souldiers: it would be very good, that ſome of the number

were

were Carpenters, or at leaſt each of them ſomewhat skilled in uſe of the axe and addice. If Souldiers both at Sea and on Land were Artificers, their Captains, or others might cauſe them to work. They ſhould be paid for what they made, and the perſon that employed them might ſell their work, either in groſs or by retail: as Garments, Shooes, Cloth, Hatts, Gloves; and this would prove hugely beneficial; all the Souldiers would find content in it, and hardly one of them fall into debauch.

When the Youngſters have been ſome time in Garriſon, and are not needed for recruits, they ſhould be ſent home with their Diſcharge and Certificate. Hereupon they may ſet up the trade they have learned, or addict themſelves to Husbandry, as they ſhould think moſt commodious for them. The Country Youth, not choſen by the King's Commiſſioners for the Garriſons, ſhould abide in their Pariſhes, to learn the Art of Husbandry, and be exerciſed in it.

A like courſe, as is to be taken with young men, ſhould alſo be taken with young women. There muſt be School-Miſtreſſes in every City, publickly pay'd, who may teach them all kind of works: the Maids giving them too, ſomething for a reward. It would do well to uſe means, that Women, and even thoſe of higheſt rank, might count it a ſhame to be

be unskilfull: work would notably fix their thoughts, and busy them to excellent good purpose.

Of Women I had not yet spoken; nor will I say, of them, ought more: herein I shall Imitate *Lycurgus*, and besides him *Aristotle*; who both conceiv'd it not possible, to give them any rules, and that their temper was so imperious, that they could not endure to be restrained by Law: this is more to be excused in *French* Women than in others: 'tis their due to be Mistresses; since they may glory, upon better title than the *Lacedemonian* Dames, that they give birth to men, who are capable of rendring themselves, by their Valour, Conquerours of all the earth.

It seems to me a fault, that Maids should be suffer'd to marry at Twelve, and Males at Fourteen, at which Ages, the too too indulgent Laws have fixed the Puberty of the Sexes. For, as to Nature, it is not possible but persons of those years only must extremely prejudice their health by Marriage, and spend their Strength before they have attain'd it. 'Tis the making of young trees bear fruit before the time: the children are without doubt the less vigorous for it. How can the Parents give them, what they as yet have not themselves? Again Morality

rality and the Laws are concerned in the caſe: the truth is, when a Girle is put ſo young into the poſſeſſion of an Husband, ſhe hath the leſs of baſhfulneſs and modeſty; nor is Virtue ſo well ſecured for her. Beſides, at this age, neither Man nor Woman is of underſtanding to know their duty: and hence it comes, that the marriages of perſons ſo young are odinarily attended with no very ſure felicity and ſucceſs. Finally, how can the one or the other, take care of the affairs of an Houſe, being altogether unexperienced? or duly govern their Children needing Government themſelves, and having not, by allowance of the Laws, power to diſpoſe of any thing? So that it muſt be ordained, they ſhall not be capable of making a valid contract of marriage till they have attained, Females the age of Eighteen years compleat, and Males of Twenty.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIV.

1. *How* France *ſhould act with Forreign Princes, and firſt with the King of* Spain, *and King of* Portugal. 2. *Secondly, with the Pope, with* Venice, *with the Princes of* Italy. 3. *With the* Suiſſes, *with* England. 4. *With the Emperour, and Princes of* Germany. 5. *With the* Hollanders, *the Crowns of* Denmark, Sueden *and* Poland. 6. *With the* Turks, *and King of* Perſia. 7. *With the Kings of the Coaſt of* Barbary, *and the King of* Marocco. 8. *With all remote Princes; as the Emperour of the* Negro's, Preſter John, *the great* Mogol, *the other Kings of the* Indies, *of* China, *and of* Tartary.

HAving treated, in the precedent Chapters, of things Internal to the State: I think it reaſonable to ſpeak of Externals, and what courſe is to be taken in them. For to promote the happineſs of people, and govern them diſcreetly, 'tis not enough, that

that you regulate their lives, and their comportment at home, but their eaſe and well-being muſt be ſecur'd againſt Strangers abroad, and principally againſt their Neighbors. Now Intereſt being the prime motive unto all States, we ought to conſider other Nations, either in quality of Friends, or in that of Enemies; ever accounting of them, according to the advantage we may receive from them, or the damage they may do us. As they on their part take no thought of us, but in proportion to what they fear, or to what they hope for from our Arms. Beſides, to treat ſafely with Forreigners, it is neceſſary that we know their Deſignes, their Strength, their Alliances, their Temper, and their Country. Forasmuch then as *Spain* ſhareth with Us, at this time, the Concerns of all *Europe*, and there is not a Power in Chriſtendom, but hath Alliance with the one, or the other of theſe two Crowns, it is meet we examine, in the firſt place, what meaſures we are to obſerve with the *Spaniards*.

The Council of *Spain* proceeds with a great deal of ſlowneſs; but always with a great deal of evenneſs: and ſince the Houſe of *Auſtria* put it in their head to get the Dominion over all *Europe*, the ſaid Council hath continually ſteered the ſame courſe. The end which theſe States-men have propos'd to themſelves, has been Tyrannical and

and unjuſt; and the means, they have made uſe of to attain it, bad, deſtructive, and ill-adjuſted, which the declining of their Affairs doth evidently demonſtrate. Our Enemies, are always Allies of theirs, either covertly, or openly and declared; juſt in like manner, as they who chooſe the King's protection, and to be intereſſed with *France*, will be Enemies of *Spain*.

The Emperour is leagu'd with the Catholick King by Conſanguinity, and moreover by reaſons of State. For We are cauſe of fear to the Empire on the North, and towards *Germany*, as We are to *Spain* on the South, and towards *Italy*. Of all the other Princes, the Duke Duke of *Bavaria* ſeems faſteſt knit to the Houſe of *Auſtria*; and the Pope would, perhaps, be of the Party, did not His dignity, of being the common Father of Chriſtians, withold Him; and if He, as a Temporal Prince, did not alſo apprehend ſome Irruption on our part.

Spain is a Country yielding little increaſe; either for that the ground is barren; or becauſe the Inhabitants neglect to cultivate it. The diſcovery of the *Weſt-Indies*, and the expulſion of the *Moors* have diſpeopled it. *Flanders*, and the places in *Italy* are a charge to *Spain*, in time of War: and what is rais'd there doth ſcarce ſuffice to maintain the Armies, and Garriſons.

Their Government is hard, and ill to be endured;

endured; becauſe they are inflexibly ſevere; and the Monks, (whoſe depravation is there at the higheſt pitch) and Inquiſitors, do under pretext of Religion, exerciſe incredible grievances. The *Spaniards* are valiant for their perſons: but men of Quality deſpiſe the Military Profeſſion, as heretofore the *Carthaginians* did: and the name of Souldier is, in a manner, ignominious with them. They are idlers, and prefer a Pleaſure, and a Gallantrie, before any thing, be it ever ſo important, or of greateſt conſequence.

The King of *Spain* hath little mony, and much expenſe to defray. The vanity of the Viceroys, and Governours of His places, doth ſpend Him above meaſure. The *Spaniards* are preſumptuous, haughty, and provided there be Honour done them, you may treat advantagiouſly with them. *Charles* V. had reaſon to ſay, that the *Spaniards* ſeem to be wiſe; but are not. Their Forces are not at all to be feared; we ruin'd them, in the late War; and the affairs of *Portugal* have hindred their recovering them. The minority of their King, the diſcontent of *Don John*, and the pretenſions of ſome Lords upon the particular Kingdoms, which compoſe the *Spaniſh* Monarchy, augment it's weakneſs. *Sicily* might eaſily make inſurrection. The *Neapolitans* upon a pretext of Liberty, ſuch a darling in *Italy*, would ſet up for themſelves

ſelves, if they had ſuccours; and perhaps, a new Pope would favour our deſigns there, if he were made to ſee, that it would be no impoſſibility for him to make ſome perſon of his family King of *Naples*, or join that Kingdom to the State of the Church, of which he is poſſeſs'd already.

If ever the *Spaniards* be attacqued, it muſt be done with force, and all at once, in *Flanders*, in *Italy*, in *Spain* it ſelf, on the Sea, and on the coaſt of *Portugal*. This is the beſt method for the *French*. Such a general effort would produce two effects. The firſt is, that the *Spaniſh* Partiſans would be aſtoniſh'd, having no Forces ready to make reſiſtance. The ſecond, that all their Enemies would reſume Vigour, and might ſet on foot again their pretenſions againſt them. If a through Conqueſt be intended, we muſt not do as was done in the laſt War: muſt not make it our buſineſs to take all their fortifi'd places, one after another, or to keep them when taken. But this is a matter fit to be diſcours'd of by it ſelf.

As for *Portugal*, it's a State, yet under age, and not throughly ſetled: to us, a perpetual inſtrument for weakning the *Spaniard*. *France* hath nothing to fear on that ſide. It would do well, to convey covertly ſome Troops, or ſums into the Country: and above all, give ſecretly great hopes unto the *French*, that are in ſervice there, if they

they made any important enterprises upon *Spain*, which would divert their Forces. It would, I say, do very well to order some Soldiers thither, and 'twere to be wish'd, there were so many *French* in *Portugal*, that the *Partisans* might not dare to make a peace with *Spain*, for fear of having those same *French* for Enemies. The Queen of *Portugal*, who is *French*, both by Birth, and by Affection, may bear up this interest; and She may be told, that there is a necessity of it on Her part, and that Her Fortune depends upon it.

It must be accounted on in all treating with the *Spaniards*, that they are every whit as foolish as they seem to be.

The Pope, the *Venetians*, and all the Princes of *Italy*, are of one and the same temper. The *Italians* are wise and circumspect: nor should we, but very seldom, enter into Negotiation with them. To reduce them to our intentions, we must work by downright force: they are weak, and (as I have said) wise: they are people for pleasure; their Country is the beautifullest, and best in the world; consequently they love it, and know their interest; they are able to foresee, and fear the ill that may betide them. The Pope will ever consider *France*, by reason of the County of *Avignon*, of the consequences of the Concordat of 1618: and because of the *Jansenists*.

The

The *Venetians* are weakned by their War with the *Turk*; the Dukes of *Mantua*, of *Modena*, and of *Florence*, and the *Genoese* can do nothing that's considerable. The Duke of *Savoy* must never seperate from *France*. We have the entrance into His Estates: and a War with us, but of 3 monthes, would utterly ruine Him: He may be induc'd to hope, that He shall be re-instated in the Principality of *Geneva*. If War be made in *Italy*, the *Italians* must not have time given them, to look about them. As they are the wisest, so when inur'd to War, they are the bravest upon earth. In one word, they are the Masters of the Universe.

The *Suisses* are Mercenaries, who will alway serve the King for His mony.

As for matter of the *English*, they have not any Friends: themselves be a sort of people without Faith, without Religion, without Honesty, without any Justice at all, of the greatest levity that can be, Cruel, Impatient, Gluttonous, Proud, Audacious, Covetous, fit for handy strokes, and a sudden execution; but unable to carry on a War with judgement. Their Country is good enough for sustenance of life, but not rich enough to afford them means for issuing forth and making any conquest: accordingly, they never conquered any thing but *Ireland*, who's inhabitants are weak, and ill Soldiers. On the contrary the *Romans*

mans conquer'd them; then the *Danes*, and the *Normans*; in ſuch a manner too, that their preſent Kings are the Heirs of a Conquerour. They hate one another, and are in continual diviſion, either about Religion, or about the Government. A War of *France* for three or four years upon them, would totally ruine them. So, it ſeems reaſonable, that we ſhould make no Peace with them, but upon conditions of greateſt advantage for us; unleſs the King think meet to defer the execution of this project to another time; or that His Majeſty, preſs'd with the love He hath for His own people, do incline to prefer their eaſe, before ſo fair hopes. One had need be a Monarch, to know what it is to love Subjects; as be a Father, to know how Children are loved.

In fine, if we had a mind to ruine the *Engliſh*, we need but oblige them to keep an Army on foot: and there is no fear that they ſhould make any invaſion upon *France*; that would be their undoubted ruine, if they be not call'd in by ſome Rebells. Now if they have an Army, they will infallibly make War upon one another, and ſo ruine themſelves. You muſt put them upon making great expences; and for this end, raiſe a jealouſy in them for the Iſles of *Jerſey* and *Guernſey*, of *Wight*, and *Man*, for the Cinque Ports, and *Ireland*: and by that means, oblige them to keep ſtrong Garriſons

in

in all thoſe places: this will create a belief in the people, that the King formeth great projects againſt their pretented Liberty; and while He is in Arms, His Subjects will hate Him.

They muſt be wrought to diſtruſts of one another, by writing letters in Cipher to ſome particular Perſons, and cauſing them to be intercepted. For (being ſuſpicious and imprudent) they will ſoon be perſwaded, that the letters were ſeriouſly written. Some forces ſhould be landed in *Ireland*, and in other parts. The *Iriſh* may be induced to revolt, as having a mortal hatred for the *Engliſh*. The *Scots* alſo will not neglect to ſet themſelves at liberty. Factions muſt be rais'd, and the Sects favoured againſt one another; eſpecially the Catholicks, among whom, the Benedictine Monks in particular, ſhould be ſecretly promis'd, on the King of *Englands* behalf (wherein it will be eaſie to deceive them) that they ſhall be reſtored to all the Eſtates, which they once poſſeſſed in the Iſland, according to the *Monaſticon* there printed. Upon this, the Monks will move Heaven and Earth, and the Catholicks declare themſelves. The rumor, which hath already gone abroad, that the King of *England* is a Catholick, muſt be fortifi'd, and ſo all will fall into utter confuſion, and the *Engliſh* Monarchy be in caſe to be divided.

On-

On the other hand, our League with the *Hollanders* ſhould be renew'd, and they put into a belief, that we will give them all the Trade ſtill: becauſe they have a through Knowledge of it, and are proper for it; whereas the *French* have no inclination that way, and Nature cannot be forced. They muſt be told, that now they are come to the happy time for advancing their affairs, and ruining their competitours in the Soveraignty of the Northern Seas. Beſide theſe particulars, if the King give *Belle* Iſle, or L'iſle *Dieu*, or the Iſle of *Ree*, to the Knights of *Malta*, as I have ſaid before, theſe Knights will make irreconcilable War upon the *Engliſh*, redemand the Commanderies of their Order, and by their courſes, and Piracies, oblige them to keep great Fleets at Sea; which will ruine them, by ruining the profit of their Trade. Mean time, the King ſhall increaſe His Strength at Sea; and then finding His Enemies weakned, conſummate their depreſſion, and ſubverſion.

It is not difficult, to make defence againſt any enterpriſes of the Emperour; for He cannot make War upon *France*, though He would: ſuch a War would be too coſtly for Him; and to make any progreſs in it, He muſt needs bring into the field exceſſive great Armies. But if He armed Him ſo potently, the Princes of *Germany* would grow jealous of Him, and make

make Levies to oppoſe Him, and to hinder His paſſage through their territories: beſide, His hereditary Countries would be diſfurniſh'd of men, and ſo expos'd to the inroads of the *Turks*: ſo that there is no cauſe to apprehend any thing on the part of the Emperour. On the contrary, He hath intentions to give the King content; becauſe He may receive great ſuccors from Him, in Wars with the *Turk*, as happened of late years.

The Princes of *Germany*, whether Catholics or Proteſtants, have an equal intereſt to keep themſelves in the King's protection: for the reaſons I noted afore in the Chapter of the *Huguenots*; ſo that they will always oppoſe the Emperor's growing greater, on the ſide of *France*: as it may be, they would oppoſe the deſigns of the King; if He ſhould carry His Arms too far up into *Germany*. 'Tis the intereſt of leſſer States, that the Kings their Neighbours be equal in power, that the one may maintain them againſt the others.

To conclude: the King hath no Allies, whom He ſhould ſo highly eſteem, as the *Germans*; there is not a braver Nation, a Nation more open, more honeſt. Their original is alſo ours; They have no Vices; are Juſt and Faithfull: there is among them an inexhauſtible Seminary of good Soldiers: their generoſity put *Alexander* the Great in-

to admiration for 'em; and wrought affection and confidence in 'em, in the first *Cæsars*; who by committing their persons to the virtue of these people, entrusted them with the quiet of the Universe.

The *Hollanders* will never attempt any thing against *France*; but keep themselves in our alliance, as much as possibly they may. They are rich, and interessed as Merchants commonly are. If the King had relinquish'd them, their State would have sunk. (which yet by the rules of Policy, cannot last long; Democracies being subject to changes.) It would be expedient, that the King do interpose in their Affairs; and some divisions be raised among them. We can hope for little from their Armies; and they would alwayes be a charge, and expence to us.

The King of *Denmark* is a Prince, whose State is of but small extent; His whole Strength consists in the King's protection, who upholds Him against the *Suedes* His Enemies.

Sueden will never break off from the Interests of *France*. It's a Country unfertile, except in Soldiers; but there being little mony in *Sueden*, and they far off, they can of themselves make no considerable War: they are feared and hated in *Germany*. So, we ought to consider them, as Instruments, which for our money, we may make use of,

of, to avenge our Quarrels, either againſt the Emperour, or the *German* Princes; or to divert the *Engliſh* and the *Holland* Forces, when His Majeſty makes any enterpriſe which pleaſeth them not.

Poland and *Moſcovy* are of almoſt no uſe to us, except it be to ſerve us in ſtopping the enterpriſes of the Emperour. Furs may be had from them; and Cloth, and Silk-ſtuffs ſent them.

The Friendſhip of the *Turks* is good for *France*, to be made uſe of on occaſion againſt the Emperour; and that of the King of *Perſia*, to be made uſe of againſt the *Turks*. The one and the other may favour our Commerce.

There muſt be no reliance upon the promiſes of the Kings of *Tripoli*, *Tunis*, and *Algier*; they are Pirats, that take a Pride in breaking their words, and have no Faith at all. When ever occaſion ſerves, War muſt be made upon them, and they attacqued home to their own doors in their Harbours, but with conſiderable Forces. They may be ruin'd in time, by hindring their courſes at Sea, and by cauſing the Tributary Princes to riſe againſt them by Land: as I have obſerved afore. Upon this, the King, as the *Carthaginians* did, might employ the *Numidian* Troops, ſo much magnified by the Ancients.

The Emperour of *Fez* and *Maroco* is a

Potent Prince, who's Alliance may be uſefull to the King againſt the *Spaniards*, and for Commerce. He is a Mahometan; and I would not have too much truſt put in His Oaths.

In fine, when occaſions for it are offered, we muſt not fail to compliment the *African* Kings, as the Emperors of the *Negros*, and of the *Abyſſins*, then the Great *Mogol*, and the other Kings of the *Indies*, of *China*, of *Tartary* and *Japan*: letting them know by Preſents, the Virtue, the Greatneſs and Magnificence of the King.

The Concluſion.

Such are the Political Maxims, by which I have judged, that the Subjects of this (*French*) Monarchy might attain to the poſſeſſion of a true, and ſtable felicity; and ſo, the Heroic labours of the King be Crowned with immortal Glory, and *France* enjoy in all it's parts the highly beneficial Virtue of it's incomparable Monarch.

FINIS.

REFLECTIONS
ON THE
Fourth Chapter
OF THE
POLITICKS
OF
France,
Which Treats of the
CLERGY.

FINIS.

TO

Monſieur *P. H.* Marqueſs of *C.*

SIR,

I *Took ſo great ſatisfaction in the reading of thoſe your Reflections upon the* Roman Clergy, *that I have thought I could not better employ my time, than in illuſtrating them with a large Comment; and though ſometimes I improve upon your judgment, and make bold to puſh on ſomewhat farther than you are pleaſed to go, yet ſhall you not find that I have*

gloſs'd upon your diſcourſe, as ſome Monks have done on the Bible, for I have faithfully confirm'd your Opinion by the Hiſtory of our France, *and by the wiſe ſayings of the beſt Authors. And if by their help I let you ſee that your Maxims carry you to much higher enterpriſes than your Counſels aim at, this is not to contradict, but to aſſiſt you, and peradventure to ſay for you, what you would have been content to have ſaid your ſelf. After having thus fought under your banners, the intereſt of my party, which in your fifth Chapter you are ſo hard upon, obliges me to engage in their defence. And I know you are too generous, Sir, to take this ill. But I beſtow not above a third part of this Diſcourſe on that Subject, that you may clearly perceive I have more then double the pleaſure in following your ſteps, then I find in oppoſing you. To return then to my chief deſign, which is, to eſpouſe your quarrel, and take your part againſt the Uſurpations of* Rome, *I will ſhew you what*

more remains to be ſaid on that occaſion, there is a pretty Book called An Examination of the Powers of Cardinal Chigi, *then when he came in the quality of Legat to his Majeſty. A Book furniſht with invincible Reaſons, and a profound knowledge of Antiquity, eſpecially for what concerns our* France. *And from thence I acknowledge to have received ſome of the Authorities that I alledge. As in thoſe two Chapters, where you ſpeak againſt two contrary Parties, you conſider not Religion otherwiſe than as it affects the Policy of* France, *I likewiſe have confin'd my ſelf within the ſame bounds, and have not examin'd this or the other Religion and the Profeſſors, farther than the State has or may have damage or benefit by them in Temporals. I ſhall throughout this Diſcourſe forbear to ſay what I now only mention at parting,* viz. *That the intereſt of God ought to be dearer to us than that of the State; and that theſe two Intereſts accord ſo well, that*

where Truth and Piety reign, Peace, Juſtice, and the State can never fail to Flouriſh. God of his goodneſs grant ſuch happy times to France, *this is the Prayer of*

Your moſt humble and
moſt obedient Servant,

De L'Ormegeigny.

REFLECTIONS.

REFLECTIONS
ON THE
Fourth Chapter
OF THE
POLITICKS
OF
France,
Which Treats of the
CLERGY.

FRance is much oblig'd to my Lord the Marquess of *C.* for having markt the many Usurpations of the Court of *Rome*, upon the Rights of our Kings. He has wisely ob-

ſerv'd, *That the Church-men have attempted, on ſeveral occaſions, to render themſelves Maſters of all the Temporal Juriſdiction. That their obſtinacy has proceeded ſo far, that making avantage of troubleſome times, they have forced our Kings to declare in their favour upon very unjuſt Conditions, and to yield to them the rights of Mortmain and Indemnity for the Lands they poſſeſs.* Whereby the State is ſo much the weaker as they grow in ſtrength, *and that the conceipt of theſe Priviledges is ſo full in their heads, that to this day they can hardly acknowledge the Kings Soveraignty. That the multitude of Monks is an abuſe ſo ſenſible, that the King can diſſemble it no longer, and that 'tis high time ſeriouſly and effectually to apply ſome remedy. That their blind ſubjection and dependance on the Popes Will, makes a foreign Monarchy even in the very boſome of* France. *And that they ſeduce the ſilly credulous people, which is a matter of pernicious conſequence. That this Policy is founded on the abuſive and deſtructive Maxims of* Rome, *which are meerly Politick. That thoſe particular Vows of Obedince to the Pope, and the name of Religion in this caſe, is only a Bugg and vain pretence laid hold on by the Court of* Rome, *for promoting their Temporal Power, and making their Creatures in every corner. That the ſhiftings of the Monks, and their rambles from one end of* France *to the other, ſerve only to debauch them with*

with an universal acquaintance. All these Observations are true and judicious. But the fear that my Lord Marques shews of offending the Court of *Rome*, or at least, the Complement he had made, *That it is the glory of a King to honour the Holy See*, hinders him from sounding the bottom of the evil, and from presenting the necessary remedy. For it may be said of the wholesome rules that he prescribes for reducing the Clergy to their duty, and for preventing of fraud in matters of Benefices, that this comes to no more, than the pairing a mans nails when his skull is broken, and ought to be trepann'd. The great Honour, and the great interest of the King indeed, would be to think of a way, how he may roundly shake off this infamous and tyrannical Yoke of the *Roman* Court, which my Lord Marques calls the *Holy See*. And deliver himself from this buzzard Superstition which rides even our very Statesmen, *viz.* That there can be no Religion Catholick, but in submitting to the Spiritual Jurisdiction of the Holy See.

Is it because the Pope is the Vicar of Jesus Christ, His Majesty has a number of Bishops within His Realm, who, if they understand, and do their duty, are the Vicars of Jesus Christ? So that we need not travail over the *Alps* to seek one. Instead then of *providing a* French *Secretary*

of Conſcience, who may make a bank in the Court of Rome, *by which means we might know what money paſſes from* France *to Italy*, which is the adviſe of Mounſ. the Marqueſs, He ſhould rather break the Bank in *France*, and give order that no more money paſs out of *France* into *Italy*; for this Bank is a continual Pump which draws away the faireſt Caſh of *France*, which fattens a ſtranger with our Kingdoms Treaſure, which carries much away, but returns nothing.

I know all theſe Tributes and Reſpects are paid to the Pope, becauſe he is ſuppos'd to be the Head of the Church; and his Flatterers tell us, That the Church can no more ſubſiſt without the Pope than the Body without the Head. But that great Chancellor of the Univerſity of *Paris*, *John Gerſon* was not of this Opinion, for he writ a Book expreſly *De auferribilitate Papa ab Eccleſia*. That is to ſay, to prove that this ſame Head might very well be quite taken away, and the Church yet be never the worſe, nor take any harm. The Cardinal's have ſometimes continued more than two years before they could agree about their Choice of a Pope. During all which time the Body of the Church was without a Head. The Churches of *France* and *Germany* did not at all feel the want of it, and matters went ſtill on there as they were wont.

wont. Which puts me in mind of the man of Wood, that being mounted on Horſe-back, and coming under a Tree, a bough ſtruck off his head to the ground, yet the heart of Oak kept the ſaddle, and trotted on with the company nothing diſmaid, for that the head was not eſſential to the reſt of the body.

It is too ſoft an expreſſion to call the Pope an unprofitable Head of the Church, he is abſolutely pernicious to it. I paſs by the Spirituals, ſuiting my ſelf herein with the humor of Mounſ. the Marqueſs, who conſiders the Catholick Religion little farther than as it makes for the intereſt of *France.* But what greater miſchief can the Pope do to the Church, than to render the Power of the Church ſuſpected to Soveraign Princes, as a pure politick device to invade their Rights, grind their Subjects, and form even an Empire within their Empire.

The Marqueſs endeavours with great reaſon to make the King jealous of the Popes Temporal Monarchy over his Subjects. He might with as good reaſon have mov'd him to be jealous of that Spiritual Monarchy, which is in effect purely Temporal. For he has well obſerv'd, *That the name of Religion is a falſe pretence us'd by the Court of* Rome *to advance his Temporal Power. And that the Popes having begun with*

with Letters of Recommendation to the Chapters, to have an eye on such an ones merit to be chosen Bishop. Have *after in process of time turn'd these Letters Recommendatory to Bulls and Decrees to dispose of the Bishopricks of* France *at their pleasure*; which is a tyrannical invasion of the Rights of the King, and of those of the Church.

Glaber, who liv'd in the times of *Hugh Capet*, relates *lib.* 3. *cap.* 4. how Pope *John* sent a Cardinal into *France* to found and consecrate a Monastery within the Dioceſs of *Tours*; and that the Prelates of *France* and *Hugh* Archbishop of *Tours* oppoſed him, and said roundly, That the Bishop of *Rome* having a Dioceſs to himself, ought not to meddle with the affairs of another Dioceſs, nor send his Commands to their Bishops, who are his fellow Bishops and Colleagues.

The Doctors of the *Sorbon* in their *Reſcriptum* publiſht at the time of the Appeal, concerning the abuſe about the Breviary of *Anjou*, by the Bishop of *Angers*, and his Injunction to the Church of the Trinity, to uſe that of *Rheims*, amongſt other Propoſitions declare, *That the other Bishops have the power of Government and Ordination within their Dioceſs as fully as the Bishop of* Rome *has within his.*

Therefore in the time of St. *Cyprian*, and even in St. *Auguſtin*'s days, the Popes did write

write *Ad Coepiſcopos Galliæ & Collegas.* Now *Collegue* imports equality of Power.

And if the Biſhops of *Rome* have not any power over the Biſhops of *France*, they can much leſs pretend to any over our Kings. Pope *Leo* VI. promiſed *Lotharius*, *diſt.* 10. *c.* 9. *can.* 10. *to obey his Edicts both at preſent and for the future.* Pope *Pelagius* to the like effect to *Childebert*, *The holy Scriptures*, ſays he, *command us to obey Kings, and to be ſubject to them.*

The Popes were always humble Subjects of the *Roman* Emperors ſo long as that Empire continued. And 'tis but the other day that they got free from the Emperors of *Germany*. *Onuphrius de varia Creatione Pontif. l.* 4. teſtifies, That even then when they were lookt upon as the Succeſſors of St. *Peter*, their Authority reached no farther, but only to maintain and defend the truth of the Doctrines of Faith. And for the reſt were wholly ſubject to the Emperors, who ordered all things according to their wills, and were wont to create the Popes.

It is a notable Obſervation the Marqueſs has made, *That the Tables were put into the hands of* Moſes, *and not into the hands of* Aaron, *and that it is the part of Secular Princes, that the people be inſtructed in the Laws of God.* He was entruſted with the firſt Table as well as with the ſecond, to

teach

teach us that the care of the Service of God belongs as much to the Authority of the Prince, as that of Juſtice and Civil Government.

Thoſe expreſſions of the Marqueſs, That *ſecular Princes are the Protectors of the Church, of its Doctrine, and of its Canons.* Are intended by him in a more liberal and ingenuous ſenſe, than they meant, from whom he takes them. For they are the ordinary terms of thoſe who make the King ſubject to the Pope, and who own not the King for the Soveraign of the Church, but only for its Protector, and to execute the Commands of his Holineſs, and for that his Canons be obſerved. This is the Stile of my Lord Biſhop of *Montauban. Peter Bertier* in his Remonſtrance made to the King in the City of *Rheins*, *June* 8th 1654. where after he had term'd his Soveraign Power a true reſemblance of the Deity, he ſinks it again not only below the Pope, but even below the Biſhops, who are the Kings Subjects, ſaying, That the Biſhops are the Head to govern, and the mouth of the Church to ſpeak, but that the King is its arm, and its right hand to execute its Decrees and Ordinances. This Scholar of the Jeſuits ſpeaks like his Maſters; for all the Jeſuits harp on the ſame ſtring, with *Becanus in Pref. ad Reg. Jac. Kings are only to execute the Popes Commands.*

What

What is the duty of Kings (ſaies he) in relation to the Church and to Religion? I will tell you in one word; they ought to guard and defend it, not as Lords but as Servants, not as Judges but as Executioners.

And why, I pray, has not the King the ſame Soveraignty in *France*, that the Emperour *Conſtantine*, and the Emperour *Charlemaign* enjoy'd? under whom the Canons of the Synods were none other then counſel and advice, till theſe Emperours had examin'd and authoriz'd them. Did not theſe Soveraigns altogether call and diſſolve thoſe Synods of Biſhops at pleaſure? and wherefore ſhall our Kings be robb'd of that Power? Our great King who ſurpaſſes all his Predeceſſors in Glory and Magnanimity, ſhall he ſuffer a ſtranger Biſhop to ſnatch from his Crown this eſſential Right, of governing the Church of his Kingdom, and He of a King become a Serjeant to put in execution the Commands of that Biſhop, and thoſe of the Biſhops his Subjects?

The world is well chang'd ſince Pope *Adrian* in his Letters, inſerted in the ſecond Council of *Nice*, expreſs'd himſelf to the Emperour *Conſtantine* to this effect, *We beſeech your Clemency with ardour of Spirit, and as though we were preſent, we caſt our ſelves at your knees, and lie at your feet, I with my brethren.*

brethren. Then it was that Popes kiſſed the Feet of Emperours, whereas now Emperours kiſs the Popes toe.

In the Year 679. the Pope *Agathon* pray'd the Emperour *Conſtantine* to diſcharge the Tribute which the Biſhops of *Rome* pay'd Ordinarily to the Emperour for their Conſervation. Very far from compelling the Emperours, the day of their Conſervation, to lay a ſum of money at the Popes feet for Tribute, as a token of ſubjection, which afterwards the Emperours of *Germany* have been oblig'd to do.

Gregory the Firſt gave a good Example for our Popes at this day, how they ſhould demean themſelves towards the Emperour, for he ſpeaks thus to the Emperour, *l.* 3. *Ep.* 6. *I am the unworthy Servant of your pity.* And in the ſame Epiſtle, *Whilſt I ſpeak thus before my Maſters, what am I other then duſt and a worm.* And *l.* 2. *Ep.* 61. *I am ſubject to your Commands.*

I might bring many Examples how anciently the Chriſtian Emperours, and the Kings of *Italy* created and depos'd the Popes, commanding them, and depoſing them at their pleaſure.

Not to go farther than our *France*, there we may ſee what Power our Kings of the firſt Line exercis'd in the government of of the Church. The Hiſtory of *Gregory* of *Tours* may furniſh us with many Examples,

l. 4.

l. 4. *c.* 5. King *Clotharius* ſpeaks thus to the Inhabitants of *Tours*, *Have not I commanded that the Prieſt* Cato *be made a Biſhop? why are my Commands ſlighted?* and *Ch.* 18. *Paſcentius* is made Biſhop of *Paris*, *ex juſſu regis Chariberti*, by the Command of King *Heribert*. The ſame King being provokt, becauſe *Emerius* had been turn'd out of the Biſhoprick of *Xaintes*, cauſed him to be beaten, who came to ſignifie to him that depoſition, and made him be drawn upon a Cart loaden with thorns into baniſhment, and reſtor d *Emerius* to his place from whence he had been caſt out, *l.* 6. *c.* 27. *Felix* Biſhop of *Xaintes* being deceas'd, *Nonnichius Conſobrinus rege ordinante ſucceſſit.* His Couſin *Nonnichius* ſucceeded him by the Kings Order, *C.* 39. King *Guntram* treated *Sulpitius* Biſhop of *Bourges*, rejecting the Preſents offer'd him for promoting another, and ſaying, *It is not our cuſtom to ſell the Prieſthood for the price of money*, *l.* 8. c. 22. are theſe words, *Then the King commanded that* Gundegeſil *be made a Biſhop, which was done accordingly.* And *C.* 39. *Evantius* Biſhop of *Vienna* died, and in his place was ſubſtituted *Vitus* a Prieſt, the King chooſing him.

In all theſe paſſages we find no mention of the Pope, nor of *Annates*, nor of Letters of Inveſtiture. For in thoſe days the Biſhops of *Rome* meddl'd not at all with

with the Election of the Biſhops of *France*. Above all is memorable the Francique Synod, to be found in the third Tome of the Councils of the Edition of *Cologne*, *page* 39. Where *Carloman*, who ſtil'd himſelf Duke and Prince of the *French*, thus ſpeaks, *By the advice of my Prieſts, and of the Chief of the Realm, we have appointed Biſhops for the Towns, and have ſet over them* Boniface *Archbiſhop.*

Pope *Adrian* the Firſt, by a Council, made this Law to paſs, That *Charlemain ſhould have the Right and Power to Chooſe the Pope, and to govern the* Roman *See.* Which Conſtitution is inſerted in the *Roman Decretal.*

The Council of *Mayence* held under *Charlemain*, *an.* 813. *diſt.* 63. *Can. Hadrians* begins thus, *To Charles Auguſt, Rector of the true Religion, and Defendor of the holy Church of God.* And the ſecond Council of *Mayence*, under *Lewis* the *Debonnaire*, *To* Lewis *the moſt Soveraign Rector of the true Religion.* At this day theſe Titles would be counted wicked.

Now for all that *Charlemain* and *Lewis* the *Debonnaire* have advanc'd the Pope out of meaſure, yet his Authority, even in Spirituals, was no better than precarious, and ſubject to thoſe Kings that were Emperours. For proof of this, *Hincmar* relates, *l.* 55. *c.* 20. That the Emperour *Charlemain* did convoke

convoke a general Synod in *France*, whereby the worſhipping of Images was condemn'd, and the ſecond Council of *Nice* which defended them was rejected as a falſe Synod, though the Pope had approv'd it. And though at this Synod, convoked by *Charlemain*, the Authority of the Pope was admitted. For the Hiſtory of thoſe times teaches us, *That* Charlemain, *who had advanced the Pope, made uſe of the Authority given him, to his own advantage, even againſt the Pope himſelf, when he had a mind.* Inſomuch that he was not content to make the Popes Opinion be condemn'd in this Synod aſſembl'd (*pro forma* at leaſt) by Order of the Pope; but he ſent to the Pope a Book, which he writ againſt the ſecond Council of *Nice*, and againſt Images, which we have ſtill to this day.

After that *Charlemain* had rais'd the Pope, in giving him a good ſhare of the Country, which he had taken from the *Lombards*, the Popes began to be puſt up extreamly, and by little and little made themſelves formidable, taking upon them the figure of Judges, and Correctors of the Actions of Princes throughout *Chriſtendom*, by Excommunications, Interdictions, and finally, by the Depoſition of their Crowns. Now 'tis very remarkable, that whereas, by their imaginary arms, they have laid at their feet the Emperours of *Germany* and

and the Kings of *England*, and brought their Eſtates into a miſerable confuſion, yet had they never the like ſucceſs againſt *France*, they never have been able to depoſe our Kings, never could prevail to have any Interdict receiv'd in their Kingdoms, which ſo often as they attempted, they were mock'd, their Officers beaten, and their Partiſans ruin'd. But alas, the ſubmiſſion which *Henry* the Great made to the Pope (the only inſtance that we can be reproacht withall) is a cooling caſt in our way.

Under *Lewis* the *Debonair* was held at *Paris* a Council againſt Images, that is to ſay, againſt the Pope who maintain'd them. Of which Council we have all the Acts entire. And in the beginning of his Reign *Claudius* Biſhop of *Iurin* broke down all the Images he could find within his Dioceſs, and liſted himſelf againſt the Biſhop of *Rome*, who ſtood for their Adoration, and writ a Book againſt Images, and the Pope durſt not be angry, becauſe this Biſhop was ſupported by the authority of *Lewis*.

Great troubles being ſtirr'd in *France*, *Gregory* the Fourth confederates with the Sons of this *Lewis*, too *Debonaire*, who had engag'd in a wicked Conſpiracy againſt their own Father. *Sigebert* about *an.* 832. teſtifies, That Pope *Gregory* came into *France*,

France, and took part againſt the Emperour with his Sons. And the *Annals* written at the ſame time, *Bochel. Decret. Eccl. Gall. l. 2. tit. 16.* and the continuer of *Aimoinus*, a Religious of St. *Benet*, write, That the reſolution of the *French* Biſhops was, that they would by no means yield to his will, and that if he came to Excommunicate them, they would Excommunicate him again.

After this, Pope *Nicholas* the Firſt Excommunicated King *Lotharius*, (for in thoſe days depoſing was not talkt on) to make him leave *Waldrade*, and take again *Thetberge* his former wife. Whereupon the Articles drawn up by the *French*, and which may be ſeen in *Hincmar* Archbiſhop of *Rheims*, import, *That the Biſhops hold that as the King ought not to be Excommunicated by his Biſhops, ſo can he not be judged by other Biſhops: becauſe he ought to be ſubject to the Empire of God alone, who alone could eſtabliſh him in his Kingdom.* Then alſo the Clergy of *France* writ to the Pope Letters full of hard words, related by *Aventin* in his *Annals* of *Bavaria*, inſomuch as to call him Thief, Wolf, and Tyrant.

The Popes growing in inſolence, *Adrian* II. took upon him to command King *Charles* the *Bald* to leave the Kingdom of *Lotharius* entirely to his Son *Lewis*. The ſame *Hincmar*, a man of great authority in

in his time, writ ſeveral Letters to him, containing many Remonſtrances on this occaſion, and amongſt other matters, informs him, *That the Church-men and the Seculars of the Realm aſſembled at* Rheims, *have ſaid, and ſay by way of reproach, That never was ſuch a Command ſent from that See to any of our Predeceſſors.*

He adds, that Biſhops and Secular Lords us'd threatnings againſt the Pope, which he dares not repeat. And for the Kings part, ſee how little he valued the Popes Commands; amongſt the Epiſtles of the ſaid *Hincmar*, are to be found the Letters of *Charles* the *Bald* to Pope *Adrian*, wherein after having charg'd him with Pride and Uſurpation, he adds, *What pit of Hell has vomited out this prepoſterous Law? what infernal gulf has diſgorg'd it from the black and diſmal dungeons, quite contrary to the way that is ſet before us by the holy Scripture.* And he forbids the Pope to ſend any more ſuch Commands to him, or to his Biſhops, unleſs he would be content to meet with contempt and diſhonour.

Pope *Urban* excommunicated *Philip* the Firſt, and ſet his Kingdom under an Interdict. *Innocent* the Third did as much to *Philip* the *Auguſt*. But neither of their Thunderbolts had any effect, and were only receiv'd with mockery. Which agrees with the relation of *Mat. Paris*, that after

the

the Pope had declar'd to *Philip* the *Auguſt* by the Cardinal *D'Anagnia*, that he would ſet his Land under an Interdict, unleſs he would reconcile himſelf with the King of *England*; the King anſwered, That he was not at all affraid of his Sentence, ſeeing that it was not founded upon any juſt cauſe: adding moreover, that it belong'd not to the Church of *Rome* to pronounce Sentence againſt the King of *France*, the which *Du Tillet*, Clerk of the Parliament, tells us, was done by the advice of his Barons.

But what was ever more memorable in Hiſtory than the truly royal courage of *Philip* the *Fair an.* 1302? *Boniface* VIII. that Monſter of Pride, was irritated againſt him, becauſe he held Priſoner the Biſhop of *Pamiers*, who had ſpoken defamatory words againſt him: and moreover, for that he aſſum'd to himſelf the Collation of Benefices. The Pope then commands him to releaſe the Biſhop, and writ him the following Letter.

Fear God, and keep his Commandments: We will that thou take notice, That thou art ſubject to us in Spirituals and Temporals; that no Collation of Benefices and Prebends belongs to thee; that if thou haſt the keeping of any that are vacant, thou reſerve the profits for the Succeſſors; if thou goeſt about to make any ſuch Collations, we Decree them void, and ſo far as in fact they are executed, we revoke.

Thoſe

Thoſe who ſhall believe otherwiſe, we ſhall count Hereticks. A Legate come to *Paris* with theſe fine Letters, which were torn from him by the Kings people, and thrown into the fire by the Count of *Artois*. The anſwer of *Philip* to the Pope was this:

Philip, *by the Grace of God, King of the* French, *to* Boniface, *that calls himſelf* Soveraign Pontifex, *wiſheth little health, or rather none at all. May thy great ſottiſhneſs know, That in Temporals we are ſubject unto none, that the Collation of Churches and Prebends belongs to us by our right of Royalty; and alſo to take to our ſelves the profits during the vacancies. That the Collations made by us, and to be made, ſhall be ſtrong and good, and that by vertue thereof we will defend thoſe in poſſeſſion couragiouſly. Thoſe who believe otherwiſe we count fools and mad-men.*

The Pope thus provokt, Excommunicates the King, but no body durſt publiſh the Excommunication, nor be the bearer of it. Nevertheleſs the King aſſembles at *Paris*, his Knights, Barons, and Prelates, and demanded of them, of whom they held their Fiefs, and their Church-Temporalties. They anſwered, That they hold them of the King, and not of the Pope, whom they accus'd of Hereſie, Murder, and of other Crimes. In the mean while the Pope made it his buſineſs to ſtir up *Germany* and the Low-Countries againſt *France*.

France. But the King ſent into *Italy William de Nogaret*, who aſſiſted with the advice of *Sciarra* a *Polander*, took the Pope at *Anagnia*, and having mounted him upon an hurdle, carried him Priſoner to *Rome*, where he died of grief and anger. Obſerve, that this Pope who thundered againſt Kings, had ſo little Power at *Rome*, and ſo little love of the people, that not a *Roman* ſtirr'd foot to deliver the Biſhop of *Rome*, ſo rudely treated even in *Rome* it ſelf. For all this the King had immediately from the Succeſſors of *Boniface* rare Bulls, for aboliſhing the memory of all theſe tranſactions; as may be ſeen in the *Extravaganta Mernit* of *Clement* V. where this King is prais'd as a religious Prince, who had deſerv'd well of the Holy See. For the Popes are of the nature of *Spaniards*, who will lick their Maſters feet when they have roundly bang'd them.

In the Year 1408. Pope *Benedict* XIII. angry becauſe *Charles* VI. had expreſs'd the exactions and pilferings of the Popes Court, which drain'd *France*, ſends into *France* a Bull of Excommunication againſt the King and his Princes. The Univerſity of *Paris* Order'd, That theſe Bulls be torn in pieces, and that the Pope *Benedict*, whom they call'd *Peter de Luna*, be declar'd Heretick and Schiſmatick, and Diſturber of the Peace. And theſe Bulls were torn by the

Sentence of the Court *June* 16. 1408. and ten days after, the Court being riſen, at eleven a Clock in the morning, two Bull-bearers, who had brought this Excommunication, made their hononourable Amends upon the ſtairs of the Palace, and after were carried back to the *Louvre* in the ſame manner they had been brought (being drawn on two Sledges, adorn'd with Coats of painted *Canvas*, and Miters of Paper on their heads) with the ſound of Trumpets, and the publick laughter. So little did they care for the Popes thunder. And what would they have done, if theſe Bulls had brought the Sentence of Depoſition againſt the King? *Charles de Moulin* in his Treatiſe againſt the *Petites Dates*, relates a pretty Sentence of the Court againſt the Pope under *Charles* VI.

From the ſame vigor of the *French*, to defend the Dignity of the Crown of their Kings, are riſen theſe cuſtoms, which have been obſerv'd many Ages, that a Legate of the Pope is not receiv'd in *France*, nor any Reſcript, nor Command of the Pope, without the Kings leave, and without that the Legate communicate his Powers to the Kings Procurator-General, and that they be view'd and verified in the Court of Parliament, who modifie and reſtrain them as Maſters that do not derogate from the Rights of the King, the Liberties of the Chur

Church, nor the Ordinances Royal. Againſt which ancient form Cardinal *Balui* being come into *France an.* 1484 and there acting as a Legate without the Kings permiſſion, the Court, at the requeſt of the Procurator-General, decreed a Commiſſion for an Information to be brought againſt him by two Counſellors of the Court, and did forbid him to uſe farther any Faculty or Legantine Power, on pain of being declared Rebel.

An. 1510. the *Gallicane*-Church being aſſembled at *Tours*, it was concluded, That the King *Lewis* XII. might with a good Conſcience diſpiſe the abuſive Bulls and unjuſt Cenſures of Pope *Julius* II. and might by Arms oppoſe his Uſurpations, though the Pope ſhould go on to excommunicate, or to depoſe him. Which is more, by a Council held at *Piſa*, he declar'd himſelf fallen from the Papacy, and caus'd money to be coin'd with this Inſcription around it, *Perdam nomen Babylonis.* There is ſome reaſon to believe he would have made good his word, had he been 30 years younger. And we hope that God has reſerv'd this Glory for another *Lewis* in our days, who with the vigour of a flouriſhing Youth, has the prudence of an old *Cato*; as alſo the courage and fortune of an *Alexander.*

When *Lewis* XII. and his Adherents were depos'd, *John D'Albert*, King of *Navarre*, was entangl'd with the ſame misfortune, whoſe Kingdom by this Pope *Julius* II. was given to *Ferdinand* King of *Arragon*. And this is all the Right the *Spaniard* has to that our great Kings Hereditary Kingdom.

In the Year 1561. on *Friday* 12*th* of *December*, Maſter *John Tanquerel*, Batchelor of Divinity, was condemn'd by a Sentence of the Court to make confeſſion publickly, that he had indiſcreetly and raſhly held this Propoſition; *That the Pope is Vicar of Chriſt, having Power ſpiritual and ſecular, and that he may deprive of their Dignities the Princes that rebel againſt his Commands. And notwithſtanding that* Tanquerel *proteſted, that he had propos'd this* Doctrinaliter tantum & non juridice; that is to ſay, not for affirming it as true, but as a Subject for diſpute in the Schools was he compell'd to make this acknowledgment.

During the Wars of the League *an.* 1591. were ſent from *Rome* Bulls monitory of Pope *Gregory* XIV. by the which King *Henry* the Great was declar'd uncapable of the Crown of *France*, as an Heretick, and a Relapſer; and his Kingdom was expos'd to prey. Whereupon the Court of Parliament aſſembl'd at *Tours*, made this Decree.

The

The Court having regard to the concluſions of the Kings Procurator-General, have declared, and do declare the Bulls monitory given at *Rome* the firſt of *March*, 1591. null, abuſive, damnable, full of impiety, and impoſtures, contrary to the holy Decretals, Rights, Franchiſes, and Liberties of the *Gallicane*-Church. Do Order that the Copies ſealed with the Seal of *Marſilius Landrianus*, underſeal'd *Septilius Lamprius*, be torn by the Executioner of High-Juſtice, and burnt in a fire which ſhall be kindled for this occaſion, before the great Gate of the Palace, &c. which was executed *Auguſt* 5*th* of the ſame year.

I verily believe that many good *Frenchmen* read not theſe Examples with pleaſure, and reckon it no glory that the Pope has never ſet his foot on the neck of a King of *France*, as Pope *Alexander* the Third did to the Emperour *Frederick*, nor kickt off his Crown with his foot, as *Celeſtine* II. to the Emperour *Henry* VI. nor brought our Kings to yield homage to the Pope for their Kingdom, as other Kings have done, and do to this day. Without doubt they will laugh at the juſt puniſhment which *Boniface* VIII. had for his Inſolence from the Officers of the generous King *Philip the Fair*, and to ſee how after this treatment the Popes Succeſſors of *Boniface*, did complement him with a many

Commendations, and Apoſtolick Benedictions.

Without doubt alſo theſe good *Frenchmen* are well ſatisfied with the pragmatick Sanctions, whereby our Kings have repreſs'd the Exactions of the Court of *Rome*, and have appropriated the Collation of a number of Benefices; and think we are well helpt up in that the King, the Magiſtrates, and the Sorbonne will own no other Superior to the King but God, for what concerns Temporals.

But I pray to what end is all this briskneſs in our Kings, in our Parliaments, and in the Sorbon againſt the Uſurpations of the Pope in Temporals, but to yield him the Spirituals, and to confirm his pretenſions even in Temporals? Grant him the Spiritual Power, and he will be Maſter of the Temporal without contradiction, and he ſhall bring under his Juriſdiction all ſecular Cauſes under the colour of a Sacrament, of an Oath, of Charitable Uſes, or of matters of Conſcience.

The Concords of our Kings with *Rome*, and their pragmatick Sanctions about the Collations of Benefices, what have they come to? Is not this to come in for a ſhare with the Robbers, who had ſeiz'd the Royalties, and by ſolemn Articles to make them a Title, which they had no pretence to before their Invaſions? And what other

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do our Kings, in acknowledging the Spiritual Power of the Pope, but own themſelves his Subjects in Temporals? for the one hooks in the other of neceſſity. The experience of ſix Ages has prov'd this truth. 'Tis the voluntary Subjection of Emperours and Kings to the Spiritual Power of the Pope, that has given him the liberty to excommunicate them, for this belongs to the Spiritual Juriſdiction. And the very ſame Juriſdiction has authoris'd him to exempt their Subjects from the Oath of Fidelity, for the keeping an Oath is a duty of Religion: ſo that if the Pope be obey'd by a diſcontented and factious people, you ſee an Emperour or King is depos'd by the Spiritual Juriſdiction: and the Pope may ſpare the other Power that he pretends to over the Temporalties of Kings, ſeeing that his Spiritual Power all alone is ſufficiento ruine the poor Prince.

And if that the *Chriſtian* Princes, that are of his Communion, own him for the Vicar of Jeſus Chriſt; let the Kings underſtand it in what ſenſe they pleaſe, he will make them know, when-ever their weakneſs ſhall give him an opportunity, that he takes himſelf for the Vicar of the Secular Power of Jeſus Chriſt, as well as of the Spiritual: And that to him, as to Chriſt whom he repreſents, all Power is given in Heaven and on Earth. This is what the laſt

Council of *Lateran* attributes to him, and applies to him that Prophesie of *Psalm* 72. particular to Jesus Christ. *All Kings shall be prostrate before him, and all Nations shall serve him.*

The Kings that prostrate themselves the most humbly before him, are those he throws at his feet. Witness the treatment he gave our good King *Henry* the Third, who ador'd him: and yet he thundered upon him, and persecuted him even to death, and beyond death. For after he was assassinated, in pursuance of his Excommunication and Deposition, by his Creatures of the League, and particularly of the house of *Guise* that he favour'd: He would not at all suffer any Obits or Services to be made for him at *Rome*, as if he had a mind to have him damn'd, after he had caus'd him to be murder'd. Particularly he extoll'd, in a publick Harangue, the execrable parricide *Jacob Clement*, and compares his Fact to the mystery of the Incarnation of the Son of God.

The design of this Persecution drawn out so at length against the King, the Princes of the Blood, and against all the Kingdom, is to be seen in the Memoirs of the Advocate *David*, intercepted at *Lyons*, *an.* 1577. as he was upon his return from *Rome*, where he had been Secretary to the Bishop of *Paris*, the Kings Ambassador with the Pope.

This

This Biſhop of *Paris*, a Creature of the Duke of *Guiſe*, being at *Rome*, *an.* 1576. inſtead of ſerving the Intereſts of the King his Maſter, who had ſent him to make an excuſe, by reaſon of the neceſſity of the Kings Affairs for the Peace he had made with the Duke of *Alenzon* his Brother, and with the Princes of the blood that were Proteſtants; He appli'd himſelf wholly to the Intereſts of the Duke of *Guiſe* and the Pope, who had then complotted together their deviliſh deſign of the League. For the Pope, whoſe cuſtom it is to build his Greatneſs upon the weakneſs of Kings, and the troubles of their States, ſeeing the Royal-Houſe declining, deſpis'd, and drawing to an end, and *France* haraſſed with Civil Wars; was eaſily wrought upon to favour the Houſe of *Guiſe*, which aſpir'd manifeſtly to the Crown by the excluſion of the Princes of the blood. So upon the whole matter the Duke of *Guiſe*, a Prince well made, and of high undertaking, powerful in Friends, lov'd and ador'd by the people, promiſed to give him all the Soveraignty in *France*, which he counts himſelf debarr'd of, by the pragmatick Sanctions, and by the Liberties of the *Gallicane*-Church.

Then during the ſtay of this Embaſſador at *Rome*, *an.* 1576. an Agreement was drawn between the Pope and Duke of *Guiſe*, whereby the Pope declares, That

Hugh Capet had ſeiz'd the Crown of *France*, which of Right belong'd to the Houſe of *Charlemaign*. That he and his Race had render'd the *French* refractory and diſobedient to the Holy See, by that damnable Error which they call the Liberties of the *Gallicane*-Church, which is none other (ſays he) but the Doctrine of the *Valdenſes*, *Albigenſes*, the poor of *Lyons*, *Lutherans* and *Calviniſts*. That it is this Error which makes the Arms of the Kings of *France*, in defence of the Holy Church, unfortunate, and that they never will proſper, ſo long as the Crown ſhall continue in this Line.

In order thereunto, an opportunity was now offer'd by reaſon of the preſent Diviſions, to labour in good earneſt the Reſtoration of the Crown to the true Succeſſors of *Charlemaign*, who had always conſtantly obey'd the Commands of the Holy See. And who had in effect ſhew'd themſelves the lawful Heirs of the Apoſtolick Benediction upon that Crown, though depriv'd of their Inheritance by fraud and violence.

That 'tis plain, the Race of the *Capets* are wholly deliver'd over to a reprobate ſenſe; ſome being poſſeſs'd with a ſpirit of mopiſhneſs, ſtupid, and of no valour. Others rejected by God and men for their Hereſie, proſcribed and ſhut out from the

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Communion of the holy Church. Whereas the Branches of *Charlemaign* are fresh and flourishing, Lovers of Virtue, vigorous of Body and in Mind, for the execution of high and laudable Enterprises. He goes on and prophesies for them, that as War had been the means whereby they lost their Degree, so Peace shall do them the service to restore them to their ancient Heritage of the Kingdom, with the good will, the consent and the choice of all the people.

Afterwards follows a lesson of the Conclave, for the execution of this Design, well worthy to be read. For it is the whole plot and project of the League, which was exactly observ'd all along, even to the very last Act with the States of *Blois*, when the Theater on a sudden fell upon the Actors heads, and that the tragical death of two of the Principals broke the great Design ready to be accomplisht; which was, to shut the King in a Monastery, and the Queen in another, and to put to death all the Princes of the blood, to make way for Monsieur the Duke of *Guise*, to whom immediately the Crown was to be given.

For the Conclusion of this Accord, His Holiness requires of the Duke of *Guise*, that he shall cause to be acknowledg'd the Power of the Holy See, by the States of the

the Realm, *without any reſtriction or modification:* aboliſhing the Priviledges and the Liberties of the *Gallicane*-Church: the which he ſhall promiſe and ſwear to do before he take the Crown.

The Pope enrag'd to ſee his great Deſign quaſh'd, that he had labored and puſht on with ſo much Artifice, by the execution made by the King upon the perſons of the Duke of *Guiſe*, and of the Cardinal his Brother, Excommunicates and Depoſes the King, who, for all that loſt not his Crown, till he loſt his life; alſo, being aſſaſſinated by *James Clement*, a Dominican-Monk: who being immediately kill'd by the Kings Servants there preſent, had undoubtedly been Canoniz'd by His Holineſs for his Heroick Act, if the buſineſs of the League had proſper'd: for we have ſeen and read with horror the *Legend* of St. *James Clement*, printed and diſperſed throughout *France:* and his execrable parricide has been defended as a juſt and meritorious Action by the Jeſuit *Guignard*, who has written a Book expreſly on that Subject. Even *Bellarmine* condemns highly thoſe that kill'd the Monk who murdered his King, becauſe (ſays he) they kill'd *Sacratum virum*, a man conſecrated, accounting this deteſtable Monk more ſacred and more inviolable, than the ſacred Majeſty of the King.

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Henry the Great having inherited the Crown of *Henry* the Third, the Pope proſecutes the League againſt him with a redoubled Zeal. So that beſides the open War, there followed three ſeveral attempts upon his Perſon, by Villains inſtructed, and poſted in convenient places for their deſign by the Jeſuits, who, for this reaſon, were baniſhed out of *France*, and a Piramid was erected cloſe by the Palace, with an Inſcription which declar'd the cauſe of their baniſhment.

Now, for all that His Majeſty profeſſed the *Roman* Catholick Religion, yet would not the Pope of a long time receive him into the boſome of the Church, becauſe as yet his Party was but weak. But when His Holineſs ſaw that the Intereſts of the League declin'd, and that good Cities and whole Provinces treated with the King, then the Holy Spirit ſuggeſted to him, that he might receive into his Fold of the Church this ſtraying ſheep; out of fear leaſt *France*, provoked too far, ſhould, in the end, come to do what has been often threatned, that is, to make a Patriarch of the *Gallicane*-Church.

And yet in this Reconciliation the Pope made appear ſo much Pride and Rancor, this great King could not but in the Perſon of his Ambaſſadour, lying on the ground at the Popes feet, receive a bitter Cup of Repentance. Never

Never had a King of *France* made the Pope the like ſubmiſſion. The Pope has taught our Kings a leſſon to take advantage in their turn of his Neceſſities, to make him bend or break. And I am full of hope that our Great and Glorious King will have a deep reſentment of ſo great an Indignity done to His Heroick Grandfather. Eſpecially might His Majeſty be pleas'd to conſider, that the Court of *Rome*, notwithſtanding that Reconciliation, never pardon'd him; keeping near his perſons Confeſſors that conſpir'd againſt his life, cauſing ſeditious Sermons to be preacht in *Paris*, and cenſuring at *Rome* in full conſiſtory the Sentence of the Court of Parliament againſt *John Chaſtel*, executed for having ſtruck with a knife at this Great King, in order to cut his throat. And this cenſure was made at *Rome* four moneths before that this excellent King was kill'd, to prepare their Spirits for this execrable aſſaſſination.

Thereupon when *Ravaillac*, who perform'd what the other Martyrs of the Pope had attempted, was examin'd, and asked why he undertook this deteſtable Parricide, he anſwered, That there needed no more then to have heard the Sermons preached in *Paris* the laſt *Lent*, to inform any body of the Motives; for the reſt that the King was preparing to make War againſt God, in that he would make War againſt the

Pope

Pope, and that the Pope is God. In ſhort, one might find in this Wretch the ſparks of that fiery Zeal, and blind Devotion for His Holineſs, and the deſperate ſpirit of the League, which the Pope, by the means of the Jeſuits, induſtriouſly fomented in *France*, to produce this horrible and dire effect.

When it was repreſented to theſe Bigot parricides, that the King having been Excommunicated, was afterwards abſolv'd, and reconcil'd to the Pope, they anſwer'd, That his Converſion was feign'd. And they who attempted againſt his Perſon, before this Reconciliation, might ſhield themſelves with the Canon *Excommunicatorum* of Pope *Urban*, which ſpeaks thus, *We count them not Murderers, who ſhall happen to kill any excommunicated perſons, out of an ardour of zeal, for the Catholick Church, their Mother.*

Obſerve then, that all they whom the Pope taxes for Hereſie, they that Appeal from the Pope to a future Council, and they that levy Taxes upon the Clergy, are Excommunicated by the Bull *De cœna Domini*, which the Pope pronounces every *Thurſday* abſolutely: a many Kings and Princes are involv'd in this Excommunication, and the Kings of *France* amongſt the reſt: no Hereſie being more Criminal at *Rome*, than the aſſerting of the Liberties of the *Gallican* Church,

Church, and the not owning the Terreſtrial Empire of His Holineſs. It concerns then thoſe to make good proviſion for the ſecuring of their Lives, who are by this Canon expos'd to all thoſe who ſhall be puſht on to kill them by an ardour of zeal for the Catholick Church.

He was much deceiv'd, who thought that the Pope, and the Jeſuits, his Emiſſaries, take it very ill any ſhould repreſent to the World, that by the Doctrine, and by the Cenſures of *Rome*, Subjects are inſtructed to kill their Kings, as often and as many as it ſhall pleaſe the Pope to Excommunicate; and that the murder of our two laſt *Henries* enſued thereupon. I think the quite contrary, they are well content that in laying to their charge theſe furious Executions, which have plung'd our *France* in a gulph of Miſeries, we ſerve their deſign, which is to ſcare our Kings and Princes, and render them tame Slaves to the Court of *Rome*, by the fear of Excommunication, Depoſition, Rebellion, Knife and Poyſon.

But this is not to be fear'd ſave where the people are bigotted with a ſottiſh zeal, and believe in the Pope, inſtead of believing in God, and obeying the King. *France* at this time is pretty well purg'd of this Zeal. And by the Grace of God, and the wiſe Conduct of His Majeſty, there is no longer

now

now any ambitious Prince within the Kingdom to rob him of his peoples Affection, or that may dare to make any Alliance with the Pope, to tumble him from his Throne, and ſhare the Crown.

We have this good fortune, that we may ſet out to the life the ill aſpect of *Rome* upon our Kings, and that dangerous Vigilance over *France*, without any danger of abating the Courage of our Great King; but on the contrary, were his truly Royal Courage capable of an encreaſe, it would yet ſwell the higher, from the conſideration of the Evils that *Rome* has done, and will yet do to *France*, if he do not heartily oppoſe the Uſurpations ſhe exerciſes, with impunity in all the parts of His Kingdom.

The honeſt *French-men* that have the honour to be near his Perſon, might repreſent to Him the danger of this Doctrine maintain'd by the Popelings of His Kingdom, That *Jeſus Chriſt committed to St.* Peter *as well the earthly as the heavenly Empire*, which are the very words of Pope *Nicolas*. Therefore Cardinal *Bellarmine*, *Ch.*27. againſt *Barclay*, holds abſolutely, That the Pope may diſpoſe of all the Temporals of the World. *I affirm* (ſays he) *with confidence, That our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, the time he was mortal, might diſpoſe of all Temporal things, and deprive the Kings and the Princes*

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of their Kingdoms and Dominions, and that without doubt he has left the ſame Power to his Vicar, to be employ'd, when he ſhall judge it neceſſary for the good of Souls.

The Pope *Pius* V. diſplays this Power with great Oſtentation, in his Bull againſt Queen *Elizabeth* of *England*; wherein after that he calls Himſelf *Servant of Servants*, he declares, That *God has eſtabliſht the Biſhop of* Rome *Prince over all Nations and Kingdoms, to take, deſtroy, diſperſe, conſume, plant and build*, and in the Power hereof he does Anathematize, degrade, and depoſe this Queen, abſolves all her Subjects from the Oath of Fidelity that they had made her, and forbids them abſolutely to give her Obedience.

Gregory XIV. ſet out ſuch another Bull againſt our Great *Henry*, declaring him uncapable of the Crown, and expoſing His Kingdom to prey. But both this and the other Bull were torn and caſt into the fire by the hands of the Hangman.

Obſerve, that the Pope exerciſeth this Power over the Temporalties of Kings *for the good of Souls*, and as *a Spiritual Prince*. So that our *French* Stateſ-men may ceaſe to have their eyes wilfully ſeal'd up by that diſtinction of Spiritual power, which they allow him, and Temporal Power that they deny him. For that it is by virtue of this Spiritual Power, that he exerciſeth the Tem-

Temporal. See what Cardinal *Bellarmin* ſays, *De pont. Rom. l.* 5. *c.* 5. *The Pope may change the Kingdoms, take them from one, and give them to another, as a Soveraign Spiritual Prince, when it ſhall be neceſſary for the good of Souls.* And of this neceſſity he ſhall be the only Judge, as the Soveraign Spiritual Prince. For 'tis thus the Cardinal argues, *Apol. pro Garnet p.* 84. *If the Church* (that is to ſay the Pope) *had no the power to diſpoſe of Temporal things, ſhe would not be perfect, and would want the Power that is neceſſary for the attaining her end: for* (ſays he) *the wicked might entertain Hereticks, and go ſcot-free, and ſo Religion be turn'd upſide down.* This reaſon charges imperfection on the Church in the Apoſtles time, for that had no power over the Temporals.

Theſe horrible Principles ſo ſtrongly maintain'd by the Court of *Rome*, were of freſh memory found ſo prejudicial, both to the ſafety of our Kings, and to the Peace of *France*, that thoſe of the third State *an.* 1615. were mov'd to propoſe to the General States an Article, containing the means to diſpoſſeſs, the people of that Opinion, that the King might be depos'd by the Pope, and that by the killing of Kings one might gain the Crown of Martyrdom.

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Cardinal *Du Perron*, in the name of the *Clergy*, oppos'd this Article, and employ'd all the ſtrength of his Eloquence and Learning in two fair Speeches, the one before the Nobility, the other before the third State, to perſwade them that our Kings may be depos'd by the Pope, offering himſelf to ſuffer Martyrdom in defence of this Truth. The Lords of the Nobility, to their great ſhame, joyn'd with the *Clergy*, for the putting their Kings Crown under the Miter of the Pope; much degenerating from the vertue of their Anceſtors, thoſe *French* Barons, by whoſe advice *Philip* the *Auguſt* declar'd to the Cardinal *D'Anagnia*, the Popes *Legat*, that threatned him, that it did not at all belong to the Church of *Rome* to pronounce Sentence againſt the King of *France*. But the third State held firm to their Article that maintain'd the Dignity of their King, and the ſafety of his Perſon; and could never be won by promiſes, nor affrighted by threatnings, to depart from it, ſhewing themſelves in this more noble than the Nobility.

It is no wonder in this caſe that the third State ſhew'd more affection to their King than the Clergy, ſeeing that the Clerks hold, That they are not the Kings Subjects; for in effect they acknowledge another Soveraign out of the Kingdom. And who can think it ſtrange if they labour to heighten

heighten that Monarchy of which they make a Party? But that the Nobility, the Kings right arm, that they ſhould be ſo baſe to ſtrike their Head, and lay it at the feet of an *Italian* Biſhop; this is that which after Ages will reflect upon with aſtoniſhment and indignation, and which Hiſtorians ſhall bluſh to relate, and be vext that they cannot let paſs in ſilence.

So the Nobility being joyn'd with the Clergy, the Article of the third State was cenſur'd and rejected. Whereupon the Pope writ triumphant Letters to the Clergy and the Nobility, who had been faithful to Him in this Cauſe, glorying in His Victory, and exalting the Magnanimity of theſe generous Nobles. But in truth, the Deputies of theſe generous Nobles deſerv'd to have been degraded from their Nobility, and they of the third State to have receiv'd their Titles.

The minority of the late King, and the baſeneſs of the Queen-Mother, render'd them expos'd to theſe Injuries, and apt to be circumvented; inſomuch that this *Harangue* made to the third State was printed, with the Priviledge of the King, and the Pope gain'd his point.

The falſe dealing of the Cardinal, who made this Speech, is remarkable; namely, that he had a long time followed King *Henry* the Great, even then when he was

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of a contrary Religion, and depos'd by the Pope: and that a little before, in an Aſſembly held at the *Jacobins* in *Paris*, he had reſiſted the Popes *Nuncio*, who would that this Doctrine of the Temporal Sovereignty of the Pope might be held for an Article of Faith. But in theſe two *Harangues*, the Cardinal made a kind of a Recantation, and pronounc'd himſelf his own condemnation. Ungrateful wretch to have thus abus'd the tender Age of the Son of his King, and his great Benefactor and to have baſely betray'd the Right of the King, to oblige the Court of *Rome*.

But this may not ſeem ſo ſtrange, if one conſider, that he got the beſt part of his preferment for certain Services of pleaſure that do not much bind the Conſcience of him that receives them, nor that of him who is recompens'd for them. And in truth, thoſe diverting Services that he and Monſieur *De la Ravenne* render'd to King *Henry* the Great, deſerve that Poſterity ſhould erect for them Statues crown'd with Myrtle.

God be thankt that *France* now has a King vigorous both in Age and in Virtue, who is the terrour of *Rome*, having ſhew'd himſelf ſenſible of its Uſurpations upon *France*, beyond all his Predeceſſors; and of whom we have good occaſion to hope

that he will ſhake off this *Italian* Yoak, and baniſh all Foreign Juriſdiction out of his Kingdom.

We alſo ought to bleſs God, for that the *French* Nobility at this day is much of a different temper from that which in the full States ſubmitted the Crown and life of their King to the Popes Tyranny 56 years ago. And that is ready to cover their Fathers faults by generouſly aſſiſting their King, to make Him the only King within his Kingdom.

To effect this, above all things, theſe pretended Immunities and Exemptions muſt be taken from the Clergy, which indeed are revolts from the Kings Authority to that of the Popes. 'Tis in truth very reaſonable, that they who have the charge of Souls, ſhould be diſcharg'd from many publick Services, by reaſon they are vow'd and reſerv'd to the Service of God: but however, not that they and their Lands ſhould no longer depend on the King, and be ſubject to another Soveraign.

This is what was repreſented to King *Henry* the Great, by that illuſtrious Perſonage *Achilles de Harley*, firſt Preſident of his Court of Parliament at *Paris*, in a Speech he made to him, to diſſwade him from recalling the Jeſuits, he Remonſtrates to him, That *according to their Doctrine, he who has taken the loweſt Orders of the Church, could*

could not be guilty of High Treason, whatever Crime he committed, for that the Clergy are no longer the Kings Subjects, nor belonging to his Jurisdiction. In such manner that the Church-men (if one would believe them) are exempt from Secular Powers, and may, without punishment, attempt against Kings with their bloody-hands; and that this Doctrine they maintain in their publisht Books, Thuanus l. 130. ad an. 1604.

To this effect, the Jesuit *Emanuel Sa* holds, That *the Rebellion of a Clerk against the Prince is not the Crime* læsæ Majestatis, *because he is not a Subject of the Prince.* Words that have been left out in the Edition of *Paris*, but remain in that of Cologne, and that of *Antwerp.*

Bellarmin, that has not been purged, says the same thing. He affirms, *De Cl. C.* 28. *That a Clerk cannot be punished by the Civil Judges, or in any wise brought before the Judicial Seat of a Secular Magistrate.* He likewise says, That *the Soveraign* Pontifex *having deliver'd the Clerks from the subjection of Princes, Kings are no more the superiors of Clerks.* The Pope then by his reckoning is the King of Kings, if he can deliver whom he pleases from their subjection due to their Princes by their birth, by making them Clerks; and it will be in his Power not to leave in *France* any Subject to the King, if all his Subjects will but accept of the meanest Orders. This

This Body of the Clergy has its Judges and Officers apart, and Priſons apart. Their Cauſes will not bide the Trial before the Kings Judges, but fly to the *Rota*, or to the Conſiſtory at *Rome*. There may be found an incredible number of perſons in *France*, who, under the Title of the Clergy, have ſhaken off the Yoak of the Kings Authority; and a third part of the Land of the Kingdom is in the Church-mens hands, for which they will neither render Homage nor Service to the King. And though the lots and vents, the quints, requints, and other Rights of Lordſhip belong to the King; all theſe Rights are loſt after that the unmoveable goods are enter'd into the poſſeſſion of the Clergy. The King alſo loſes his Rights *D'Aubanir*, of Confiſcation, and of Deforence, the Clergy being a Body that never dies, yet mortifies the inheritances; new Donations falling to them every day, but none goes from them. A famous Writer ſaid pleaſantly, That as the arms and thighs dwindle when the belly ſwells to exceſs; ſo in the Body of a State the Nobility and people that are as the arms and leggs of a Commonweal, are impair'd by the fatning of the Clergy.

I am of thoſe who wiſh the Clergy may have thoſe means, and that Dignity which may lift them above Contempt and Oppreſſion, and render them reſpected even

of Kings. But becauſe I love them, I wiſh their Riches may not be ſo exceſſive, as to create in Kings a jealouſie, that may cauſe them to be taken away, as has happen'd in *England*, and in other places.

'Tis therefore a great imprudence of our Lords, the Clergy of *France*, who poſſeſs the beſt part, and the fat of the Kingdom enough to cauſe jealouſie in the Seculars and the avarice of Sacriledge; to add, yet this unjuſt pretenſion of immunity from all Charges, both for their perſons and for their goods; and defend themſelves with the Popes Authority, which exempts them. Which, in effect, is to tell the King, That they are another Kings Subjects, who has Power to Command Him, to diſpoſe of the Lands under his Obedience, and to limit his Authority over the Perſons of the Natives *French*.

If for this they alledge a long Cuſtom, we may ſay, That the Popes to ſettle their Uſurpations in *France*, have ever embroil'd our Kings in Troubles, and oblig'd them to think of ſomewhat elſe, beſides the repelling the blind encroachments of a ſtrange Kingdom that crept into their Realm; and that they had to do with weak Princes, or ſuch as had their hands full other way. But now that God has given *France* a King wiſe, powerful, flouriſhing, and who has leiſure to have an eye on all his Intereſts

will these Gentlemen expect that he will suffer long that a third of his Kingdom lie unprofitable to him, and even that it be reserv'd to fortifie a foreign Monarchy? and though natural reason requires that they who live at ease should comfort those who fight for their preservation; all this while that the Nobles and the third State oppose the invasion of Strangers, all this while that the King is fortifying his Frontiers, entertaining Garrisons, settling Officers both for the State and for the War, why do not the Church-men, who are thereby maintain'd in the quiet enjoyment of so great plenty, contribute one Mite towards the defraying of publick Charges? why shall their encrease be a diminution to the strength of the King, who is kept waking for their repose and preservation?

Shall not the King, who is so clear-sighted, see what an impoverishment it is to his Kingdom, that *France* be tributary to a Stranger, under the Title of Annates, Offerings, Dispensations, Absolutions, and Causes Matrimonial?

Against these Depredations, our ancient Kings had provided some remedy by the pragmatick Sanctions, vext to see the fairest Revenue of the Kingdom pass over the *Alps* by a Religious spoil, and go into the purses of those who laugh at our simplicity.

But what reaſon is there that they who pay ſo willingly Tribute to the Pope ſhould make ſo great difficulty in paying to the King? Is it not becauſe they believe they owe all to the Pope, and nought to the King? St. *Paul* teaches them to pay Tribute to the Higher Powers, *inaſmuch as they are Miniſters of God.* And St. *Chryſoſtom* commenting upon this Text, tells them who are *theſe Higher Powers. If* (ſays he) *the Apoſtle has eſtabliſht this Law whilſt the Princes were* Pagans, *how much more ought this to be done under Princes that are Believers?* And he had ſaid before, *The Apoſtle commands this to all, even to the Prieſts.* Which is more, he adds, *Though thou art an Apoſtle, though thou art an Evangeliſt, or a Prophet, or what ever elſe thou art.* From St. *Ambroſe* we have the ſame leſſon, in his Oration on delivering the Temples, *If Tribute be demanded, refuſe it not, the Lands of the Church pay Tribute.* Even Pope *Urban* and the *Roman* Decretal ſay, *That the Church pays Tribute of its exteriour goods.* Alſo, *That Tribute muſt be paid to Emperours, in acknowledgment of the peace and repoſe in which they ought to maintain and defend us.*

The Right of Kings and truth muſt needs be very ſtrong, that could draw from the Pope and his Canoniſtical Doctors this acknowledgment. For the Canon-Law was not founded for any other end, but to ſup-

plant

plant the Civil Laws, and eſtabliſh the Popes Juriſdiction throughout. This is a Body of foreign Laws, that have their Tribunal apart, and that depends on a foreign Prince, and where the King has nothing to do but look on; I mean till ſuch time as he ſhall pleaſe to take cognizance of ſo unreaſonable an Uſurpation. And forbid that any Cauſe be judged in *France* by other Authority than His, and much leſs any Cauſe commenc'd in *France*, be appeal'd to *Rome*. And, in truth, he is but a King by halfs, till he alone poſſeſs all the Juriſdiction exercis'd within his Kingdom.

This is what *Charles du Moulin* ſaid in an *Epiſtle* to *Henry* II. where he writes freely againſt the Empire that the Pope has ſet up within our *France*, where the Pope has Subjects that ſubmit not to the Laws of the King, but to thoſe of the Pope, which are the Canon-Law, and the Conſtitutions that come from *Rome*.

But (ſome may object) would you have the King judge in Spirituals? I anſwer, That if the King ought not to be Judge, it does not follow that the Pope muſt. The King has his Biſhops that may and ought to judge of matters purely Spiritual; but of nought without being authoriz'd by the King: and there is no need of an Authority out of the Kingdom for this.

I will ſay more, That the Eccleſiaſtical Government is a part of the Office of a King. For ſo it was in the Kingdom of *Iſrael*. And who would believe that in this Age, and in *Spain*, where the Inquiſition reigns, King *Philip* IV. aſſum'd to himſelf the Soveraign Power of Churches within his Dominions? for this purpoſe he appli'd that excellent paſſage of *Iſodore*, which is attributed alſo to the Council of *Paris*, *That the Secular Princes ſhould know, that they ought to give an account of the charge of the Church committed to them by Jeſus Chriſt; for whether that the Peace or the Diſcipline receive improvement by believing Princes, or that they are impair'd: He who committed the Church to their Power will demand an account.*

O the excellent paſſage! O the holy leſſon! God give all *Chriſtian* Kings the Grace ſo well to learn it, that they may never leave this charge of the Church which Jeſus Chriſt has committed to them upon the hands of Strangers; and when they have taken it into their own hands, to acquit themſelves worthily, and render a good account.

Alas! alas! Have Kings Eyes to ſee their Rights, and have they no Hands to maintain them? Are they quick-ſighted enough to perceive that the Government of the Church is committed to them, and that they

they are to render an Account to God; and have they not the Courage to reſcue them from unjuſt and ſtrange Hands that ſnatch them away? think they to acquit themſelves of this great Account, of the Government of the Church of their Kingdoms, by ſaying, That the Holy Father has diſcharg'd them of it, when they have in their Hands the power to diſcharge Him from His Uſurpations?

In truth, they will never be in condition to govern the Church committed to them; they will never be but Kings by halfs, till they have baniſht from their Territories this pretended Spiritual Juriſdiction, which deſtroys the Civil, and which will draw under its Cogniſance all ſorts of Cauſes, there being none, wherein there is not ſome matter of Conſcience, or ſome kind of tranſgreſſion of Gods Commandments, and that by conſequence belongs not to the Juriſdiction of the Pope, if He muſt be own'd the Soveraign Spiritual Judge in *France*.

The Popes themſelves inform our Kings of their Right to govern the Church. *Leo* IV. writing to *Lewis* and to *Lotharius*, did not he own that the Inveſtiture of the Biſhop comes from the Emperour, and the Pope has only the Conſecration? Did not He beſeech the Emperour to inveſt a perſon he had recommended? and does he not

acknowledge, That the Metropolitan dares not Conſecrate him, without the Emperours conſent? And Pope *John* X. in his *Epiſtle* to *Hereiman* of *Cologne*, about the buſineſs of *Heldwin* of *Tongres*; does he not obſerve, *That the old Cuſtom has this force, that none ought to confer a Biſhoprick upon any Clerk, ſave the King, to whom the Scepter has been given of God.*

The Council held at *Thionvil*, under *Lewis* the *Debonair*, *an.* 835. gives us this good Maxim, That the Pope ought to be call'd Pope and Brother, not Father and *Pontifex:* and that *Lewis* had more Power in the Government of the *Gallicane*-Church, than the Biſhop of *Rome*, as *Agobard* Biſhop of *Lyons* has it in his Treatiſe of the Compariſon of the two Governments, related by *Boſſellus* in his *Decretals.*

Gregory Turonenſis does furniſh us with more than ten Examples of the right of Inveſtiture belonging to our Kings before the Empire fell into their Hands. In the times of *Clovis* they held the Royal Right of the Inveſtiture of Biſhops. They had alſo a Right which they call'd Regal, which was the Power of enjoying vacant Biſhopricks and Prebends, and the moveables of Biſhops dying without a Will. And it is very eaſie to prove, that under the firſt Line of our Kings, and a long while under the ſecond, the Kings of *France* were the Sove-

Soveraigns as well in Spirituals as in Temporals. And though they had loſt their Soveraignty about the end of the ſecond Line, and under the third by their negligence, and by the cunning of the Popes, watchful for their advantage; nevertheleſs an infinite of perſons, in thoſe times, both of the Clergy and of the Law, took notice of, and taxed the Uſurpations of the Popes upon the Rights of our Kings. Amongſt others *Ægydius Romanus*, Archbiſhop of *Bourges*, in the time of *Philip the Fair*, this Archbiſhop, for the Reaſons regiſtred in the Court of Parliament, remonſtrates, That the *Gallicane*-Church has that Right, and that Liberty to provide for its occaſions by Synods of the Biſhops of the Country, without that the Pope ought to meddle, unleſs by way of exhortation.

Cardinal *D'Oſſat* (Letter 90 to the King) ſhews, That the Pope ought not to meddle at all with the Election of the *French* Biſhops, and this he proves by the Ordinance of *Orleans an.* 1560. and ſaith, That ſince the Popes have reſerv'd to themſelves the proviſion of Biſhopricks, they have been very ill ſerv'd.

The excellent Archbiſhop of *Paris*, *Peter de Marca*, in his agreement of Empire and the Prieſthood, has wiſely and boldly remonſtrated, That ſince the Pope would hold the ſame degree in *France*, that the

Soveraign Sacrificer held in the Synagogue, he ought not to pretend to more Authority in our *France*, than the Soveraign Sacrificer had in the Kingdom of *Israel*, where he was the Kings Subject: his Person, his Jurisdiction, the Affairs of the Church, the Order of Ceremonies were within the Kings Jurisdiction: who depos'd the Sacrificer, and set another in his Place, out of his pure and full Authority. God be prais'd for that in these latter times, where the Throne of Iniquity, the Papal See is so much adored, he has rais'd up such brave Assertors of our Christian Liberty, which would bear up again, and for which we want only to shake off the Yoak.

What is alledg'd the most specious for the necessity of a Pope to superintend the Christian Kingdom, is, that the Kings need an Arbiter of their Differences, that may be generally respected, and whose Dignity and Sanctity may oblige them to submission and veneration.

But if this general Arbiter, instead of making peace amongst Princes, foment their Differences, and embroil their Affairs, to fish in troubl'd waters, they shall do wisely to let him alone, and yet more wisely to rid themselves of him.

There's no question but that when a general Peace is for the advantage of the Pope, that then he will set himself seriously about

about it. But it rarely happens otherwiſe, then that the good of one Party ſhall be diſadvantageous to the Pope, and then 'tis ill truſting to his Arbitrement.

France has more reaſon to ſtand upon its guard than any other Nation, for the Court of *Rome* has always ſought its ruine: has favour'd its Enemies, or rais'd them up anew. When the *Engliſh* made War againſt us, *Rome* abetted their quarrel, and aided them with Spiritual Weapons. I cannot let paſs the ridiculous aſſiſtance ſent to *Henry* V. of *England*, when he levied an Army to go into *France*: this was a Ship loaden with conſecrated Apples, which were diſtributed to all who would liſt themſelves for this War; and they liſted themſelves with a good will, having ſcambl'd for the Apples with greedineſs and devotion, and were well ſatisfied in Conſcience of the juſtice of this Expedition by theſe Apples Apoſtolical.

The Pope employ'd more powerful means againſt us, when *France* was weak, and the *Spaniard* powerful, whom he aſſiſted with all his Forces Spiritual and Temporal. What a ſtrong League did he make to deſtroy both King and Kingdom? what Evils did he heap on *France?* and after the injury done us, how much praying did he require before he would be appeas'd?

Thomas Campanella ſpeaks thus of this Judge of Differences, *Who ſhall carefully read Hiſtory, ſhall find that the Popes have made more Wars amongſt Chriſtians, than they have quieted.* Let *France* mark what he adds, *So far have the Popes been from oppoſing himſelf,* Hiſpanis Imperiorum helluonibus, *to the* Spaniards *unſatiable devourers of Empire, that the Pontifical Authority has lent pretences to their Voracity: witneſs* Navarre *and* France *in the times of* Henry III.

For this laſt hundred years, all the Popes (except *Urban* VIII.) have favour'd the *Spaniard*. And what reaſon can we have to expect better from them, ſeeing that the greateſt part of the Cardinals are born Subjects of *Spain*, in the Principalities of *Milan*, of *Naples*, and of *Sicily*; and that the Court of *Rome* is enclos'd within theſe Principalities? judge what confidence we can have in ſuch Arbiters.

France looſes plainly both money and pains, ſending Ambaſſadors to theſe Gentlemen, courting them, and enriching them, when they are aſſembled for the Election of a Pope. The fear they have of *France*'s Power, may gain ſome reſpect, but it is a reſpect without Friendſhip; and when *France* has gain'd it, I do not ſee what *France* has gain'd.

They

They have reaſon to fear the King knowing that this Great Prince is ſenſible of their Uſurpations; and they have no great reaſon to love his Subjects, becauſe they are no great purchaſers of Indulgences. And the leſs the King cares for them, the more will they fawn upon him; but we may aſſure our ſelves, they employ all their ſtrength, and ſet to work all their art and ſubtilty to put a ſtop to his Progreſs, and to pull down his Greatneſs.

That Agreement of the Pope with the Duke of *Guiſe* ought never to be forgotten. What rancour did he teſtifie againſt the Royal Line that Reigns at this day? what pains did he take to diſinherit and deſtroy it. Into what combuſtion did he caſt the poor Kingdom, that he might have a King of his own Choice, who might aboliſh the Liberties of the *Gallicane*-Church, and make *France* a Fief of the Court of *Rome*. Let us for our experience learn the truth of that Character given by *Æneus Sylvius*, who was afterwards Pope *Pius* H. That there was never any great Slaughter in *Chriſtendom*, nor any great Calamity happen'd either of Church or State, whereof the Biſhops of *Rome* were not the Authors. *Hiſt. Auſtria.* And as much is ſaid by *Machaivel* in his Hiſtory of *Florence*.

And if we consider that the great Evils done by the Pope to Kings, were done under the colour of com-p o nise, we shall find that 'tis the surest way to decline his kindness, and to have nought to do with him; and that he always comes better off that affronts him, than he that flatters him.

The Marquess after he has wisely consider'd, that the name of Religion is a false pretext laid hold on by the Court of *Rome*, thereby to encrease their Temporal Power, and raise them Creatures every where, the abuses he would have retrencht after the example of *Charlemaign*, and of many more great Kings.

But to compass this, it is not advisable to appear in it barefac'd, for (says he) *That would be to bring upon us the Clamours and importunity of all the Monks and their followers; this would be to bring* Rome *upon our back, which might give us trouble.*

I confess that no good can be acquir'd without trouble. But I cannot conceive that it would be much trouble to deliver *France* from the Usurpations and the Exactions of *Rome*. To forbid that there be in *France* no more Courts depending on the Pope; nor money carried from *France* to *Rome*, or any Cause removed thither by Appeal. And that no provision of Benefices be receiv'd from thence. This, in truth,

truth, would be to bring *Rome* on our backs; but not one Sword would be drawn in the Cauſe either within the Kingdom or without. Should the Emperour do the ſame within his Principalities, our King would not ſtir; nor would the Emperour any more be concern'd if the King ſhould ſet back the Juriſdiction of the Pope to beyond the *Alps*.

When King *Henry* VIII. of *England* did the ſame in his Kingdom, what Prince undertook the quarrel againſt him: How eaſily would the people accuſtom themſelves to be free from the Papal Exactions: and how vain and idle were the Attempts of the Popes Partiſans in *England* to reſtore his Authority? that Prince hackt and haraſs'd what he had a mind to in the Eccleſiaſtick Eſtate, and the clamours of the Monks, which the Marqueſs is affraid on, frighted not him, though he treated them courſely.

Nor are we at all to fear leaſt the Monks take up Arms, as the Chiefs of the League forc'd them to do; which would ſerve only to make them be laught at, and gave a ſubject to the *Painters* for thoſe antick and ridiculous Portraicts that they have left us. Or if any little broil ſhould be rais'd by ſome of the Bigots, how ſoon muſt it fall before a great King who is never without an Army.

Who

Who ſhall read over all the Book of the Marquiſs, ſhall find that he propoſes Reformations in the State far more hard to be effected, than the baniſhing of the Canon-Law and Papal Juriſdiction out of the Kingdom. For he would perfectly melt down the Juſtice and Policy, and caſt them all anew. He has truly made it appear, that he underſtands the Malady of the State; and yet his Projects to remedy them cannot be put in execution, without bringing to ruine and deſpair many active Spirits that live on their Profeſſions, which is very dangerous to attempt in a State. Whereas the expulſion of the Canon-Law out of *France*, and the reduction of all Cauſes thereon depending to the Civil Magiſtrate, and of all perſons acknowledging the Pope to the Obedience of the King, would not at all be any dangerous Innovation. To diſcontent the regular Eccleſiaſticks that are unactive, as bred up in the ſhade, and in contemplation, or in idleneſs, can be no great danger: eſpecially leaving them their Revenues, at leaſt for life.

I neither have the wit nor the preſumption to give a model of what Orders ſhould be preſcrib'd the Church after the Papal Juriſdiction is baniſht the Kingdom. And I ſhall go no farther than to ſay, that I ſee no vigor in the *Roman* Juriſdiction, and their Partiſans in *France*, that may hinder the

the King from caſhiering them abſolutely, and making himſelf Maſter at home. Even the Excommunications and Interdicts that would follow, would ſtrengthen him, being of no other effect but to provoke the Parliaments, and to animate the people againſt the Pope. The greateſt part of the Clergy would ſubmit to the King, and would caſt off all foreign Domination: and the diſſenting Clergy would be inconſiderable, would be diſperſt, and vaniſh before the Rayes of the Authority Royal.

And, I pray, a King of *England*, could he accompliſh this Work, to free himſelf from the Papal-Yoak, though carried thereunto more by paſſion than prudence? And our Great King, ſo Vigorous, ſo Powerful, ſo Wiſe, ſhall not he dare to undertake it, for fear of vexing the Pope and the Monks? Shall he ſcar'd with an imaginary Monarchy, that has neither force nor foundation, ſave in the Opinion of thoſe that fear it, and eſtabliſh it by their ſottiſh fear?

What is moſt conſiderable in this Example, is, That the Pope continues baniſht out of *England*. For though reſtor'd by Queen *Mary*, and his Power own'd for the ſpace of five years; Queen *Elizabeth*, and the Kings her Succeſſors, found themſelves ſo much at eaſe in being deliver'd from the *Roman*-Yoak, and in being acknowledged Supream,

Supream, under God, in all Cauſes, and over all Perſons, as well Eccleſiaſtical as Civil; that they have maintain'd, and do yet maintain this Authority eſſential to their Crown.

This Authority is no leſs eſſential to the Crown of our Great King; and 'tis this that the good Prince, *James* King of *England*, repreſents to all Kings and Princes of *Chriſtendom*, in the Remonſtrance he has made them, touching the Rights of their Crowns. They have not hitherto been ſo happy to liſten to it, but let us hear what he ſays to them.

If you that are the moſt Powerful, come to conſider in earneſt with your ſelves, that well-nigh a third of your people and of your lands belongs to the Church; will not the thoughts of ſo great a loſs move you, which withdraws from your Juriſdiction ſo many men, and ſo much of your Lands; in ſuch manner that every where they plant Colonies and Provinces for the Pope? What thorns and thiſtles ſuffer you to grow in the Country under your ſubjection, ſo long as ſo powerful a Faction flouriſhes and ſpreads over ſo much good ſoil within your Kingdoms, openly maintaining, that they are exempt from your Power, and that they are by no right ſubject to your Laws, and to your Judgments? inſomuch, that whereas formerly the Clerks deſir'd no more but their Tithes, and liv'd thereon content; at this day the

Pope,

Pope, chief of the Clerks, is not content with leſs than with a third part of your Subjects, and of your Lands.

Theſe words of a King, our Neighbour, happily enjoying a Soveraignty independant of the Pope, of which his Anceſtor robb'd this Robber an hundred and forty years ago, ought to move in our Kings a virtuous Emulation to recover, and after to maintain the Rights proper to their Crown. And the example of ſo flouriſhing a ſucceſs ought to encourage them to ſo juſt and ſo noble an Undertaking.

From this great and principal acquiſition, that the King ſhall be the only Soveraign in his Kingdom, other advantages will ariſe. Theſe ſtranger Courts being put down (that are the Mills whither every one brings, and where the Moulture goes all to *Rome*, or to their Creatures) the money they drain from the Kings Subjects ſhall ſtay in *France*; and ſeeing that this employs a great number of Officers, that only do harm to the State; when this Gate ſhall be ſhut, the young men will ſeek out other ways to make themſelves valued by, and the Arts and Commerce of the Kingdom will be more conſiderable.

We ſhall likewiſe ſave the Treaſure, that is ſpent unprofitably in the Embaſſies to *Rome*, and in courting the good Graces of

of the Cardinals at the Elections of Popes, and in the Reception of Legates and Nuncio's; by all which *France* does nought else but profess and encrease her Slavery, without the return of the least advantage. For what-ever Compliments, what-ever Expence *France* may make, yet the Catholick King is the Minion of *Rome*; and the Subjects of *Spain* are the Chapmen that buy most of their Wares, and that have most blind Devotion for the Holy See.

And, in truth, seeing that the Politicks of *France* (by the Marquess) and Monsieur *Silhon*, and before them Cardinal *D'Ossat*, have testified their little satisfaction with *Rome*, and published her Cheats, in so far that as we know that *Rome* does not at all love us; in like manner *Rome* well knows, that we care not for Her: and I cannot understand to what end serve all our Civilities to the Court of *Rome*, but to puff them up the more, and provoke the Gentlemen to laughter, who without doubt receive a wonderful pleasure in seeing their professed Enemies come to kiss their feet.

'Tis true, that so long as *France* suffers *Rome* to dispose of many Benefices, we must always have occasion to deal with them; and as the Pope, to preserve his Credit, amuses the Princes with com-promises and treaties which he draws out at length,

length, deporting himſelf as the Judge of Differences, whereas he creates more than he decides. So very often Princes contribute to his Inclination by their delays, and in ſetting before his Council-board Affairs that they have no intention ſhould be concluded. And what-ever their Inclination be at the bottom, he is courtedand careſs'd as the Arbitor, which pleaſes him extreamly. And why ſhould it not pleaſe him to have at his Court the Ambaſſadors of the Empire, of *France*, of *Spain*, of *Poland*, of *Portugal*, and other Princes that bring him Authority by their difference, and bring gain to his Court and his Citizens, by their Liberalities, and by their Expences, ſuitable to the Dignity of their Maſters? The great Men and the Sages of Council to His Majeſty may, when they pleaſe, conſider what good comes to our Kings, by their keeping the Pope in this humour, of his being their Judge, and in letting him enjoy his pretended Rights in *France*. And whether it is not better, and a ſhorter way, for *France* to do its own buſineſs without him, and to take from him what does not at all belong to him in our Kingdom, that we may have no more to do with him.

The King has been pleas'd to declare, That he deſir'd to re-unite his Subjects in their Religion. This ſo Chriſtian and Royal

Royal Deſign cannot be executed, ſo long as the Pope ſhall have any Power in *France*; for this Re-union cannot be made, unleſs the Parties mutually yield ſome matters either in the Doctrine or in the Diſcipline; 'tis certain that the Pope will never conſent, at leaſt not to be own'd the Vicar of Jeſus Chriſt, that has all the Power which Jeſus Chriſt had upon Earth; and that on the other hand, the Proteſtants who have quite another Opinion of him, and ſuch an one as all know (though they make it not an Article of their Faith) they can never ſubmit to his Authority. But if that *France* were not govern'd in Spirituals, ſave by the King and his Biſhops, an half of the way to this great Work were already over; it being moſt certain, that moſt of the Points in difference are not maintain'd by the Theologians, vow'd to the Popes Service, farther than as they ſerve his Intereſts.

REFLECTIONS.

REFLECTIONS
UPON THE
Fifth Chapter
OF THE
POLITICKS
OF
France,
Which Treats of the
HUGUENOTS.

I Have treated, my Lord, the Marquess of *C.* with all the respect that was possible for me in my Reflections upon his Chapter of the Clergy. I could not do more to comply with him and

and ſerve him, than by approving his judgment, and confirming it with Authorities, adding only what he durſt not venture, and (may be) had a mind to ſay.

Upon his Chapter of the *Huguenots* I ſhall keep my ſelf within the ſame reſpect. But I would hope from his ingenuity, that after I have taken ſome pains in commending and defending the judgment he has made on the *Roman* Clergy, He in recompence would give me the liberty to oppoſe that which he has given upon thoſe he calls *Huguenots*, and to complain of the treatment he would have dealt to them.

But becauſe I take great delight in according with him as far as is poſſible, I embrace the advice he gives at the entrance, *That a King cannot have a more noble Object of his Care, than to preſerve in his States the Religion he has receiv'd from his Anceſtors.* For though this Propoſition be not univerſally true, I will underſtand it in his ſenſe, ſuppoſing that he means the true Chriſtian Religion. And 'tis that His Majeſty *has receiv'd of His Anceſtors*; the which I preſume he will not limit to two or three Deſcents of his next Predeceſſors; but as he has drawn from three Stocks the lawful ſucceſſion of our laſt Kings, and affirms, That they are *Branches ſprung from the ſame Root*, he cannot take it ill that we go back

back to the first and second Race, to find the Religion that His Majesty has receiv'd of his Ancestors. Therefore as the noble Marques in his Second Chapter, speaking of the pretended Exemptions of the Clergy, appeals for that matter to the old Kings and Emperours, who own'd no such thing, and says, That *the Clergy cannot take it amiss if His Majesty reduce things to their Primitive state.* In like manner the Marques cannot take it amiss, that Religion be reduc'd to its Primitive state, at least to the state it was left in at the time when our Kings were Emperours. Now I have shew'd in the foregoing Chapter that the Emperour *Charlemaign*, one of His Majesties Ancestors, *convok'd* a Synod, in which the Worship of Images was condemned; and that he himself made a Book against the second Council of *Nice*, and against Images, which we have preserv'd to this day; and that under *Lewis* the *Mild*, his Son, another Synod was held at *Paris* against Images, all the Acts of which we have entire. This Doctrine is a principal Point of the Religion that our Kings receiv'd from their Ancestors, and which we profess. And as much may be said in point of the holy Sacrament, of which so much noise is made at this day, that we willingly refer our selves to what was believ'd in the times of His Majesties Ancestors.

I ſhould ſtray from my Subject, ſhould
enter upon Controverſie; the Marque
obliges me to ſtand upon another guard
employing his Eloquence in treating us
Rebels and Enemies of the State.

I am far from juſtifying the evil Actio
of our Party. But ſince we are to de
with men of ſuch a ſpirit, that diſplay th
Evil and ſuppreſs the Good, that inſult ov
us for actions forc'd by the deſpair of
few, and proteſted againſt by the great
Party; and that will not acknowledge t
ſignal Services we have done for t
Crown, which ought never to have be
forgotten, ſo long as the Race of *Hen*
the Great ſhall ſit upon the Throne.
think my ſelf oblig'd to repreſent tru
what is moſt conſiderable in their cond
tion, and in their actions ſince the laſt r
turn of the purity of the Goſpel in
France.

I ſay the laſt return, becauſe that it h
been, and has flouriſht there two or th
hundred years before, and the Profeſſo
remain'd there skulking, and yet in gre
numbers, after long and cruel Perſecu
ons. For we diſſemble not, but own th
this holy Doctrine came to us, and w
planted by the remains of thoſe poor *V*
denſes and *Albigenſes*, the deſtruction
whom is rankt by the noble Marqu
amongſt the good Works of the firſt ra

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The Character that *Reinerius*, their cruel Inquisitor, gave them, is very remarkable, and may satisfie those who ask, where was our Religion before *Luther*, c. 4. *Contra Valdenses*. *This*, says he, *of all Sects, is the most pernicious, for three Reasons. First, because of its long duration, for some say, that it has continu'd since the time of Pope* Sylvester; *others hold, that it began even in the Apostles time. Secondly, because of all Sects, this is the most general, there scarce being any Country where this Sect has not taken root. In the third place, by reason that all contrary to other Sects that become abominable, by the enormity of their blasphemies against God, these people seem very godly, for they live justly before men, have a sound belief in all things, and of God, and of all the Articles contain'd in the Apostles Creed: only this, they blaspheme against* Rome. An admirable testimony from the pen of a mortal enemy, that deserves to be writ in letters of Gold. Let us joyn hereunto that of good King *Lewis* XII. the Father of the people; he was much importun'd by those of the Clergy, who pray'd him to root out the Inhabitants of *Cabrieres*, and of *Merindol* in *Provence*, that were of this Profession, and some remainders of the *Albigenses*. But this just King afore he would grant that bloody Request, would see their Confession of Faith, which having read, He

ſwore they were better Chriſtians than He and his people, and preſerv'd them from the rage of their Enemies. But theſe Ene mies obtain'd what they deſired of King *Francis* the Firſt, and made an horribl Slaughter of thoſe poor *Chriſtians*.

If theſe *Albigenſes* be Hereticks, becauſ they *blaſpheme againſt Rome*; Is not th Marqueſs one, and all the men of Politick in *France*, who declame ſo openly, and ſ generouſly againſt the Popes Uſurpation that makes of Religion a pretence thereb to invade the Rights of the King, and mak himſelf Univerſal Monarch of all th World?

Theſe Gentlemen would abate much the hatred they bear us, would they b pleas'd to conſider that the Pope and *Ro man* Clergy hate us, for a Cauſe that common to us both. For it is not upo the account of any Controverſies about th holy Sacrament, the Invocation of Saint and the prayers for the Dead; but it becauſe we oppoſe boldly the Uſurpatio of *Rome*; it is becauſe we *blaſpheme agai Rome*, as the *Albigenſes* in *Reinerius*'s day That we are call'd (as he calls us) *a p nicious Sect*. This is the great Hereſie f which we have been made Objects the publick hatred, and for which the dev tion of the people is made to conſiſt in bloody zeal to burn us, and Maſſacre us.

In the Year 1520. the light of the Goſpel ſhin'd throughout all the parts of *France*. And the Queen of *Navarre*, Siſter of King *Francis* I. who was enlighten'd therewith, was a great Rampire againſt the fury of the *Roman* Clergy, that labour'd to extinguiſh this Holy Light by Perſecution: however ſhe could not hinder, but that much cruelty was exerciſed. But after her deceaſe the Perſecution grew hot again, and continued during the Reign of *Francis* I. and *Henry* II. For the ſpace of forty years, thoſe that were converted, maintain'd their Holy Profeſſion, by a conſtancy in their Sufferings, in imitation of the *Chriſtians* of the Primitive-Church. Notwithſtanding this Vigor, many of the Princes, and of the beſt Families of *France*, as the Princes of the blood of the Houſe of *Bourbon*, embrac'd the Reform'd Religion.

Under the Reign of *Francis* II. the Princes of the Blood, debarr'd of their Rights by thoſe of the Houſe of *Guiſe*, the Queens Uncles, form'd the deſign at *Amboiſe*, to baniſh thoſe from the Kings Perſon, that held them at diſtance. This attempt failing, was call'd a Crime of High Treaſon, and charg'd on them of the Reform'd Religion, though *Renaudy*, the chief of the Plot, was a *Roman* Catholick, and this Party was compos'd of Noblemen and

Gentry of both the Perſwaſions. Whoſo underſtands the Priviledges of the Princes of the Blood in *France*, will never accuſe theſe Undertakers of the Rebellion. *Thuanus* teſtifies in their favour, *Hiſt. l.* 24. That *not one of them was prov'd to have attempted againſt the King, or againſt the Queen, but only againſt Strangers that govern'd all at Court in a tyrannical way:* for then the Houſe of *Guiſe* was ſtill lookt upon as a ſtranger in *France*.

Francis II. being dead, his Succeſſor *Charles* IX. being a Minor, the Princes of the Blood had more Right than afore to be admitted to the management of Publick Affairs, at leaſt jointly with the Queen-Mother. But when they ſaw themſelves excluded, and their Perſons in danger, they levy'd Forces for their Perſervation.

When the King came of Age, the Princes ſeeing Him much incens'd againſt them, and that he was of a dangerous and implacable Nature, they retir'd, and ſtood upon their guard. The ſeveral Affronts they receiv'd, and the frequent Maſſacres, occaſion'd two or three little Wars.

To rid himſelf of them all at one blow, the King ſet his Siſter for a bait, to draw in and to deſtroy the whole party of the Princes, giving her in marriage to the Prince of *Navarre*; who was afterwards

our

our *Henry* the Great. He and his Cousin-Germain the Prince of *Conde* were imprison'd, and the Principals of the Party slain in their beds, having danc'd at a Ball the Evening before. Never were dancers at such a Wedding.

Pope *Gregory* XII. had a hand in this execrable Action, his Predecessor *Pius* V. refused to consent to this Marriage, because (said he) the Prince of *Navarre* is an Heretick. But when the Cardinal of *Lorraine* told his Successor *Gregory* XII. that this Marriage was a trap to catch the Hereticks, he then dispatcht the Dispensation, and encourag'd the design.

The Prince of *Navarre* having sav'd himself at *Rochel*, was immediately assisted by a great Party that had escapt the Massacre, and the War broke out afresh. Thereupon was form'd that Faction of the League, to destroy the Princes of the Blood, under the colour of Religion, and particularly to destroy the King *Henry* III. as appear'd afterwards. During these long Troubles, what refuge found the King of *Navarre*, whom God reserv'd for the Crown of *France*, but amongst these of the (Reform'd) Religion? These were they that aided, that defended, and even nourisht him in his long and cruel Adversities.

And after, in the end, when the League had pull'd off the mask, and had driven the King from *Paris*, and beſieg'd him at *Tours*, came not they to his Relief under their brave Chieftain, and did they not deliver him from the utmoſt danger, though he had ſent his Armies againſt them, to extirpate them?

I would glady ask the noble Marqueſs, Where were then the honeſt *French?* and where were the Rebels? Would he find the honeſt *French* amongſt the fiery Zealots and *Bigots* of the League, *Who have ſhed ſo much blood to beat down this dangerous Sect*, as he is pleas'd to brand us? With your good leave, noble Marqueſs, which of the two is this dangerous Sect, that which teaches that the Perſons of Kings are inviolable, and that expoſes their lives to defend thoſe King that had perſecuted them; or that which holds, That a King Excommunicated by the Pope, may be juſtly kill'd by any body; and which, out of zeal for Religion, plunge their bloody-hands into the bowels of their Soveraign, as St. *Jacob Clement* did, and as *John Caſtrel* and *Peter Barriere* attempted, and as *Ravailliac* perform'd? Where is the *Huguenot* that ever offer'd any thing of this Nature, during all the Perſecutions of their Party? Or where is the Miniſter that ever broacht ſuch Doctrine to his Flock, to kill their King,

King, which your Spiritual Fathers have so often done? I would also ask the Marquess, Where he finds *that term of near fourscore years spent in quelling this dangerous Sect*, which is the title he is pleas'd to give us? Would he take in to these 80 years the 38 after the death of *Francis* II. till the Peace of *Amiens*, in which time the Reformed Party were the constant, and the only support of the Great *Henry* for near 30 years? Will he venture to say, That those Arms which defended the hope of after-Ages, and the fortune of *France*, were unjust?

Let him also say if he please, Whether by the *zeal that has been to reduce the Heretick's to their duty*, he means that Butchery of the St. *Bartholomews*, and the Massacres in every Town of *France*, at that time and before, which are reductions of a strange nature.

And because he may Object, That their defence of the Princes of the Blood was only a pretence for the *Huguenots* taking up Arms, and their unjust resistance against their Soveraign. It will suffice to answer, That their Arms were necessary for the Preservation of that Great Prince, whom God reserv'd for the blessing of *France*; and that when He came to the Crown, they were judg'd worthy of a Reward. I would beseech also all indifferent persons to consider them simply as men, that are neither

Angels nor Devils, and to tell us, if they think it ſtrange that men, the Relicks of Fires and Slaughters (which were the only arguments employ'd for their Converſion for ſo many years) take the courſe at length that Nature teaches them, to defend themſelves againſt force with force. This to take it at the worſt, is all the Rebellion can be objected againſt them in all that paſt Age, till the quiet ſettlement of *Henry* the Great.

But the good Providence of God has well clear'd them from the neceſſity of that excuſe, having ſet them out an Employment ſo juſt, and ſo fortunate for their Arms, that all who love, and who ſhall for future Ages love the Proſperity of *France*, and the Greatneſs of the Royal Family, will have perpetual reaſon to bleſs the timely ſuccour of this Party, and to praiſe God, who rais'd them for the everlaſting good of the Kingdom.

Let us come to their condition, after that *Henry* the Great was eſtabliſht on His Throne. The King being turn'd *Roman* Catholick, and ſeeing his Party of the Reformed Religion diſcontent, and in trouble, as expos'd afreſh to what they had afore tried, gave them Places of Security for about twenty years.

This was the Ground-work of all their Miſeries, and I am much inclin'd to believe that

that this was procur'd for them by those who projected their ruine. For their Enemies might well think that a King that understands his Interest, would not long suffer in the heart of his Kingdom places assign'd for Protection, against Himself in effect, and to make resistance, in case he kept not all his promises. That these Places would be retreats for all discontented persons, and incendiaries that would trouble the State. That Strangers seeing in *France* a Party strengthen'd with Garrisons, and holding themselves in perpetual defiance, would never leave bidding them to cock up, and fomenting their discontents. That this thorn in the foot of *France* would always hinder it from advancing; and after all, that this would be a kind of dangerous Discipline in a State; to accustome Subjects to represent their Grievances with Sword in hand.

On the other hand, they might well fore-see that the Reform'd being seiz'd of these places, would not quit them at the end of the term assign'd, imagining that that the enjoyment of their Religion, of their Goods, and of their Lives, depended all on their keeping of these Places; and that by their refusal, they would oblige the King to win them by force; which would make them Criminals, odious, and objects of the Justice and Vengeance of an incens'd Master.

And

And even ſo it happen'd. For their term for holding theſe places being expir'd, the King demands them again, and having at their inſtant requeſt prolong'd their term for three or four years, at length wiſely reſolv'd to force them; this gave occaſion for the Aſſembly of *Rochel*, where moſt imprudently, and contrary to their duty to God and the King, they reſolv'd to hold the Places by force; a reſolution of deſpair ill-grounded. For though the King ſhew'd himſelf favourable to his Subjects of the Religion, after he had taken theſe Places by his Arms, he would have been yet more favourable to them, had they render'd the Places humbly and peaceably at his demand.

When the Aſſembly of *Rochel* began, was held the National Synod of *Alaix*, in which the famous *Du Moulin* was Preſident. In that Country where many of theſe Places of Security were, he appli'd himſelf ſeriouſly to conſider the poſture of the Affairs of his Party, to ſound their Inclinations, and to give them good counſel. And he found that *the greateſt and the beſt part* was diſpos'd to render their Places to the King, and did not at all approve of the proceedings of the Aſſembly of *Rochel*, of which matter he thought himſelf oblig'd to inform that Aſſembly; and having return'd home, he writ them an excellent Letter, a Copy whereof

whereof I have procur'd, which is as follows:

SIRS,

I Write not to you, to pour my Sorrows into your Bosome, or entertain you with my particular Afflictions. I need no consolation on that account, thinking my self greatly honour'd, that in the publick Affliction of the Church, it pleases God to set me the foremost. I should account my self very happy, if all the storm might fall on my head. So that I might be the only Sufferer, and the Church of God continue in Peace and Prosperity. One care more pressing, has mov'd me to write to you, and has forc'd Nature, which was ever averse from medling with Publick Affairs, and acting beyond my Calling. For seeing the Church generally in eminent danger, and upon the brink of a Precipice, it was impossible for me to hold from speaking. Nor can I be silent in this urgent necessity, without making my self guilty of insensibility, and of cruelty towards the Church of God. And, I hope, in speaking my thoughts about Publick Affairs, my domestick affliction will deliver me from jealousie in your Opinion. And if I be not believ'd, at least I may be excus'd.

I confess indeed it does not become me to give Counsel to an assembly of Persons, chosen out of all the Kingdom, to bear the weight of Publick

Publick Affairs in a time so full of difficulty; but I think it for your advantage to be inform'd rightly what is the Opinion, and what the Disposition of our Churches, from persons that have a particular knowledge of them.

The question then being, Whether you ought to break up your Assembly, in Obedience to his Majesty, or continue to hold together, in order to provide for the Affairs of the Churches; I am bound to tell you, that it is the general desire of our Churches, that it might please God we may continue in peace, by obeying his Majesty. And that seeing the King resolv'd to make himself obey'd by force of Arms, they assure themselves that you will to your power endeavour to avoid this Tempest, and rather yield to necessity, than engage them in a War that will most certainly ruine the greatest part of our Churches, and will plunge us in troubles, whereof we well see the beginning, but know not at all the end. By obeying the King, you will take away their pretence, who incense his Majesty to persecute us. And if we are to be persecuted, all they who fear God desire that this may be for the Profession of the Gospel, and that our Persecution may truly be the Cross of Christ. In a word, Sirs, I can assure you, that the greatest and the best *part of our Churches desires your Assembly may break up, if it can be done with safety to your Persons: and even many of the* Roman *Church love that*

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Publick Peace, are continually about us, praying and exhorting us, that we may not, by throwing our ſelves down the Precipice, involve them in our ruine.

On this occaſion, I need not repreſent to you the general conſternation of our poor Flocks, who caſt their eyes upon you as perſons that may procure their quiet; and by yielding to neceſſity, may divert that ſtorm ſo ready to break upon their heads. Many already have forſaken the Country, many have quitted their Religion, from whence you may judge what a diſtruction there will be, ſhould theſe troubles go on farther.

Nor need I more recommend to you, to have a tender care for the preſervation of our poor Churches, knowing that you will rather chooſe death, than draw upon you the reproach, that you have haſten'd on the Perſecution of the Church, and deſtroy'd that which the zeal of our Fathers had planted, and brought this State into confuſion.

I am not ignorant that many Reaſons are alledg'd to perſwade you to hold on your Aſſembly. As that the King has permitted it; but for this permiſſion you have not any warrant, nor any Declaration in writing; without which, all promiſes are but words in the air. For Kings believe they have Power to forbid what they have permitted, and to revoke what they have offer'd, when they judge it expedient for the good of their Affairs. And there is

none

none of you that having ſent his Servant any whither, or given him leave to go, does not think you have power to call him back again. Above all, Soveraign Princes keep not willingly their promiſes, when they have been extorted from them.

There are alſo repreſented to you many Grievances and Controventions to the Kings Edicts; which Complaints, to our great ſorrow, are but too true: yet, without alledging that we our ſelves have given the occaſion of many of theſe Evils; the difficulty lies not in repreſenting our Grievances, but in finding redreſs. Conſider then whether the continuance of your Aſſembly may heal theſe Maladies, whether your Seſſion may put our Churches under ſhelter, provide neceſſaries for a War where the Parties are ſo unequal, levy Forces, and make a fond for payment; if all the good your Seſſion is capable to produce, ſhall be equivalent to the loſs of ſo many Churches that lie naked, and expos'd to the wrath of their Enemies; whether when they are beaten down, you can raiſe them again; whether in the manifeſt diviſion that is amongſt us, you have the power to bring together all the ſcatter'd parts of this divided Body, which, were it well united, would yet be too weak to maintain it ſelf on the Defenſive.

Pardon me, Sirs, if I tell you, that you will not find all thoſe of our Religion diſpos'd to obey your Reſolutions; and that the fire being kindl'd

kindl'd all about you, you will remain feeble Spectators of the ruine that you have made to tumble upon your heads. Besides, you cannot be ignorant that many amongst us, of the best quality, and most capable to defend us, condemn openly your Actions, imagining and expressing that to suffer for this Cause, is not to suffer for the Cause of God. These making no kind of resistance, and opening the gates of their places, and joyning their Arms to those of the King, you may easily gather what the loss will be, and what a weakning of your Party. How many persons of our Nobility will forsake you, some by treachery, others through weakness? Even they that in an Assembly are the most vehement, and that to appear zealous, are altogether for violent Courses, are most commonly those that revolt, and that betray their Brethren. They hurry our poor Churches into the greatest danger, and there leave them, and run away after that they have set the house on fire.

If a Fight, or the siege of a Town should happen, what-ever might be the event of the Fight or Siege, it would prove a difficult thing to contain the people animated against us, and to hinder them from falling upon our Churches, that have neither defence nor retreat. And what-ever Orders the Magistrates of the contrary Religion should give, it will be impossible for them to take effect.

I might

I might also represent to you many Reasons arising from the State of our Churches, both within and out of the Kingdom, to let you see that this Commotion is altogether ill-tim'd, and that it is to sail against wind and tide. But you are wise enough to see and consider the posture of our Neighbours, and from whence you may hope for succour, and whether amongst you the virtue and the good agreement, and the quality of your Chiefs is augmented or dimimisht. Certainly this is not the time when the troubling of that Pool will bring us a Cure. And it is plain, that if any thing can help us amidst so much weakness, it must be the zeal of Religion, the which, in our Fathers time, did support us, when we had less strength and more virtue. But in this Cause you will find that zeal very cool, because the most part of our people *believes that this Evil might have been prevented, without making a breach in the Conscience. Assure your selves, there will always be Divisions amongst us, when we shall stir upon civil accounts and not directly for the Cause of the Gospel.*

Against all this, 'tis Objected, That our Enemies have resolv'd our ruine. That they undermine us by little and little, and that we had better begin presently, than attend longer.

'Tis very true, he must want common sense, that doubts of their ill will. Mean time, when I reflect on our several losses, as that of

Letoure,

Letoure, *of* Privas, *and of* Bearn; *I find that our ſelves have contributed thereto: and we are not at all to wonder if our Enemies are not much in pain to ſet us right, and if they join with us to undo us. But herein it does not follow, that we ſhould throw the helve after the hatchet, and ſet fire to our own houſe, becauſe others are reſolv'd to burn it, or undertake to remedy particular Evils by means weak for that end, but ſtrong and effectual for the general ruine. God, who ſo often has diverted the Counſels taken for our deſtruction, has not loſt his Power, neither has he chang'd his Will. We ſhall find that He is always the ſame, if we have the Grace to wait His aſſiſtance, and do not caſt our ſelves headlong through our Impatience, and daſh upon Impoſſibilities.*

Take this for certain, that though our Enemies ſeek our ruine, they will never attempt it openly, and will lay hold on ſome other pretence, more plauſible than that of Religion, which we never ought to give them. If we contain our ſelves in the Obedience that Subjects ow to their Soveraign, we ſhall ſee that whilſt our Enemies hope in vain that we ſhall make our ſelves Criminals by ſome Diſobedience. God will cut them out ſome other work, and furniſh us with occaſions to teſtifie to His Majeſty, that we are a Body profitable to his State, and thereby put him in mind of the ſignal Services our Churches have paid to the late King of glorious Memory.

But

But if we are ſo unfortunate, that whilſt we keep to our Duty, the Calumnies of our Enemies prevail; at the leaſt, we ſhall have this ſatisfaction, that we have been juſt on our ſide, and that we have teſtified, that we love the peace of the State.

Notwithſtanding all this, Sirs, you can, and you ought to give order for the ſecurity of your perſons. For His Majeſty and his Council having ſaid often, That if you will ſeparate, He will leave to our Churches the enjoyment of peace, and of the benefit of his Edicts; it is not reaſonable that your ſeparation ſhould be made with danger to your perſons. And when you ſhall require that you may ſeparate with ſafety, I make no doubt but you will eaſily obtain your deſires, provided that you inſiſt upon what is poſſible, and ſuch things as the miſery of the Times, and the preſent neceſſity may admit. It remains, that whilſt you are together, you adviſe what ought to be done, in caſe you may be oppreſt, notwithſtanding your ſeparation. I concerns your prudence to give order, and is not my part to ſuggeſt.

If in propoſing theſe things to you, I have ſlipt beyond the bounds of diſcretion, impute it, if you pleaſe, to my zeal for the good and the preſervation of the Church. And if this my advice be rejected, as unworthy your conſideration, I ſhall have this comfort, that I have diſcharg'd my Conſcience, and retiring into a ſtrange Country, I ſhall there finiſh the few days

days that remain for me to live, lamenting the ruine of the Church, and the deſtruction of the Temple; for the building of which, I have labour'd with more courage and fidelity than with ſucceſs. The Lord turn his Wrath from us, guide your Aſſembly, and preſerve your Perſons. I am, &c.

When this Letter was read in the Aſſembly, which did not at all approve it, ſome aroſe immediatly, went from the Aſſembly, and never return'd more; And all found in the end that the Advertiſements of this holy Perſon were Propheſies.

It appears then, that notwithſtanding the great Temptations of Fear and deſpair, that mov'd this Aſſembly to reſiſt the King, their reſiſtance was diſavow'd by *the beſt and the greateſt Party* of the Reform'd Churches of *France*, and that they were exhorted to obey the King by their Divines, who, in matters of Conſcience, are the repreſentative Body of the Church, when they are ſolemnly aſſembl'd. Now this was the ſenſe of the National Synod, of which this eminent Perſon came from being the Preſident. 'Tis then wrongfully that the noble Marqueſs taxes all our Party with Rebellion, when as our Theologians declar'd themſelves ſo ſtrongly againſt it; the moſt of thoſe that held theſe Places of Security open'd their Gates to the King; and more than

than three fourths of his Subjects of the Reform'd Religion kept in their Obedience.

I cannot omit, that in the greateſt heat of thoſe who reſiſted, there yet appear'd many glances of Loyalty and Love for their King. I ſhall obſerve two: At the ſiege of *Montaubon*, the moſt obſtinately defended of all the other ſieges, the King and his Court paſſed before the Walls, from whence they were ſhooting moſt furiouſly: but when the beſieged beheld His Majeſty, they left off ſhooting, and cry'd out with a great force, *Long live the King.*

The inſtance of *Roebel* is more remarkable, and it is very memorable. The *Rochellers* beſieg'd, implored the aſſiſtance of *England*, which was offer'd them; but the Duke of *Buckingham* came late, ſo that the *Rochellers* after they had eaten the Horſes, were now eating their Saddles. In this great extremity the Duke told their Deputies, that if they would deliver the Town to the King of *England*, they ſhould be aſſiſted effectually. The Deputies refus'd, and the *Rochellers* reſolv'd to undergo all the rigours that their King, provok'd, would exerciſe upon them, rather than deliver the Town to a ſtranger. This juſt King had notice thereof, and treated them the more mildly at the Surrender, overcoming, like a *Chriſtian*, evil with good.

The

The noble Marqueſs does the quite contrary, for he ſtudies to overcome good with evil; diſplaying our Faults, with all the aggravation, and concealing our Services. He ſays, That *the ſpirit of the* Huguenots *is always ready for revolts, for Confuſion and Anarchy. That there will be more than an hundred thouſand men of the Kings Enemies in the bowels of his Kingdom, ſo long as there ſhall be* Huguenots *in* France; *and that perhaps they wait only an occaſion to riſe up in Arms.* He pretends even to know their hearts, ſaying, That *they have in their hearts the ſame hatred they had*; which are words flung out with more animoſity than reaſon.

For t is but ill Logick, that they are all Rebels, becauſe about a ſixt part of their number took up Arms, in their defence, to keep ſome Places of ſafety; and that becauſe they have ſin'd they never have repented. If all they who have been engag'd in the Troubles of the State, within this laſt forty years, are to be thought the Kings Enemies for ever; His Majeſty would find few Perſons in his Kingdom whom he might truſt; and now forty years are paſt ſince the War for thoſe Places of ſafety, was ended. When the Body is in a feavor, the good humours are ſtir'd as well as the bad, and all ſettle again when the Diſeaſe is over. The ſame is in the

Body

Body of a State; it is subject to hot fits that enflame both good and bad; but all grow cool and quiet in time, by the wisdom of the Soveraign, and by the repentance of those that are honest good men. To upbraid them as Rebells and Enemies, that took up Arms against their duty, and laid them down again forty years ago; this is to violate the Laws of *Amnesty*, without which no State could subsist. Kings being the Lieutenants of God, ought to deal with their Subjects as God does with his. He forgives and forgets offences: and makes them faithful that were disobedient, through his Benefits.

The Protestants of *Languedoc* stai'd not for the Kings Benefits, till they testifi'd their Fidelity, and their Oblivion of what they had suffer'd in the reduction of the Places that they had held, than when their wounds were yet bleeding. This was when the Duke of *Montmorency* in *Languedoc*, where he was Governor, made a Party against the King, hoping to find the Protestants, who are in great numbers in that Province, ready for an Insurrection from the resentment of their late Sufferings. But he found the quite contrary; for they all join'd as one man with the Kings Forces, and did him excellent Service in a battel where the Duke was defeated and taken, and a Bishop with him. The old

Marshal

Marshal *De la Force*, who had scap'd the Massacre of St. *Bartholomew*, by hiding himself under the Carkasses of his Brothers, whose throats were cut, was one of the Principal Commanders in this Action.

The Marquess confesses, That *in the Wars at* Paris, *they put themselves in Arms, and with great respect protested, that they were at the Kings Service*; and their Actions would have justifi'd their Protestations, if His Majesty had had occasion for their Service.

I will not loose time and pains in making Reflections upon the fourteen ways he proposes to torment us, and make us weary of our Religion, of our Country, and our Lives. Ways enough are found out, without his proposing. And now, because the King, of late years, has had much to do with the Court of *Rome*, it has been a part of the Policy of *France*, whilst they affront the Pope, at the same time to treat us with some extraordinary Severity, to prevent the suspicion of Heresie. We humble our selves under the powerful hand of God, and under that of our Soveraign; confessing that we are justly chastis'd for our sins. For the rest, we know in whom we have trusted, and shelter our selves under the Hand that strikes us; assuring our selves, that it will protect us, and that we shall find Jesus Christ our Redeemer, and his Spirit our

Comforter, both in this Life and in that which is to come.

As the Marquess is very exact in giving Instructions to ruine us, he does the same towards the end of his Book for *England*; counting it a Nation that is good for nothing but to be ruin'd. We cannot take the advantage of these Instructions given against us, to defend our selves against them, for we are a Body meerly passive, expos'd, and submitted to all that God and the King will do with us. But for the *English*, when he has disoblig'd them by the most odious Character that his Malice could furnish his Eloquence withall; He obliges them, in publishing all those ways that must be taken to destroy them; for it is likely, that being told of them they will look to themselves. Mean time his Readers will say of him, that they who tell aforehand of their cunning, are not very cunning.

Because that the noble Marquess terms us Rebels and Enemies of the State, after the humble confession of our Faults, which we have neither cloakt nor dissembl'd; I will take the boldness to compare them with those of some of the Gentlemen of the *Roman* Clergy, especially of the Jesuits and their Disciples: and that they that are not pre-possest with passion may judge whether to them rather, or to us, belong

the title, Of Enemies of the State. Let us consider the Actions and the Doctrine of the one and the other.

For the Actions, the horrible attempts against the Sacred Persons of our Kings, by Ecclesiasticks and Scholars of the Jesuits, and all the Enormities of the League, to destroy our Kings, our Laws, and our Monarchy, and to transfer it to a stranger; carry away without dispute the prize of Villany, from those who being possest with a fear ill-grounded, have with Arms defended the Places that were lent to them by Edict, for the security of their Religion, of their Goods, and of their Lives. Add hereto, that they had their hearts big with the sense of their incomparable Service to the Crown, and believ'd they well deserv'd what they endeavour'd to keep.

And as for the Doctrine, these never read Lectures of Rebellion and Parricide. And the resistance some of the Party made against the King, was condemn'd by their Divines, whose writings are full of Lessons of Obedience, and of Fidelity to their Soveraigns. Whereas those of the Jesuits, and their Disciples, teach the people to cast off and kill their King, so often as it may please the Pope to Excommunicate him. *France* has felt the Effects of this Doctrine during the long Wars of the League; and it was the Books and the Sermons that

made the Sword be drawn, and that ſhar pen'd the Daggers for the Murder of our Kings, whilſt the Proteſtants expos'd their Lives for their Preſervation.

Now I am content to let paſs what is paſt, provided the ſame may be done to us. Let us fix upon the preſent. Whom ought you to eſteem the Enemies of the State, thoſe who ſubject the Crown of our Kings abſolutely to the Papal Miter, and who acknowledge another Soveraign than the King; or they who own him their only Soveraign, and maintain that his Crown depends not ſave on God alone? What, in Conſcience, is the true ground of the great hatred that is born us? is it not for that, if we are to be believ'd, there would not in *France* be any *French*-man that is not the Kings Subject, Cauſes Beneficial and Matrimonial would not be carried to *Rome*, nor the Kingdom be tributary under the ſhadow of *Annates*, and the like Impoſitions.

And on this Subject, the Teſtimony of Cardinal *Perron* for us, in his Harrangue to the Third State, is very conſiderable; when he ſays, "*The Doctrine of the Depoſition of Kings, by the Pope, has been held in* France *until* Calvin. Whereby he tacitely acknowledges, That our Kings had been ill ſerv'd before; and that thoſe he calls Hereticks having brought to light the Holy Scripture,

have

have made the Right of Kings be known, which had been kept ſuppreſt.

Shall they be ſaid Friends of the State, who owning themſelves Subjects of a ſtranger Soveraign, dare endeavour to make themſelves Maſters of all the Temporal Juriſdiction? of which the Marqueſs complains loudly, and with good cauſe; and of the great reſiſtance they have made to maintain themſelves in an Uſurpation ſo unreaſonable. In this kind, thoſe of the Church of the Reform'd Religion could never be accus'd, in the Towns where we have had ſome Power.

Our Religion is hated, becauſe it combats the Pride, the Avarice, and the Uſurpations of the Court of *Rome*, and their Subſtitutes in the Kingdom; and becauſe we have ſhewn to the World that ſordid bank of Spiritual Graces they have planted in the Church, and how they have drawn to themſelves a third of the Lands of *France*, for fear of Purgatory, from ſilly people, mop'd with a blind devotion, and from Robbers and Extortioners, who have thought to make peace with God by letting theſe ſhare in the booty.

'Tis an advice very ſuitable to the *Politicks of France*, to examine well the Controverſies that are moſt gainful to the Clergy, as this of Purgatory, concerning which an old Poet ſaid the truth in his way of Drollery.

But if it be ſo,
That no more Souls ſhall go
To old Purgatory,
Then the Pope will gain nought by the ſtory.

It would be wiſely done to examine what neceſſity there is for ſo many begging-Fryers, that ſuck out the blood and marrow of devout people; and for ſo many Markets of Pardons in honour of a number of Saints of a new Edition; and for what deſign are made ſo many Controverſies. And whether it would not be a great Treaſure for the Kings Subjects to teach them to work out their Salvation, and put their Conſciences in quiet at a cheaper rate.

God, juſtly provokt, by the great Sins of *France*, gives us not yet the Grace of that Goſpel-Truth, St. *John*, *Ch.* 8. *Know the Truth, and the Truth will ſet you free.* And though it ſhines out ſo clear, to let us ſee the Uſurpation of the Popes upon the Temporals of the King, and upon the Spirituals of the Church; yet ſee we not clearly enough to diſcover all the myſtery of Iniquity, and to reſolve to ſhake off the Yoak.

For this great Deſign, no other War need be made with the Pope, but only take from him all Juriſdiction in *France*, all Annates,

Annates, and all evocation of Cauſes to *Rome*. This would hardly produce any other ſtirs, but the complaints and murmuring of them that are looſers. And the condition, truly Royal, that the King at preſent is in, will ſufficiently ſecure Him from Inſurrections at home, and Invaſions from abroad. Or ſhould any happen, behold *more than an hundred thouſand Huguenots*, that the noble Marqueſs has found him, *in the heart of his State*, whom he is pleas'd to call *His Enemies*, but who on all occaſions, and on this eſpecially would do His Majeſty a hearty and faithful Service.

The two main Intereſts of *France*, being to weaken the Houſe of *Auſtria*, the Princes of which encloſe him on both ſides; and to throw off the Yoak of *Rome*, which holds a Monarchy within the *French* Monarchy; 'tis eaſie to judge, that amongſt the Kings Subjects, the Proteſtants are abſolutely the moſt proper to ſerve him on both theſe occaſions. I know, that amongſt the *Roman* Catholicks, as well Eccleſiaſticks as Seculars, there are excellent Inſtruments to ſerve the King in both theſe Intereſts. But there is need of great caution to well aſſure him, by reaſon of the multitude of Jeſuits Scholars, with whom theſe Fathers have induſtriouſly fill'd all Profeſſions of the State and Church; and it is for no other end that they

they have ſo many Colledges. They who have been too good Schollars of theſe Maſters, are contrary to both theſe Intereſts, being ſo great Catholicks, that they Eſpouſe the Intereſt of the Catholick King, to advance that of His Holineſs. But to find amongſt the Proteſtants truſty Inſtruments for both theſe accounts, he need not try them; they are fitted and form'd, by their Education, for theſe two Uſes, ſo neceſſary to *France*.

The Marqueſs aſſures His Majeſty, with good reaſon, of the friendſhip of the Proteſtant Princes of *Germany*, which they would never teſtifie ſo freely, as in ſerving him to ruine the Power of the Pope, who favours that of the Houſe of *Auſtria*. For thereby they would kill two birds with one ſtone. Not to mention our other Neighbours, who have broken with *Rome*, and being diſquieted by its ſecret practiſes, will be ready to contribute to its deſtruction.

Who ſhall well conſider the Scheme of the Affairs of *Chriſtendom*, ſhall judge, that all things invite His Majeſty to ſhut out the Juriſdiction of *Rome* beyond the Mountains; Right, Honour, Profit, Liberty, Facility, his Duty to his Crown, to his Subjects, and to his Royal Poſterity; and that many Aids ſmile upon Him, both within, and out of His Kingdom, for ſo fair and ſo juſt an Enterpriſe.

This

This is the warm desire of the honest *French*-men. And none there are who better deserve that Title, then they, who, with the most indignation, resent that their Kings should kiss the feet of that Prelate, who ought of Right to kiss their feet, for having receiv'd his Principalities from Kings of *France*; and who in recompence of their good Deeds, have plotted, and plot continually their ruine.

When the King shall have deliver'd Himself, and his people, from this strange Yoak, he will find the enmity amongst his Subjects, for matter of Religion, greatly diminisht; and the way open to a re-union. And were the difficulties about the Doctrine overcome, the Protestants would not stick much at the Discipline.

God, who is the Father of Kings, and the King of Glory, protect and strengthen our Great King, to accomplish the Designs that turn to the general good of His Church, to the greatness, and to the respect of His Sacred Person, and to the Peace and Prosperity of His State.

FINIS.

The Politicks of *France.*



Sr Rod